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Abstract 
Ad hoc wireless networking is a new approach to wireless communication with potential applications in 
very unpredictable and dynamic environments. In contrast to wired and cellular networks, an ad hoc 
wireless network does not depend on any established infrastructure or centralised administration such as a 
base station. It is an autonomous system of wireless mobile nodes that move freely and randomly, 
organising themselves arbitrarily. Therefore, its network topology is dynamic in nature and may change 
rapidly and unpredictably. Hence, the intercommunications among nodes will change continuously. Such 
networks have no infrastructure for achieving end-to-end routing of packets. The nodes communicate 
with each other without the intervention of a centralized administration; thus each acts both as a router 
and as a host.  
The security of ad hoc wireless networks is becoming an increasingly complex issue. Many applications 
today, especially military and emergency ones, are based upon ad hoc wireless networks, where security 
requirements are harder to enforce than in traditional networks. Securing routing creates particular 
difficulties, since these networks have neither centrally administrated secure routers nor strict policies of 
use. The network topology is rapidly changing due to nodes in the networks being highly mobile, thus 
creating the presence or absence of links. Therefore, routing is especially difficult to accomplish securely, 
robustly and efficiently at the same time. Security requirements such as authentication, non-repudiation, 
data integrity and confidentiality, which would otherwise be provided by a central server, must be enabled 
and provided by all nodes.  
The contributions of this research are threefold. First, it offers a new routing approach to ad hoc wireless 
network protocols: the Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol (EHARP), which is an 
enhancement of HARP based on an on-demand routing scheme. We have added important features to 
overcome its disadvantages and improve its performance, providing the stability and availability required 
to guarantee the selection of the best path. Each node in the network is able to classify its neighbouring 
nodes according to their heading directions into four different zone-direction groups. The zone direction 
is reduced until the node can select the strongest and most stable link and so increase availability in the 
network. Each node in the network has a counter for the stability of link (SL) to its neighbouring nodes, 
which indicates which nodes are active in the network, improving the performance of the network and 
increasing the likelihood of selecting the optimal path. EHARP is based on the time and 
acknowledgement message in order to guarantee the selection of the path and link stability.  
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The second contribution is to present a new Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
(SEHARP) for ad hoc networks based on the integration of security mechanisms that could be applied to 
the EHARP routing protocol. It proposes a novel secure routing protocol to improve the security level in 
ad hoc networks, based on key management and a secure node-to-node path, which protects data to 
satisfy our security requirements: the detection of malicious nodes, authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality, availability, data integrity and a guarantee of secure correct route discovery. SEHARP 
works as a group and has three stages:  
- Distribution of keys and certificate stage.  
- Secure path stage.  
- Secure routing protocol stage.  
Thirdly, we present a new approach to security of access in hostile environments based on the history and 
relationships among the nodes and on digital operation certificates. We also propose an access activity 
diagram which explains the steps taken by a node. Security depends on access to the history of each unit, 
which is used to calculate the cooperative values of each node in the environment. The calculated 
cooperative values are then used by the relationship estimator to determine the status of the nodes. Each 
node should be capable of making its own security decisions based on cooperation with other peer nodes.  
The EHARP and SEHARP protocols are both evaluated using the NS-2 network simulator. The NS-2-
based evaluation tests the two proposed protocols in real network environments and measures their 
communication costs using other evaluation metrics such as the data packet delivery ratio, the efficiency 
of data packet delivery, the average end-to-end-delay of data packets and overheads. The results of the 
evaluation study shows and prove that EHARP is a protocol that provides a high level of availability, 
scalability, flexibility and efficiently for Ad hoc Wireless Network. Also the evaluation study shows and 
proves that SEHARP is fully security protocol that provides a high level of secure, available, scalable, 
flexible and efficient for Ad hoc Wireless Network. 
 
 
 
  
 Acknowledgments 
V 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I am thankful to Almighty ALLAH for all his bounties and blessings, for giving me 
the ability to complete this research, without which none of my work would have been done.  
Studying at University of De Montfort and particularly at the STRL was the most rewarding experience I 
have ever had. For me, this is certainly related to the high standard of the facilities offered to students, the 
friendly atmosphere among the research students, and above all the excellence of supervision. For this 
reason I would like to express my deepest appreciation and lasting gratitude to Professor Hussein Zedan 
head of the STRL, for his guidance, ideas, invaluable directions and support throughout my research 
study. Without his contributions, this research would not have been possible. I am deeply indebted to him 
for his insights and suggestions to the research topic and for invaluable supervision at various stages of 
my work. He has helped me in many ways and has developed my academic thinking, problem solving 
which will be very helpful in my future work and research. I feel extremely lucky to have had as my 
supervisor one who is always dedicated to the success of his students. 
My thanks and appreciation also go to to my supervisor, Dr. Francois Siewe, for his valuable comments, 
constructive criticism, academic support, insightful comments, guidance and suggestions, without which 
this thesis could not have been produced in the present form. 
I would also like to express my thanks to my family especially my parents, and my brothers and sister 
who have always supported me during my studies and provided advice and encouragement throughout my 
research. I would also like to thank my wife and my daughters for being there for me and supporting me 
in my decisions; they truly share in this achievement. Thank you for your patience, love and dedication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgments 
VI 
 
 
I would also like to express my great thanks to Dr Mohammad Taye and Dr Ali Al Bayatti for their 
assistance and support during the whole duration of my research. 
 
Last but not least, my thanks go to all my friends and the staff of the STRL research group, especially Mrs 
Lindys, Mrs Lynn, Abddullah Bajahzar, Mohammed Al-Sammarraie, Nasser Alwan, Ali Al-Qhatani and 
Khalid Al-Drawiesh for their help. Being with them made working in the lab very enjoyable. 
  
 PUBLICATINS 
VII 
 
 
  PUBLICATIONS  
1- Al-Otaibi  S, Siewe F, “Architecture of EHARP Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks”, 
IEEE International conference on intelligent network and collaborative system (INCoS 2009).  
2- Al-Otaibi  S, Siewe F, “Secure Routing Protocol Base on Secure Path in Ad hoc Wireless Networks”, 
IEEE International Forum on Computer Science-Technology and Applications (IFCSTA 2009).  
3- Al-Otaibi  S, Siewe F, “Security of access in hostile environments based on the history of nodes in ad 
hoc networks”, IEEE the First Asian Himalayas International Conference on Internet (AH-ICI2009).  
4- Al-Otaibi  S, Siewe F, “Architecture of Stability Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks”, 
IEEE International Forum on Computer Science-Technology and Applications (IFCSTA 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table of Contents 
IX 
  
Table of Contents 
DECLARATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I 
DEDICATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- II 
ABSTRACT --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- III 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ V 
PUBLICATIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IX 
LIST OF FIGURES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IX 
LIST OF TABLES --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X 
CHAPTER 1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
INTRODUCTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
1.3.1 Enhanced Heading Direction Angle Routing Protocol ----------------------------------------------------- 3 
1.3.2 Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol -------------------------------------------- 4 
1.3.3 Secure Ad hoc Environment -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
1.3.4 Evaluation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
1.4 THESIS ORGANISATION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
CHAPTER 2 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
STATE OF THE ART OF AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
2.2 AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
2.2.1 Characteristics of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks ---------------------------------------------------------------10 
2.2.2 Applications of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks ------------------------------------------------------------------10 
2.2.3 Challenges to Ad Hoc Wireless Networks --------------------------------------------------------------------11 
2.3 NETWORK SECURITY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 
2.3.1 Security Requirements --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 
2.3.2 Security Attacks -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14 
2.3.3 Cryptography --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 
2.3.3.1 Symmetric Key Algorithms -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
2.3.3.2 Asymmetric / Public Key Encryption ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
2.3.3.3 Digital Signatures ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
2.3.3.4 Digital Certificates ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 20 
2.3.3.5 Public Key Infrastructure ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
2.4 SECURITY IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------24 
2.4.1 Security Challenges ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24 
2.4.2 Key Management --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------25 
2.4.2.1 Trusted Third Party ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
2.4.2.2 Cluster-based Approach to Ad Hoc Wireless Networks -------------------------------------------------------- 27 
 Table of Contents 
X 
  
2.5 AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORK LAYERS---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------28 
2. 6 SUMMARY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30 
CHAPTER 3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND SECURE ROUTING IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
3.2 CHALLENGES IN ROUTING ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
3.3 REQUIREMENTS OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS FOR AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS ------------------------------------------32 
3.4 CLASSIFICATIONS OF CURRENT ROUTING PROTOCOLS ---------------------------------------------------------------------33 
3.4.1 Proactive Routing Protocols -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------34 
3.4.1.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
3.4.1.2 Wireless Routing Protocol -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
3.4.1.3 Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 
3.4.2 Reactive Routing Protocols --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------38 
3.4.2.1 Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 
3.4.2.2 Heading-directional Angle Routing Protocol --------------------------------------------------------------------- 40 
3.4.2.3 Dynamic Source Routing Protocol ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41 
3.4.2.4 Associatively-Based Routing Protocol ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 42 
3.4.2.5 Signal Stability-Based Adaptive Routing Protocol --------------------------------------------------------------- 43 
3.4.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------44 
3.4.3.1 Zone Routing Protocol ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 
3.5 SECURE ROUTING IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS-----------------------------------------------------------------------46 
3.5.1 Proactive RSA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------47 
3.5.2 Security-aware Ad Hoc Routing Protocol --------------------------------------------------------------------48 
3.5.3 Authenticated Routing Protocol --------------------------------------------------------------------------------48 
3.5.4 Secure AODV --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------49 
3.5.5 Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector ----------------------------------------------------------------------49 
3.6 SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------51 
CHAPTER 4 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------52 
ENHANCED HEADING DIRECTION ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND MODELLING ------------------------------------52 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------52 
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------53 
4.2.1 Simulation Environment ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------54 
4.3 THE KEY IDEA OF HEADING DIRECTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------57 
4.4 PRINCIPLE OF THE HEADING DIRECTION MECHANISM ---------------------------------------------------------------------59 
4.4.1 Categorization of Nodes ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------59 
4.4.2 Downstream Node Selection ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------60 
4.4.3 Route Records List--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------61 
4.5 MODELLING AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------62 
4.5.1 Definition of the System Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------62 
4.5.2 Assumptions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------62 
4.5.3 Models ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------63 
4.5.3.1 Network Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63 
4.5.3.2 Mobility Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
4.5.3.3 Traffic Model ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65 
4.5.4 General System Model --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------65 
4.5.4.1 Message Formats ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65 
4.5.4.1.1 Route Records List Format ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 
 Table of Contents 
XI 
  
4.5.4.1.2 Route Request Message Format------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 66 
4.5.4.1.3 Route Reply Message Format --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67 
4.5.4.1.4 Route Error Message Format ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68 
4.5.4.1.5 Hello Message Format ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 69 
4.5.4.2 Table Formats ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 70 
4.5.4.2.1 Routing Table Format ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70 
4.5.4.2.2 Neighbours Table Format -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71 
4.5.5 Route Establishment ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------72 
4.5.5.1 Route Requests ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73 
4.5.5.2 Route Replies ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 74 
4.5.5.3 Route Errors -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74 
4.6 SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------76 
CHAPTER 5 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------77 
ALGORITHM AND ANALYSING OF EHARP PROTOCOL ------------------------------------------------------------------77 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------77 
5.2 ENHANCED HEADING-DIRECTION ANGLE ROUTING PROTOCOL------------------------------------------------------------78 
5.2.1 EHARP Architecture ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------78 
5.2.2 Route Discovery -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------79 
5.2.2.1 Route Discovery at the Source Node ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79 
5.2.2.2 Route Discovery at Intermediate/ Relay Nodes ----------------------------------------------------------------- 82 
5.2.2.3 Route Reply --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85 
5.2.3 Route Maintenance and Local Repair-------------------------------------------------------------------------86 
5.3 FORMAL MODEL OF EHARP -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------86 
5.3.1 Overview of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) -------------------------------------------------------------------87 
5.3.1.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87 
5.3.1.2 Derived Constructs ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 88 
5.3.2   A formal Specification of EHARP Protocol ------------------------------------------------------------------88 
5.3.2.1 Static Variables ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 
5.3.2.2 State Variables ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 
5.3.2.3 Memory Variables ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 89 
5.3.2.4 Formal Specification of EHARP -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90 
5.3.2.4.1 System Initialisation: Init () ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 91 
5.3.2.4.2 System Termination: Terminate () --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 91 
5.3.2.4.3 Specification of Nodes: Node (i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 91 
5.3.2.4.4 The source node performs: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 92 
5.3.2.4.5 The intermediate nodes perform:---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 93 
5.4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY AND MODEL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------94 
5.4.1 Simulation Environment ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------94 
5.4.2 Parameter Values --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------95 
5.5 SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------97 
CHAPTER 6 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------98 
SECURE ENHANCED HEADING DIRECTION ANGLE ROUTING PROTOCOL (SEHARP) ---------------------------98 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------98 
6.2 OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------99 
6.3 OUR APPROACH ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 100 
6.3.1 Distribution of Keys and Certificate Stage ----------------------------------------------------------------- 101 
6.3.2 Secure (node-to-node) Path Stage --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 102 
6.3.2.1 Source Node -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------102 
6.3.2.2 Intermediate Node ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------103 
 Table of Contents 
XII 
  
6.3.3 Secure Routing Protocol Stage -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104 
6.3.3.1 Hash Function -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------104 
6.3.3.2 Digital Signature --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------105 
6.3.3.3 Time Synchronisation -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------106 
6.3.3.4 Route Discovery Request---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------106 
6.3.3.5 Route Reply --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------107 
6.4 NS-2-BASED EVALUATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108 
6.4.1 Simulation Environment ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108 
6.5 SUMMARY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 109 
CHAPTER 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 110 
SECURITY OF ACCESS IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS BASED ON THE HISTORY OF NODES IN AD HOC 
NETWORKS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 110 
7.1 INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 110 
7.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 111 
7.3 SECURE ENVIRONMENTS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 111 
7.3.1 Node classification ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 112 
7.3.2 Node Documentation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 113 
7.4 DIGITAL OPERATION CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK -------------------------------------------------------- 113 
7.4.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificates ---------------------------------------------- 113 
7.4.2 Digital Operation Certificate Distribution ------------------------------------------------------------------ 114 
7.4.3 Revocation of Digital Operation Certificates -------------------------------------------------------------- 114 
7.5 COMPONENTS OF OUR ARCHITECTURE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 115 
7.6 ACTIVITY DIAGRAM --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 
7.7 FORMAL DESCRIPTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 121 
7.7.1 Network model --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 121 
7.7.2 Behaviour model ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122 
7.7.3 Mobility model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123 
7.8 CASE STUDY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 126 
7.8.1 Military environment -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 127 
7.8.2 Definition of components -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 127 
7.8.3 Securing the Military Environment -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 127 
7.8.4 Scenario One ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 128 
7.8.4.1 Authentication and authorisation between elements of an army in the SE military system --------130 
7.8.4.2 Authentication between elements from different armies in the SE military system ------------------132 
7.8.5 Scenario Two ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 134 
7.9 SUMMARY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 139 
CHAPTER 8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 140 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS ----------------------------------------------------------------- 140 
8.1 INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 140 
8.2 RESULTS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EHARP AND HARP -------------------------------------------------------- 140 
8.2.1 Performance Metrics -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 141 
8.2.2.1 Route Discovery Packets (overhead) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------142 
8.2.2.2 Efficiency of Data Packet Delivery ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------145 
8.2.2.3 Average end-to-end Delay -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------147 
8.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR SEHARP AND EHARP------------------------------------------------------ 149 
8.3.1 Efficiency of Data Packet delivery --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 149 
8.3.2 Route Discovery Packets (overhead) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 151 
8.3.3 Average end-to-end Delay ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 154 
 Table of Contents 
XIII 
  
8.4 DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 157 
CHAPTER 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 158 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 158 
9.1 SUMMARY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 158 
9.2 CONTRIBUTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 160 
9.2.1 Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol -------------------------------------------------- 160 
9.2.2 Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol ----------------------------------------- 160 
9.2.3 Secure Ad Hoc Environments ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 161 
9.2.4 Comparative Analysis ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 162 
9.3 FUTURE WORK -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 163 
10. REFERENCES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 165 
 List of Figures 
IX 
  
List of Figures  
Figure 2.1: Ad hoc network showing single-hop and multi-hop operation (arrows) and 
the RF range of nodes (circles) ......................................................................................... 9 
Figure 2.2: Symmetric encryption scheme...................................................................... 18 
Figure 2.3: Asymmetric encryption scheme ................................................................... 19 
Figure 2.4: Digital signature scheme .............................................................................. 20 
Figure 2.5: The information in an X.509 certificate [16] ................................................ 21 
Figure 2.6: The components of PKI [11] ........................................................................ 22 
Figure 2.7: CRL contents [16] ........................................................................................ 24 
Figure 2.8 In-line, on-line and off-line TTPs .................................................................. 27 
Figure 2.9: Communication between nodes A and D [3]................................................ 29 
Figure 4.1: Simulator usage, from the Mobile Hoc survey [88] ..................................... 55 
Figure 4.2: Communication between two nodes in an ad hoc wireless network [93] .... 57 
Figure 4.3: Lifetime of link vs. difference between heading angles of end nodes [84] .. 58 
Figure 4.4: Neighbours categorised within four basic zone ranges ................................ 60 
Figure 4.5: Axis mapping technique; is added and subtracted through 45°[94] .......... 61 
Figure 4.6: Hidden and exposed problems in ad hoc wireless networks ........................ 64 
Figure 5.1: The four basic heading direction ranges and neighbours classified in these 
ranges .............................................................................................................................. 79 
Figure 5.2: Route discovery at a source node S .............................................................. 81 
Figure 5.3: Route discovery at an intermediate node I ................................................... 84 
Figure 5.4: Propagating a route request from source S to destination D......................... 85 
Figure 6.1: User nodes and network backbone nodes in a network .............................. 101 
Figure 6.2: Secure path request and reply between nodes S and D............................... 103 
Figure 6.3: Secure path request and reply between nodes S and I ................................ 103 
Figure 6.4: Secure path request from intermediate node .............................................. 104 
Figure 7.1: Secure environment .................................................................................... 112 
Figure 7.2: Components of our architecture ................................................................. 116 
Figure 7.3: Activity diagram ......................................................................................... 120 
Figure 7.4: Secure environment community [105] ....................................................... 128 
Figure 8.1: Route discovery vs. mobility (elapsed time) .............................................. 143 
Figure 8.2: Route discovery vs. speed .......................................................................... 144 
Figure 8.3: Route discovery vs. network size ............................................................... 144 
Figure 8.4: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. mobility (elapsed time) .................. 146 
Figure 8.5: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. speed .............................................. 146 
Figure 8.6: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. network size ................................... 147 
Figure 8.7: Average end-to-end delay vs. mobility (elapsed time) ............................... 148 
Figure 8.8: Average end-to-end delay vs. speed ........................................................... 148 
Figure 8.9: Average end-to-end delay vs. network size ................................................ 149 
Figure 8.10: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. mobility (pause time) ................... 150 
Figure 8.11: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. speed ............................................ 150 
Figure 8.12: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. network size ................................. 151 
Figure 8.13: Route discovery vs. mobility (elapsed time) ............................................ 152 
Figure 8.14: Route discovery vs. speed ........................................................................ 153 
Figure 8.15: Route discovery vs. network size ............................................................. 154 
Figure 8.16: Average end-to-end delay vs. mobility (pause time) ................................ 155 
Figure 8.17: Average end-to-end delay vs. speed ......................................................... 156 
 List of Figures 
X 
  
Figure 8.18: Average end-to-end delay vs. network size .............................................. 156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 List of Tables 
IX 
  
 
List of Tables 
Table 3-1: Performance comparison between protocols ................................................. 46 
Table 4-1: Wireless LAN Products ................................................................................. 56 
Table 4.2: Route records list format ................................................................................ 66 
Table 4.3: Route Request Message Format .................................................................... 67 
Table 4.4: Route Reply Message Format ........................................................................ 68 
Table 4.5: Route Error Message Format ......................................................................... 69 
Table 4.6: Hello Message Format ................................................................................... 70 
Table 4.7: Routing Table Format .................................................................................... 71 
Table 4.8: Neighbours Table Format .............................................................................. 72 
Table 5.1: Parameters of simulation used with NS-2 and random waypoint .................. 96 
Table 6.1: Secure suffix message format ...................................................................... 106 
Table 7.1: Node classification by analyser unit ............................................................ 118 
Table 8.1: Percentage of increase against period of simulation .................................... 142 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of Abbreviations 
X 
 
List of Abbreviations  
ABR  Associativity-Based Routing   
AODV  Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector  
ARAN  Authenticated Routing Ad hoc Network  
AU  Analyser Unit  
CA  Certification Authority  
CEDAR  Core Extraction Distributed Ad hoc Routing  
CGSR  Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing   
CH  Cluster Head  
CRL  Certificate Revocation List  
DB  Database  
DoS   Denial of Service  
DRP  Dynamic Routing Protocol  
DSR  Dynamic Source Routing  
DSDV  Destination Sequence Distance Vector   
DT  Distance Table  
EHARP  Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
ERDP  Efficiency Ratio of Data Packet delivery  
ETI  Exchange Time Interval  
FP  Forwarding Protocol  
HARP  Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol  
HDA  Heading-Direction Angle  
HNATN  History of Natural Node  
HNEGN  History of Negative Node  
HPOSN  History of Positive Node  
IARP  IntrAzone Routing Protocol  
ITL  Interval Temporal Logic  
 List of Abbreviations 
XI 
 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
KDC  Key Distribution Centre  
KTC  Key Translation Centre  
LAN  Local Area Network  
LCT  Link-Cost Table  
MAC  Medium Access Control  
MANET  Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
MN  Mobile Node  
MR  Magneto Resistive 
MRL  Message Retransmission List  
NATN  Natural Node  
NBBN  Network BackBone Node  
NDB  Node DataBase  
NEGN  Negative Node  
OCU  Operation Certificate Unit  
OSP  Operation Service Provider  
OTcl  Object Tool command language  
PAN  Personal Area Network  
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure  
POSN  Positive Node  
RA  Registration Authority  
RBAC  Role-Based Access Control  
RERR  Route Error Packet 
RF  Radio Frequency  
RREP  Route Reply Packet 
RREQ  Route Request Packet  
RRL  Route Records List  
RSPR  Reply Secure Path Request  
 List of Abbreviations 
XII 
 
RT  Routing Table  
RTI  Regular Time Interval 
RU  Registration Unit  
RWP  Random WayPoint  
SAR  Security-aware Ad hoc Routing  
SE  Secure Environment 
SEAD  Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector  
SEHARP  Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
SL  Stability of Link  
SNR  Signal-to-Noise Ratio  
SP  Secure Path  
SPR  Secure Path Request  
SPS  Secure Path Stage  
SSA  Signal Stability-Based Adaptive  
SST  Signal Stability Table  
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol  
TEK  Transmission Encryption Key  
TTL  Time to Live  
TTP  Trusted Third Party  
UN  User Node  
WAN  Wide Area Network  
WANET  Wireless Ad Hoc Network of Networks  
WLAN  Wireless Local Area Network  
WRP  Wireless Routing Protocol  
ZRP          Zone Routing Protocol   
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Objectives: to present 
 Research Motivation 
 Problem Formulation  
 Contributions 
 Thesis Organisation 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Future wireless technology aims at providing an umbrella of services to its users. The emerging 
ad hoc wireless network technology seeks to provide users with ―anytime‖ and ―anywhere‖ 
services in a potentially large infrastructure-less wireless network, based on collaboration 
between individual nodes. In recent years, ad hoc wireless networks have found applications in 
military, commercial and educational environments such as emergency rescue missions, smart 
homes and instantaneous classroom/ conference room applications.  
The unique characteristics of ad hoc wireless networks—namely a shared broadcast radio 
channel, an insecure operational environment, the lack of a central authority and of association, 
limited resource availability and physical vulnerability—make such networks highly vulnerable 
to security attacks compared to wired or infrastructure-based wireless networks.  
Consequently, security is one of the main challenges facing ad hoc wireless networks, a 
challenge which requires deep investigation and proper solutions. The establishment of a secure 
routing protocol is the most crucial and challenging of all security issues in these networks, 
because of the absence of dedicated routers.  
The task of ensuring secure communication in ad hoc wireless networks is difficult as a result of 
many factors, including the mobility of the nodes, limited processing power and limited 
availability of resources such as battery power and bandwidth. Security mechanisms must deal 
with all security requirements, such as authentication, data confidentiality, data integrity and 
non-repudiation, in order to make routing protocols secure. 
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1.2 Problem Formulation 
As previously stated, many applications have recently become dependent on ad hoc wireless 
networks, and security is an extremely serious issue in any network [1]. The dynamic nature of 
ad hoc wireless networks makes it extremely challenging to ensure secure transmission in these 
networks [2], which rely on the collaboration of all their nodes for their creation and efficient 
operation. While maintaining suitable routing information in a distributed way is a challenging 
issue in such networks, it is even more challenging to secure the protocols used for routing [5]. 
At the network level, an ad hoc system fundamentally requires the routing protocols to be 
secured, as they enable a communication path to be established. On the other hand, the design of 
most such routing protocols [3, 4] gives no consideration to security, working instead with an 
implicit assumption of trust among the nodes. This provides the opportunity for malicious 
attackers, who may intend to bring down the network.  
There are many different types of existing routing protocols that have been extensively 
researched with a view to finding solutions to such security vulnerabilities, but none has so far 
satisfied all of the requirements of a secure routing protocol [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], which are: 
 Confidentiality: ensures that only authorised users can access or reveal transmitted 
messages; 
 Integrity: ensures that unauthorised persons cannot modify, alter or retransmit data to 
another destination; 
 Authentication: ensures that both end-peers are who they claim to be;  
 Non-repudiation: ensures that the sender/receiver cannot deny sending/receiving;   
 Guarantee of correct route discovery: ensures that the protocol is able to find the route 
and the correctness of the selected route; 
 Stability against attacks: ensures that the protocol is able to revert to its normal operation 
after any attack; 
 Availability: ensures that resources and entities are available when needed by the 
intended parties. 
None of the existing approaches are designed to ensure a completely secure node-to-node path 
[6, 7, 8, 9, and 10]. Each of them detects or prevents one or more specific types of attack [8, 9] 
and most are extensions of existing protocols without solving the problems of these protocols, 
such as overheads, broken links and effective mobility [10, 11]. Furthermore, most of these 
approaches do not mention whether the environment is secure or not, while others assume a 
secure environment [10-20]. The problems of existing approaches can be summarised thus: 
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 They fail to satisfy all security requirements; 
 Each secure routing protocol is designed to detect or prevent specific attacks; 
 They are extensions of existing routing protocols without resolving their problems; 
 They fail to deal with hostile environments; 
 They have insecure node-to-node paths. 
The aim of the research reported in this thesis is to find solutions to the above problems by:  
 Designing new adaptive approaches to the routing of ad hoc wireless networks based on 
exist protocols; 
 Analysing the existing protocols and resolving their problems; 
 Designing a new secure routing protocol based on secure node-to-node paths. 
 Ensuring that the secure routing protocol satisfies all requirements via applied security 
mechanisms; 
 Using digital operation certificates of nodes to design a secure environment; 
 Using the history of nodes to access a hostile environment; and 
 Satisfying all requirements to protect against or prevent almost all attacks.  
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis makes the following main original contributions. 
1.3.1 Enhanced Heading Direction Angle Routing Protocol 
This thesis proposes a new routing protocol: the Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing 
Protocol (EHARP), an enhancement of HARP [16] based on an on-demand routing scheme. We 
have added important features to overcome its disadvantages and improve its performance, 
providing the stability and availability required to guarantee the selection of the best path.  
Each node in the network is able to classify its neighbouring nodes according to their heading 
directions into four different zone-direction groups (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4). The zone direction is 
reduced until the node can select the strongest and most stable link and so increase availability 
in the network. 
Each node in the network has a counter for the stability of link (SL) to its neighbouring nodes. 
This SL counter will indicate which nodes are active in the network and this will improve the 
performance of the network and increase the likelihood of selecting the best or optimal path. 
The SL counter will have an initial value of zero and this will be increased by 1 after every 
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successful sending or receiving and reduced by 1 after every failure in sending or receiving. The 
strongest SL is based on the greatest value registered by the counter. 
This protocol is based on the time and the sending of an acknowledgement message in order to 
guarantee the selection of the path and link stability. The source node should resend the route 
request (RREQ) whenever a certain time elapses before receiving the error message, in order to 
make use of the full lifetime of the links. Each node will send an acknowledgement message 
after receiving an RREQ and forwarding it, so the acknowledgement message should provide 
information on which nodes have problems or have been unable to forward the RREQ. This 
protocol is evaluated using the Network Simulator NS-2. NS-2 evaluation tests the proposed 
algorithm in real network environment and measures communication costs using other 
evaluation metrics such as the data packet delivery ratio, the efficiency of data packet delivery, 
the average end-to-end-delay of data packets, and overheads 
The EHARP system is described in our recent publication [101,104].  
1.3.2 Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
This thesis also proposes a novel secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks: the Secure 
Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol (SEHARP). This is designed to improve 
the security level in ad hoc networks, based on key management and a secure node-to-node 
path, which protects data to satisfy our security requirements: the detection of malicious nodes, 
authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, availability, data integrity and a guarantee of 
secure correct route discovery. 
SEHARP works as a group and has three stages: 
 Distribution of keys and certificate stage 
Our scheme adopts the Network Backbone Node (NBBN) system because of its superiority in 
distributing keys and achieving integrity and non-repudiation. The system uses private and 
public keys. The former are used to sign the certificate and the public keys of all the nodes, 
while the latter are used to renew certificates that are issued by another NBBN.  
 Secure path stage  
Our approach is to use a public-key algorithm to establish secure paths between nodes. The 
secure path (SP) stage requires all nodes to have an SP with other nodes before sending any 
route request packet. Any node receiving an RREQ from the source node or another node 
without an SP should discard the request. 
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 Secure routing protocol stage 
At this stage our approach uses a hybrid security mechanism to introduce SEHARP so that it 
satisfies the main security requirements and guarantees the discovery of a correct and secure 
route. The security mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash function, digital signature 
and time synchronisation. This protocol is evaluated using the Network Simulator NS-2. NS-2 
evaluation tests the proposed algorithm in real network environment and measures 
communication costs using other evaluation metrics such as success ratio, delay, average 
number of retries and overhead. The results of the evaluation study shows and prove that 
SEHARP is fully security protocol that provides a high level of secure, available, scalable, 
flexible and efficient for Ad hoc Wireless Network. 
An account of SEHARP has also been published [102]. 
1.3.3 Secure Ad hoc Environment 
This thesis proposes a new approach to ensuring security of access in hostile environments 
based on the history of the nodes of a network. It also proposes an access activity diagram and 
code which explain the steps taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure 
environment.  
In a secure environment (SE), some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other infrastructure-
based wireless networks such as wireless local area networks (WLANs) and cellular systems; 
therefore, each of the ad hoc nodes will belong to an operation service provider (OSP). Other 
non-managed ad hoc network nodes, which are not involved in any other wireless networks, 
will be managed by the OSP, in order for those undefined nodes or networks to be able to access 
our SE. 
Security depends on access to the history of each unit, which is used to calculate the cooperative 
values of each node in the environment. The calculated cooperative values are then used by the 
relationship estimator to determine the status of the nodes. 
Every node should be capable of making its own security decisions based on cooperation with 
other peer nodes. The solution is a combination of the history of the nodes and operation 
certificates. Each node in an SE is uniquely identified by its public key.  
This solution protects against various vulnerability issues affecting wireless links such as active 
and passive attacks. It is scalable and does not depend on other nodes. The dynamic nature of 
networks and their membership does not affect the solution, since each node makes access 
decisions on its own and the use of cooperative algorithms is avoided. This mechanism is 
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evaluated in a real time military environment, where different scenarios and policies have been 
introduced; this evaluation shows availability, flexibility, and high level of security detection 
against malicious and untrustworthy nodes in the SE system 
An account of the secure ad hoc environment appears in our publication [103]. 
1.3.4 Evaluation 
The EHARP and SEHARP protocols are both evaluated using the NS-2 network simulator, 
which tests the two proposed protocols in simulation and measures their communication costs 
using other evaluation metrics such as the data packet delivery ratio, the efficiency of data 
packet delivery, the average end-to-end-delay of data packets and overheads.  
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
The thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 considers the characteristics and challenges of ad hoc wireless networks. It 
investigates the security issues in such networks by discussing routing protocols and their 
requirements, security requirements, security attacks and security challenges. It then provides 
the cryptographic background needed to illustrate previous work and the mechanism proposed 
in this study. It reviews related work in key management. 
Chapter 3 investigates the routing protocols and the security issues in such networks. It reviews 
related work in the area of securing ad hoc wireless networks, including key management and 
secure routing protocols. 
Chapter 4 discusses related work, research methodology, the key idea of heading direction and 
the mechanism of heading direction routing. Moreover, this chapter establishes models for ad 
hoc networks and starts by defining the system model and listing the assumptions adopted in 
developing the new algorithm. It also describes the general network model, the mobility model, 
the traffic model and the general system model, including the format of all types of messages 
used in these algorithms. 
Chapter 5 presents the design and development of the proposed EHARP protocol, including the 
evaluation and simulation results based on the NS-2 network simulator package. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the proposed SEHARP secure protocol and proposes a novel security 
mechanism for secure routing in ad hoc wireless networks. It also presents the validation and 
simulation results based on the NS-2 package.   
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Chapter 7 proposes a novel approach to security of access in hostile environments based on the 
history of its nodes. It also proposes an access activity diagram and code which explain the steps 
taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure environment. This is a 
comprehensive solution, providing a high level of security for ad hoc environments that is 
available, scalable, flexible, reliable and efficient. 
Chapter 8 presents a comparative analysis of EHARP by comparing its performance with the 
HARP and AODV routing protocols. This is appropriate, because AODV is a conventional on-
demand routing protocol, as are the proposed routing protocols. There is also a comparative 
analysis of EHARP and SEHARP; the same evaluation metrics used for evaluating these two 
protocols are used to compare them. 
Chapter 9 summarises the work presented in this thesis, highlights the significance of the 
contributions made and discusses directions for future work.  
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Chapter 2 
State of the Art of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks  
Objectives: to present  
  Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
  Network Security 
  Security in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
  Ad hoc Wireless Network Layers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The history of wireless networks began in the 1970s, since when interest in them has continued 
to grow. This was particularly true during the 1990s, when there was a rapid increasing the 
number of Internet users, an exponential growth in the use of personal computers and great 
technological advances in the applications of mobile computers, which required much more 
exchange of information between users. Recently, this exchange of information between users 
has become difficult, as users have needed to undertake administrative tasks and establish bi-
directional links with other users. This motivates the building of temporary wireless networks, 
with no infrastructure in communication and no administrative involvement. Such an ad hoc 
wireless network is an interconnection between two or more mobile computers. In the new 
technological environment, these networks are needed for computers to relay information (in 
packets) to other computers in order for the information to reach the intended destination, 
generally because of the limited range of each computer host‘s wireless transmission [21-30]. 
This chapter enumerates the components of ad hoc wireless networks and provides a detailed 
account of many different aspects of these networks. 
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2.2 Ad Hoc Wireless Networks  
Several studies report recent developments in ad hoc wireless networks (31, 33, 34, 36,40 and 
45). An ad hoc wireless network is an autonomous system of mobile routers (and associated 
hosts), which may work in isolation or within a fixed network, connected by wireless links. The 
nodes are free to move randomly and organise arbitrarily. Thus, the network‘s wireless topology 
may change quickly with time as the nodes move around. 
The distinguishing feature of such networks is that the only direct communication is that 
between neighbouring nodes. Thus, wireless connectivity between remote nodes is based on the 
multi-hop principle. The nodes are energetically and randomly located in such a manner that the 
interconnections between them are capable of changing on a continual basis. In the absence of 
fixed infrastructure, all nodes act as routers, forming two categories of network, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1:  
 Single-hop ad hoc networks 
 Multi-hop ad hoc networks 
 
Figure 2.1: Ad hoc network showing single-hop and multi-hop operation (arrows) and the RF range of nodes 
(circles) 
The term ‗single-hop networks‘ means that all nodes in the network operate in a single radio 
frequency (RF) range, such as Bluetooth, as can be seen in ad hoc personal area networks 
(PANs). Multi-hop networks are used when nodes have dissimilar RF ranges and connect to one 
another only through their neighbours (intermediate nodes), which act as routers. This can be 
seen in ad hoc local area networks (LANs) and ad hoc wide area networks (WANs). For 
example, Figure 2.1 shows the connection between nodes A and B as a single hop; at the same 
time it shows how node A can be connected to node D by a multi-hop network. 
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2.2.1 Characteristics of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
Some important characteristics of ad hoc wireless networks are listed below [41, 42]. 
No fixed topology: The network topology in an ad hoc wireless network is very energetic 
because of the mobility of the nodes; thus, they can fluctuate in and out of range of each other. 
Limited energy: In general, mobile devices are powered by batteries, which have limited 
lifetime. Hence, the nodes in such networks must be optimized in terms of energy consumption. 
Infrastructure-less: The functioning of an ad hoc wireless network relies on collaboration 
between independent and peer-to-peer nodes that wish to communicate with each other without 
the requirement of a backbone or centralized control. Thus, all devices (nodes) have the same 
range of functions within the network; there are no fixed functions such as servers, routers or 
gateways. 
Limited physical security: The lack of infrastructure and the freedom of mobility make ad hoc 
wireless networks more susceptible to physical layer attacks, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, 
jamming and denial of service (DoS). However, their decentralised nature makes them robust 
against single failure points.  
Low and variable bandwidth: Wireless links which connect the nodes of ad hoc networks 
have significantly lower capacity than their wired counterparts, while the effects of interference, 
noise, fading and multiple access conditions are more visible, causing the available bandwidth 
to vary with the surrounding conditions, so that it is often much less than the theoretical 
maximum. 
2.2.2 Applications of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
Ad hoc wireless networks are very flexible and suitable for several types of application, as they 
allow the establishment of temporary communication without any pre-installed infrastructure. 
The following is a list of their major applications [46]: 
 Personal communications (e.g. mobile phones, laptops and earphones) 
 Cooperative environments (e.g. taxi cab networks, meeting rooms and sports stadiums) 
 Emergency operations (e.g. policing, fire-fighting and earthquake rescue) 
 Military environments (e.g. battlefields) 
 Conferencing (e.g. using mobile nodes) 
 Enterprise networks 
 Vehicle networks 
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 Home networks 
 Wireless sensor network 
 Healthcare (e.g. hospitals) 
 Wireless mesh networks (very reliable networks that are closely related to ad hoc 
wireless networks, but where the nodes are generally not mobile) 
 Collaborative and distributed computing. 
2.2.3 Challenges to Ad Hoc Wireless Networks  
The major challenges to ad hoc wireless networks concern their design and operation, and result 
mainly from the lack of a centralized entity and infrastructural elements such as base stations, 
communication towers and access points. The possibility exists of fast node movement and all 
communications are conducted through a wireless medium. These unique characteristics present 
nontrivial challenges for ad hoc wireless networks, some of which are listed here [47-50]. 
Media access: The distributed arbitration for the shared channel in transmission of packets is 
the main responsibility of medium access control (MAC). The major issue to be considered in 
designing MAC protocols for ad hoc wireless networks is the host mobility [51]. 
Spectrum allocation and purchase: The responsibility for spectrum allocation and purchase 
regulations regarding the use of radio spectrums currently lies with the United States 
government and the Federal Communications Commission. An ad hoc wireless network must 
operate over some form of allowed or specified spectrum range in order to avoid interference 
[53]. 
Routing: The primary responsibility of routing is the exchange of route information, the best 
path to a destination being based on criteria such as hop length, minimum power required and 
the lifetime of the wireless link. One of the key mobility issues is that links make and break 
randomly and often. When fixed routers and stable links are absent between an existing distance 
vector and link state-based routing protocols, then they are unable to keep up with such frequent 
link changes [54]. 
Multicasting: Multicasting plays a vital role in applications of ad hoc wireless networks and 
military communications. Routers are static, so most of the multicast protocols rely on them. 
When a multicast tree is formed, its nodes will not move. However, this is not so for ad hoc 
wireless networks [55].  
Energy Management: Energy management is defined as the process of managing the sources 
and consumers of energy in nodes or in the network as a whole, in order to enhance the lifetime 
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of the network. Most existing network protocols assume the presence of static hosts and routers, 
powered by mains electricity, thus not considering power consumption to be an issue. Most 
nodes in ad hoc wireless networks act as hosts and routers, and they are operated by batteries 
with a limited lifetime. Thus, energy management and consumption can be quite significant for 
them [56]. 
Transmission Control Performance: The main objectives of transport layer protocols include 
setting up and maintaining end-to-end connections, reliable end-to-end delivery of data packets, 
flow control and congestion control. The main issue for a transmission control protocol (TCP) is 
that it will not be capable of distinguishing between the presence of mobility and network 
congestion. Hence, some improvements are needed to ensure that the TCP performs correctly 
without affecting the end-to-end communication throughput [57]. 
Self-organization: Two very important properties that an ad hoc wireless network should 
exhibit are organization and maintenance of the network itself. Major self-organization activities 
that the network is required to perform are neighbour discovery and topology organization; it 
should be able to perform self-organization quickly and efficiently in such a way that it is 
transparent to the user and the application [51]. 
Security: The security of communications in an ad hoc wireless network is very important, 
especially in military applications. The unique characteristics of these networks which pose a 
new set of substantial challenges in security design are open point-to-point network architecture, 
a shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints and dynamic network topology. These 
clearly establish the need for security solutions that achieve both broad protection and desirable 
network performance [58, 59]. 
Although ad hoc wireless networks are enjoying a growth in the number of applications and 
possess many attractive features, they do face several challenges, as identified above. The next 
section considers one of the most important of these: security. 
2.3 Network Security  
In fact, network security is very important and measures are needed to provide an acceptable 
level of protection for hardware, software and data during transmission. When discussing 
security in general, three aspects need to be considered: requirements, attacks and mechanisms. 
Security requirements include essential functionality to provide a secure networking 
environment, while security attacks are the methods that may be used to compromise these 
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requirements and security mechanisms are the responses to the risk of attack which provide and 
enforce these security requirements. 
2.3.1 Security Requirements  
Major requirements in securing networks, and more specifically ad hoc wireless networks, are 
authentication, authorisation, privacy/ confidentiality, availability, data integrity and non-
repudiation [60, 61, 62, 63]. 
Authentication is fundamental to verify the identity of an ad hoc wireless network node and its 
fitness to access the network. In other words, nodes that wish to communicate with each other 
ensure that they are communicating with the right party and that it is genuine, not impersonating 
another node. One should ensure that the data and its origin are not modified or falsified. This is 
a vital requirement and the most difficult to satisfy. Without accurate authentication, no other 
requirements can be correctly implemented. Authentication is divided into two categories: user 
authentication and data authentication. Techniques to authenticate users securely are 
fundamental to the operation of ad hoc wireless networks. 
Authorisation: The nodes in ad hoc wireless networks need to have accurate authorisation to 
access shared resources, so that only authorized nodes are allowed to enter the network, store 
information and use it on their devices. In addition, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
provides different priority levels to guarantee that only the appropriate network elements and 
individuals can gain access to and perform operations on stored information, resources, services 
and applications. 
Privacy and confidentiality: The information that is sent between nodes and is resident on 
their devices or related to their locations needs to be protected, to ensure that any data sent 
between nodes is the same and has not been modified, deleted or retransmitted to another node 
or entity. Privacy implies protecting the identity and/ or the location of the node, and ensures 
that data cannot be followed or understood in order to disclose the entity‘s location. Protecting 
privacy requires more than data encryption; sophisticated techniques are used to hide the 
identity or the location of the node. Confidentiality includes the secrecy of the data being 
exchanged and can be achieved via many encryption techniques with proper key management 
systems. 
Availability: The availability of a network means that its essential services and applications 
should be accessible at any time when they are needed, even in the event of a breach in security. 
This availability ensures the survivability of the network despite malicious attacks (DoS) or the 
misbehaviour of particular nodes. This requirement is especially important in ad hoc wireless 
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networks, where security breaches, attacks and malfunctions are more frequent and less likely to 
be detectable. 
Data integrity: The information that is exchanged between nodes needs to be protected in order 
to ensure that messages are not modified, deleted or retransmitted to another node or entity. This 
is most fundamental in situations such as banking, military operations and equipment control 
(e.g. trains or planes), where such modification or deletion could cause damage. 
Non-repudiation ensures that any ad hoc wireless network node which sends/receives a message 
or initiates a ‗not deny‘ on receiving/sending packets to/from other nodes is genuine; thus, the 
other party can believe any information received and prove who the sender is. This is very 
important in situations of dispute or disagreement over events and can be achieved using 
techniques such as digital signatures that relate the data or action to a signer. 
2.3.2 Security Attacks  
Attacks on ad hoc wireless networks can be divided into two types, namely, passive and active 
[65-70]. A passive attack does not disrupt the operation of the network; it occurs when an 
attacker tries to eavesdrop on the data or the network traffic without altering it. This can violate 
the requirement of confidentiality if an adversary is also able to interpret the data gathered 
through snooping. This type of attack is less harmful than an active one, but is much harder to 
detect, because the attacker does not interfere with the operation. One way of overcoming such 
problems is to use powerful encryption mechanisms to encrypt data being transmitted, thus 
making it impossible for eavesdroppers to obtain any useful information from the data 
overheard.  
An active attack, by contrast, is one where the attacker actively seeks to modify, abstract, alter 
or destroy the data being exchanged, thus disrupting the normal functioning of the network. 
Active attacks can be classified further into two categories, external and internal. External 
attacks come from nodes that do not belong to the network; they can be prevented by using 
standard security mechanisms such as encryption techniques and firewalls. Internal attacks, 
however, are from compromised nodes that belong to the network. Since the adversaries are 
already part of the network as authorised nodes, such attacks are more severe and difficult to 
detect than external ones. 
Within these categories, there are many different types of attack that ad hoc wireless networks 
may face [2, 10, 12], some of which are described here. 
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Wormhole attack: The attacker receives packets at one point in the network, tunnels them to 
another point in the network, and then replays them into the network from that point. A 
wormhole creates a communication link between a source and a destination point that could not 
exist with the use of normal communication channels. 
Black hole attack: A malicious node tries to advertise that it has good paths, such as the 
shortest or most stable path, to the destination node during the path-finding process, or in the 
route update messages. Having gained access to the required communications, the malicious 
node conducts bad behaviour, performing a DoS attack or alternatively using its place on the 
route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack. 
Byzantine attack: A compromised intermediate node works by itself, or a set of compromised 
intermediate nodes works in collusion and carries out attacks at the creation of routing loops, 
forwarding packets on non-optimal paths and selectively dropping packets. 
Information disclosure: An attacker may disclose private or important information to 
unauthorised nodes in the network. Such information may include information regarding the 
location of nodes or the structure of the network. It gathers the node location information, such 
as a route table, then plans to attack in further scenarios. 
Resource consumption attack: A malicious node can attempt to consume or waste resources of 
other nodes in the network. The resources targeted are bandwidth, computational power and 
battery life, which are limited in ad hoc wireless networks. Such attacks may be in the form of 
requesting excessive route discovery, very frequent generation of beacon packets, or forwarding 
unnecessary packets to an unsuspecting node. 
Routing attack: Several types of attack can be mounted on the routing protocol; these are 
intended to disrupt the operation of the network, and include: 
 Routing table overflow: An adversary node tries to create routes to non-existent nodes for 
the authorised network nodes in order to cause an overflow of the routing tables, which 
would prevent new legitimate routes from being created in entries corresponding to new 
routes and authorised nodes. 
 Routing table poisoning: The compromised nodes send fabricated routing updates or 
modify genuine route update packets to other nodes. This may result in jamming or even 
parts of the network becoming unreachable. 
 Packet replication: The malicious node replicates stale packets to consume resources, 
such as the bandwidth and battery power, and to cause confusion in the routing process. 
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 Route cache poisoning: Similar to routing table poisoning, an adversary is able to poison 
the route cache to achieve certain objectives. This happens to on-demand routing 
protocols, where each node maintains information regarding routes that have become 
known to the node in the recent past.  
 Rushing attack: An attacker that can propagate an RREQ faster than legitimate nodes will 
increase the probability that routes which include the attacker will be discovered, rather 
than other valid routes. On-demand routing protocols which use duplicate suppression 
during the route discovery process are susceptible to this type of attack. An adversary 
node which receives an RREQ floods the network with copies of it in order for them to 
take positions in the routing tables of other nodes. Nodes that receive the legitimate 
RREQs then assume them to be duplicates and therefore discard them. 
Jamming: An adversary node monitors the wireless medium in order to discover the frequency 
at which the receiver node is receiving signals from the sender. It then transmits signals on that 
frequency so that error-free reception at the receiver is compromised. Two common techniques 
that can be used to overcome jamming are frequency hopping spread spectrum and direct 
sequence spread spectrum. 
Denial of Service: A DoS attack can be initiated from several layers. It is an attempt to make 
resources unavailable to their intended users; the attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users 
accessing services offered by the network [20]. DoS can be carried out in different ways, 
causing the same problems, a classical way being to flood centralised resources (e.g. base 
stations), causing the system to crash or to interrupt its operation. At the network level, the 
routing process can be interrupted through routing control packet modification, selective 
dropping, table overflow or poisoning. In the transport and application layers, SYN flooding, 
session hijacking and malicious programs can cause DoS. These active attacks aim at 
obstructing or limiting access to a certain resource, which could be a specific node or service, or 
the whole network.  
Impersonation: The attacker uses the identity and privileges of another node to gain 
unauthorised access to network resources. The attacker uses network resources that might be 
unavailable to it under normal circumstances, or tries to disturb network functionality by 
injecting erroneous routing information; this type of attack is considered a prerequisite to 
eavesdropping. If the attacker succeeds in gaining access to the encryption key by 
impersonating the original node, it will be able to perform an eavesdropping attack successfully. 
Device Tampering: Unlike nodes in a wired network, ad hoc wireless network nodes are 
usually compact, soft and hand-held in nature, so they can easily be damaged or stolen.  
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2.3.3 Cryptography  
Cryptography [11,13], the art and science of using mathematics to encrypt and decrypt data, is 
one of the most common and reliable means to ensure security and is not specific to ad hoc 
wireless networks, but can be applied to any communication network. It enables sensitive 
information to be stored or transmitted through insecure networks (such as the Internet) so that 
it cannot be read by unauthorised users. Its four main goals are confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. In the parlance of cryptography, plaintext is the original 
information to be sent from one person to another. This plaintext is converted into ciphertext by 
the process of encryption, i.e. encoding a text so that its original meaning is concealed. The 
opposite of encryption is decryption, which is the procedure of obtaining the plaintext from the 
ciphertext.  
  Encryption: E (M) = C 
  Decryption: D (C) = M 
When the key is to be saved and kept secret to ensure the security of the system, it is called a 
secret key, with key management being the secure administration of cryptographic keys. There 
are two types of encryption: symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms. Symmetric key 
algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption, while asymmetric ones use two 
different keys. In the following sections, these two algorithm types will be discussed in addition 
to digital signatures, digital certificates and public key infrastructures. 
2.3.3.1 Symmetric Key Algorithms  
Symmetric key algorithms [11, 13] are based on the existence of one key which is shared 
between the sender and receiver, having been exchanged previously. This shared key is used for 
both encryption and decryption. Symmetric encryption is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The sender 
encrypts the plaintext message m using the shared key and converts it into ciphertext. In order to 
recover m, the receiver decrypts the received ciphertext using the same key. The most 
challenging task in symmetric encryption is to distribute and manage this shared secret key; 
when the same key is used among more than two parties, a breach of security at any one point 
makes the whole system susceptible. DES is an example of symmetric encryption. 
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Figure 2.2: Symmetric encryption scheme 
2.3.3.2 Asymmetric / Public Key Encryption 
Public (or more commonly asymmetric) key cryptography [11, 14], which resolves these 
problems of key management in symmetric key algorithms, was introduced by Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin Hellman in 1976 [15]. Unlike symmetric encryption, it uses two separate keys for 
encryption and decryption; hence keys come in pairs, which are called private-public key pairs. 
A message is encrypted with the public key, which is known by all the entities, but it can only 
be decrypted using the private key, which is kept secret from other entities. The public key 
encryption scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.3. First, before sending an encrypted message to the 
receiver, the sender must obtain the receiver‘s public key and ensure that it is authenticated. 
This public key (PKsender) is used to encrypt the message and convert it into ciphertext. The 
receiver can then decrypt it using the corresponding private key (SKsender), which is known only 
by him. 
Public key cryptography has two main branches, public key encryption and digital signatures. 
The former is used to achieve and ensure confidentiality, while digital signatures are used to 
achieve and ensure authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. 
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Figure 2.3: Asymmetric encryption scheme 
2.3.3.3 Digital Signatures 
Public key cryptography provides a method for employing digital signatures, which is a main 
benefit of its use. A digital signature is a data structure that enables the receiver of information 
to verify its authenticity and origin and to ensure that it is intact. Therefore, digital signatures 
provide authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation, meaning proof of who the sender is. 
The difference between a digital signature and a handwritten signature is that the latter is easier 
to counterfeit, while a digital signature is almost impossible to imitate. It also provides proof of 
the contents of the information as well as the identity of the signer. The strength of the digital 
signature lies with two fundamental processes which are the public-private key pair for 
asymmetric encryption and another process termed hash function, used in both creating and 
verifying the signature.  
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Figure 2.4: Digital signature scheme 
To create a digital signature, such as that in Figure 2.4, when the sender wants to send a 
message to a receiver, it must be signed by him/her. The sender first computes the message 
authentication code or hash of the original message, then appends the code to the message. 
Next, he/she encrypts the hash code using SKsender and sends it with the message to the receiver. 
The receiver computes the hash code by applying the same hash algorithm on the received 
message and compares it with the hash code which is the result of decrypting the signature 
using PKsender. If the hash codes match, then the message must have originated from the sender 
and not been modified during transmission. 
2.3.3.4 Digital Certificates 
Public key cryptography is extremely useful, but when the presence of active attackers in an 
insecure environment is established a problem arises. In freely exchanging keys via public 
servers in particular, a potential threat is man-in-the-middle attacks [12], where attackers are 
able to read, insert and modify at will the messages between two parties without either party 
knowing that the link between them has been compromised. To do so, they must be able to 
detect and intercept messages passing between the two parties. 
Consider the following: if a sender wants to send a message to the receiver, she/he will ask for 
the receiver‘s public key. If during transmission the attacker is able to intercept the message and 
obtain the public key of the sender, then a man-in-the-middle attack is initiated.  The attacker 
will impersonate the receiver and send his key to the sender as a substitute for the receiver‘s 
public key. The sender will receive this key, will believe that it really belongs to the receiver 
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and will use it to encrypt the message before sending it to the receiver. The encrypted message 
is then intercepted again by the attacker, who this time decrypts the message using his private 
key, keeps a copy of it and re-encrypts it using the correct public key of the receiver. When this 
message is received by the receiver, he will believe that it was sent by the sender. 
Digital certificates are used to prevent the type of attack described above. Essentially, a digital 
certificate is an electronic document which incorporates a digital signature to bind together a 
public key and an identity. In other words, it contains information that is issued by some trusted 
party verifying that a public key belongs to an individual, so it incorporates the name of a 
person or organization. 
Figure 2.5 shows the information in an X.509 certificate, which is a widely used standard for 
defining digital certificates following the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme. It is 
published as an ITU recommendation (ITU-T X.509) [16]. The serial number is used uniquely 
to identify the certificate and the issuer name is that of the trusted party who has issued the 
certificate. 
 
Figure 2.5: The information in an X.509 certificate [16] 
2.3.3.5 Public Key Infrastructure  
The main purpose of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to issue the public key and 
certificates with security and integrity. It provides certificate management facilities, the ability 
to issue, update, revoke, store, retrieve and trust certificates. A PKI includes certification 
authority, digital certificates and mathematically related key pairs, each comprising a private 
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and public key. The major feature of a PKI is the introduction of what is known as a 
certification authority (CA). A CA is an example of a trusted third party (TTP) which needs to 
be distributed to each of the users. The CA is the central component of a PKI and is responsible 
for issuing and revoking certificates, while the registration authority (RA) is responsible for 
establishing the identity of the subject of the certificate and the mapping between the subject 
and its public key. The RA is generally considered an optional part of the PKI. If it does not 
exist, the registration service will be responsible for the CA. A CA could be a person, company 
department or other body that has been authorised to issue certificates for its users.  
 
Figure 2.6: The components of PKI [11] 
The mechanism used to manage certificates is shown in Figure 2.6, which illustrates the 
relationships among the components of the PKI. The following main services should be 
provided by these PKI components: 
 Registration 
 Initialization 
 Certification 
 Key update 
 Revocation 
 Distribution of certificates and revocation notices. 
The PKI provides other services [11, 16], which may include key recovery, generation and 
cross-certification, secure time stamping and non-repudiation. The following paragraphs briefly 
explain each of the basic services mentioned above. 
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Registration: The registration service establishes the mapping between an end entity and its 
public key to verify the identity of the user. This is the role of the RA, which should hold 
information concerning the user, such as his/her name, email address and organisation. The RA 
will then verify the correctness of this information by requiring that the end entity proves that it 
possesses the corresponding private key. Once the RA has proved the identity of the user, a 
certification request will be sent to the CA. 
Initialisation: Before an end entity can use the services provided by the PKI, it has to be 
initialised with the start, using the digital certificate as the public key of the CA. The most 
important item required is the CA‘s certificate, containing the public key, which is needed to 
verify any certificate signed by this CA. The initialization also provides the generation of the 
public/private key pair of the end entities. 
Certification: Upon receiving a certification request from the RA, the CA will generate a 
digital certificate and then sign it with its private key. This process includes all the information 
that needs to be supplied from the certificate and will be provided by the RA. The structure of 
the certificate is based on recommendation X.509 – standardised certificates.  
Key update: The user‘s keys and the corresponding digital certificate are typically valid for a 
limited time only, ranging from days to years, depending on the application. Therefore, this 
service provides the transition for updating these keys on a regular basis.  
Revocation: The responsibility of the CA is to maintain the status of the certificates it has 
issued. Each digital certificate has an issue and expiry date; in the case of expiration, the time 
the certificates are revoked is determined by the CA. In addition, the CA needs to revoke a 
certificate when it becomes invalid because of a compromise of the private key, or when any 
information in the certificate becomes invalid. 
Distribution of certificates and revocation notices: When it has generated a digital certificate, 
the CA distributes this to its owner, who also should send it to other users in the system. In the 
case of infrastructure-based networks, digital certificates can be distributed by making them 
available on publicly accessible servers, or by providing them to the certificate owner directly. 
In addition, the PKI must provide a mechanism that may be applied when any certificate has 
been revoked. A common method used by the CA is to publish a certificate revocation list 
(CRL), which lists all the digital certificates that have been revoked. Therefore, users can use 
the CRL to check whether or not a certain certificate has been revoked. Figure 2.7 shows an 
example of the contents of a CRL. 
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Figure 2.7: CRL contents [16] 
The time between compromising a certificate and the notification of its revocation is a problem 
for the CRL, and this time could be vital. This problem can be solved by the use of online 
revocation notification mechanisms, which allow certificate users to query in real time the 
validity of any certificate. 
2.4 Security in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
Because of their unique characteristics, such as a lack of central administration and authority, ad 
hoc wireless networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired networks or 
infrastructure-based wireless ones. This section identifies issues and challenges in security 
conditions for ad hoc wireless networks.  
2.4.1 Security Challenges  
Designing an infallible security protocol for ad hoc wireless networks is a very challenging task, 
mainly because of certain unique characteristics of such networks, namely, a shared broadcast 
radio channel, an insecure operating environment and the lack of a central authority. The 
following paragraphs discuss how each of these characteristics causes security difficulties [70-
80]. 
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Shared radio channel 
In traditional wired networks, a transmission line is provided to each end user, whereas in ad 
hoc wireless networks, a radio channel is used for communication and is public in nature, being 
shared by all nodes in the network.  Data transmitted by any one node is received by all nodes 
within its direct communication range, allowing a malicious node to obtain easy access to it. 
Insecure operational environment 
The environment in which ad hoc wireless networks operate may not always be secure. One 
important example is on a battlefield, where its nodes can move freely in and out of enemy 
territory and are thus highly susceptible to security attacks. 
Lack of central authority 
In wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless networks, a central authority can manage, 
control and monitor all traffic on the network through certain central points, such as routers and 
access points, making it possible to implement security mechanisms at such points. These 
cannot be applied in ad hoc wireless networks, by contrast, since they have no such central 
points. 
Lack of association 
Ad hoc wireless networks are dynamic in nature, any node being free to move in or out of the 
network at any time. If there is no suitable authentication mechanism being used for uniting 
nodes within a network, then an interloper would be able to join it easily and carry out attacks.  
Limited resource availability  
Resources such as bandwidth, battery power and computational power are limited in ad hoc 
wireless networks, making it difficult to implement complex cryptography-based security 
mechanisms.  
Physical vulnerability  
The nodes in ad hoc wireless networks are usually compact and hand-held, so they can become 
damaged and are also susceptible to theft and loss. 
2.4.2 Key Management 
Ad hoc wireless networks face certain particular challenges in key management owing to their 
reduced infrastructure. There are three types of infrastructure [17] which are absent from ad hoc 
wireless networks: a routing infrastructure in the shape of dedicated routers and stable links 
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which ensure communication with all nodes; a server infrastructure, such as a domain name 
service, directory services and TTP services; and the organisational and administrative support 
of certifying authorities. 
The concept of keys is central to cryptography, as noted in section 2.2.3. Two important related 
functions are the generation and distribution of keys, the responsibility of a party trusted by all 
entities. The majority of the mechanisms used to provide security services require the use of 
some type of cryptographic keys that need to be shared between the communicating parties. In 
this subsection we discuss the commonly used key management services. 
2.4.2.1 Trusted Third Party   
A TTP is an entity trusted by all users in the network; it is often responsible for providing key 
management services. A TTP may come in many different forms, such as a key distribution 
centre (KDC), a key translation centre (KTC) or a certification authority. The KDC and KTC 
are symmetric key management systems, while the CA is a public key management system. 
KDCs and KTCs are used to simplify key management; as an alternative to each node having to 
share a secret key with every other node, they need to share only one with the TTP. This reduces 
the number of keys that need to be managed from n(n-1)/2 to n, where n is the total number of 
users.   
On the other hand, CAs are used for public key cryptography in the Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI), which means that any two nodes wishing to connect must exchange their public keys in 
an authenticated manner, requiring the initial distribution of n(n-1) public keys. However, by 
having a TTP to issue certificates, only the public key of the TTP needs to be distributed to each 
of the nodes. The CA is a component that is responsible for issuing and revoking certificates, 
and they can be categorised by the nature of their participation. 
Figure 2.8 illustrates the different categories of TTP: in-line, on-line and off-line. An in-line 
TTP can be involved actively between the connection path of the two nodes, while an on-line 
TTP participates actively but only for management functions; the actual connection between the 
nodes is direct. An off-line TTP‘s connection with the nodes is created before setting up a 
connection link. Through the actual protocol run, the off-line TTP is not active; indeed, it does 
not even need to be connected to the network. 
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Figure 2.8: In-line, on-line and off-line TTPs 
2.4.2.2 Cluster-based Approach to Ad Hoc Wireless Networks  
One interesting approach is to divide the network into a number of clusters, each with a 
different membership. Each cluster selects a cluster head (CH) node with a role different from 
that of its other members [18]. The CH establishes a backbone and acts as key manager, while 
the transmission encryption key (TEK) is updated periodically. Before operation, updating the 
TEK entails a re-clustering and the selection of a new CH. One of the advantages of rotating the 
CH role is that doing so avoids exhaustion of the nodes acting as CHs, and accounts for 
mobility. Nodes that were once neighbours when the cluster was shaped may have moved out of 
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the neighbourhood. This approach has a number of susceptibilities that may cause the system to 
fail, however; for example, when the CH is malicious it will make part of the cluster fail, which 
is a serious disadvantage of this approach. 
2.5 Ad Hoc Wireless Network Layers 
The Open Systems Interconnection reference model proposed by the International Organisation 
for Standardisation consists of seven layers [3], namely, the physical, data link, network, 
transport, session, presentation and application layers (Figure 2.9).  Each layer is assigned a 
unique set of functions and responsibilities.  
The first and lowest layer is the physical layer, which may need to adapt to rapid changes in the 
characteristics and mobility of wireless links. It is responsible for the transmission of the bit 
stream over the physical medium and the time duration of each bit. It handles the mechanical 
and electrical specifications of the network hardware. The mechanical specifications refer to the 
physical specifications of the devices, such as connectors and cables used for interconnection.  
The second layer is the data link layer, whose main objective is to coordinate the access of 
multiple nodes in a shared (wireless) medium, to ensure error-free transmission of data across a 
physical link. It receives data from a higher layer, divides it into several frames/packets, then 
transmits the frames. The data link layer is also responsible for reducing collisions arising as a 
result of simultaneous transmissions by multiple nodes, maximizing throughput, allowing fair 
access and the use of directional antennas.  
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Figure 2.9: Communication between nodes A and D [3] 
 
The third layer is the network layer, which is responsible for routing data packets from the 
source node to the destination node to which the data packets belong. Thus, the network layer 
has to acquire and distribute information used to set up routes between sources and destinations 
in a way that maintains efficiency when links change frequently. The network layer is also 
responsible for node addressing; a packet may have to cross several networks in order to reach 
its destination. 
Next is the transport layer, providing a network of higher layers which is independently 
interfaced to the lower layers. The main functions of the transport layer protocol include 
handling delay and packet loss statistics that are very different from wired networks, 
segmentation and reassembly of packets, assigning and maintaining end-to-end connections, 
reliable end-to-end delivery of data packets and end-to-end error recovery. A key responsibility 
of this  layer is congestion control in the local network.  
Finally, the application layer enables users to access the network. Its main roles are to handle 
regular disconnection and reconnection with peer applications and to support data transmission 
and services, such as electronic mail, remote file access and file transfer between users. 
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2. 6 Summary 
Ad hoc Wireless Networks have various defining characteristics that differentiate them from 
other wired and wireless networks such as infrastructureless, dynamic topology, constrained 
resources, limited device and physical security, and short range connectivity. These 
characteristics present nontrivial challenges for Ad hoc Wireless Networks such as security, 
scalability, and QoS. 
The unique characteristics of Ad hoc Wireless Networks, namely a shared broadcast radio 
channel, an insecure operational environment, lack of central authority, lack of association, 
limited resource availability and physical vulnerability, make such networks highly vulnerable 
to security attacks compared to wired networks or infrastructure-based wireless networks 
This chapter has investigated the major issues and applications of Mobile Ad hoc Network of 
Networks were described. Moreover, this chapter discusses all the general information of ad hoc 
networks and tackles security challenges, security requirements and security attacks. The 
applications of ad hoc wireless networks include military applications, collaborative and 
distributed computing and emergency operations. Each of the challenges, security requirements 
and security attacks are discussed in detail.  
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Chapter 3 
Critical Review of Routing Protocols and Secure Routing in 
Ad hoc Wireless Networks 
Objectives: to present  
  Challenges in routing 
  Requirements of routing protocols for ad hoc wireless networks 
  Classifications of current routing protocols 
  Secure routing in ad hoc wireless networks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The routing protocol has two main functions: the first is to find a feasible data packet path from 
a source node to a destination node; the second is to identify and exchange the routing 
information as a routing table, required for establishing the routing path, discovering path 
breaks, re-establishing or repairing broken paths and reducing  bandwidth utilization. The nodes 
in an ad hoc network function as routers which discover and maintain routes to other nodes in 
the network. This absence of dedicated routers makes the provision of security a challenging 
task in ad hoc wireless networks, where the task of ensuring secure communication is also made 
difficult by factors including the mobility of nodes, limited processing power and limited 
availability of resources such as battery power and bandwidth.  
3.2 Challenges in Routing 
The main challenges facing the routing protocol designed for ad hoc wireless networks are as 
follows [1, 2]: 
Mobility of nodes 
The mobility associated with nodes, which is considered a primary characteristic of ad hoc 
networks, raises many issues such as packet collision, regular path breaks, stale routing 
information and difficulty in resource reservation. Their resolution requires a good routing 
protocol which is able to interpret them efficiently.   
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 Other resource constraints 
Constraints on resources such as battery power and buffer storage can limit the capability of the 
routing protocol.  
Error-prone channel state 
The bit error rate is very high in a wireless channel compared with its wired counterparts and 
the design of the routing protocol should take this into account. Taking into consideration the 
state of the wireless link, the signal to noise ratio and path loss for routing could improve the 
efficiency of the routing protocol. 
Location-dependent contention 
As the number of nodes existing in a given geographical zone varies, so does the load on the 
wireless channel. Thus, if the number of nodes increases, this raises the contention for the 
channel. A good routing protocol can avoid such difficulties by means of inbuilt mechanisms 
for distributing the load uniformly across the network. 
Bandwidth constraint 
Since bandwidth for transmission is limited in ad hoc wireless networks, the bandwidth 
available per wireless link is based on the traffic each link carry and the number of nodes. Thus, 
a good routing protocol should keep bandwidth usage to a minimum. 
3.3 Requirements of Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
Routing protocols designed for traditional wired networks cannot be used in ad hoc wireless 
networks because of the unique characteristics of these networks; they require specialised 
routing protocols that address the challenges listed above. Such a protocol should therefore have 
the following features [2, 10]: 
Distributed operation 
The protocol should be fully distributed, as centralized routing involves high control in order to 
have improved reliability. Since all nodes are mobile, it is unacceptable to have a centralized 
routing protocol. Each node should make routing decisions using information gathered from 
other mutual nodes. 
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Dynamic 
As an alternative to assuming that traffic is uniformly distributed within the network and 
maintaining routing between all nodes at all times, the algorithm must be adaptive to regular 
topology changes caused by the mobility of the nodes. 
Loop-free  
A good routing protocol should be loop-free in order to avoid wasting bandwidth and so 
improve overall performance. 
Unidirectional link support 
Unidirectional links can and do occur in wireless networks because the radio environment and 
utilization of these links improve the routing protocol performance. However, in situations 
where a pair of unidirectional links (in opposite directions) form the only bi-directional link 
between two areas of an ad hoc network, the ability to make good use of them is extremely 
valuable. 
Security 
Without some form of network-layer or link-layer security, an ad hoc routing protocol is 
susceptible to many forms of attack, such as impersonation. It may be relatively simple to spy 
on network traffic, replay transmissions and redirect routing messages within a wireless network 
without proper security requirements. Hence there is a need for preventive security measures. 
Encryption and authentication may help to solve security issues and to prevent such attacks. 
Power conservation 
Nodes in ad hoc wireless networks depend on the very limited supply of power via batteries, so 
the routing protocol should optimise the use of this scarce resource.  
Quality of service support 
The routing protocol should be implemented to provide a certain level of quality of service and 
should also be in real time to support current traffic. 
3.4 Classifications of Current Routing Protocols  
Routing protocols proposed for mobile ad hoc wireless networks can be classified by the 
routing information update mechanism into three categories: proactive, on-demand and hybrid. 
An alternative classification is based on temporal information for routing, which, given the 
lifetime of the wireless links and of the paths selected, assumes significance. Routing protocols 
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can also be classified according to whether the address topology is flat or hierarchical, or on the 
basis of the utilization of specific resources. These categories are not mutually exclusive, since 
some protocols could be classified into more than one group. The research in this report is 
related to routing protocols based on the routing information update mechanism. Thus, only this 
category will be discussed and the following subsections will examine in turn the three major 
groups listed above: proactive (periodic), reactive (on-demand) and hybrid [2, 24, 25, and 26]. 
3.4.1 Proactive Routing Protocols  
Proactive routing protocols are also called table-driven, since every node maintains one or more 
tables to store the network topology and routing information. This information is updated 
frequently by periodically exchanging the routing information, which is generally flooded 
throughout the whole network. Proactive routing protocols have many differences between 
them, dependent on the method of discovering and updating the routing information and on the 
types of information maintained in the routing tables.  
These protocols are extensions of the traditional wired network. Examples of such protocols are 
the Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) routing protocol [27] and the Wireless 
Routing Protocol (WRP) [28, 29]. Other routing protocols, based on link state algorithms, have 
also been proposed; examples are the Optimised Link State Routing [30], Fisheye State Routing 
[31, 32], Source Tree Adaptive Routing [33] and Global State Routing protocols [34].  
Three examples of protocols that belong to the table-driven category are detailed below. These 
are DSDV, WRP and Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR). 
3.4.1.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector 
The DSDV algorithm [27], an enhanced version of the Distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm [35, 
36], uses incremented sequence numbering for each destination in order to guarantee faster 
convergence and resolves the loop and count-to-infinity problems. One of the first protocols to 
have been proposed as being appropriate for ad hoc wireless networks, it uses the distance 
vector‘s shortest path routing algorithm to select the path to a destination. As it is a table-driven 
routing protocol, the routing table is maintained at each node that contains the shortest distance 
and at the first node on the shortest path to every other node on the network. The routing tables 
are exchanged between neighbours at regular intervals in order to keep the routing information 
and network topology up to date. In addition, the node forwards the table when it observes a 
significant change in the local topology since the last full table updating. Therefore, any 
required route to all destinations is continuously available at every node at all times.  
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This exchange in routing tables between nodes in the network introduces a large amount of 
control overhead to the network; thus, two methods are used to update the routing tables in 
order to reduce the control overhead broadcast through the network. The first type of update is a 
‗full dump‘ update packet, which is used when significant changes are observed in the local 
topology or when more data packets need to be carried in an incremental update. Hence, this 
type of update carries all the current routing information. Alternatively, when there are no major 
changes in the local topology, then the incremental update packet is utilised, comprising only 
the information altered since the latest full dump occurred. Incremental update messages are 
propagated more frequently than full dumps. 
A new sequence number is used by the destination node to initiate a table update. It is always 
greater than the previous one for a particular destination node. Based on the sequence number of 
the table update, the node may either forward or reject the table. The node has two choices for 
updating its routing tables if it receives an updated table: either update its routing tables based 
on the newly received information, or keep it for some time in order to select the best path from 
the multiple update table received from different neighbouring nodes.  
Route maintenance of a broken link in DSDV is handled by the end node of the broken link and 
initiates a table update message. This message assigns the broken link‘s weight to infinity and a 
sequence number greater than the stored sequence number for that destination. Each node that 
receives an updated table on an infinite weighting entry quickly disseminates it to its neighbours 
in order to propagate the broken link information to all nodes in a network. In this way, when a 
single link break occurs, it leads to the propagation of table update information to the whole 
network. 
DSDV algorithms have a number of advantages and disadvantages. First, the routes are 
available of times to all destinations in the network. Maintaining an up-to-date view of the 
network topology at all the nodes is propagated throughout the network. On the other hand, the 
periodic update messages still introduce large amounts of overhead to the network (the interval 
time is in seconds). The number of route to discover  packets (overhead) is the complexity of 
the number of nodes in the entire network equivalent to the order O(N
2
), where N is the number 
of nodes. The scalability of the network is affected by this complexity. As a result, the protocol 
is effective for forming small ad hoc wireless networks, but it is not scalable for large ones, 
because a large portion of the network bandwidth is utilised in the updating procedures, making 
topologies highly dynamic. A large amount of time is spent generating and updating the routing 
tables under the DSDV protocol. Another disadvantage is the instability of the network for a 
period of time before the update packets reach all the nodes in the network, causing a high 
mobility rate among them. 
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3.4.1.2 Wireless Routing Protocol  
WRP [28] uses the predecessor information (readily available routing information) to ensure 
fast convergence and freedom from the count-to-infinity problem. Under WRP, every node has 
a readily available route to every destination node in the network in order to maintain an up-to-
date view of the entire network and routing information among all nodes. Each node maintains 
four routing tables: a distance table (DT), a routing table (RT), a link-cost table (LCT) and a 
message retransmission list (MRL). The DT contains the network view of the neighbours of a 
node, where each element comprises the distance and the penultimate node reported by a 
neighbour for a specific destination. It shows the shortest distance, the penultimate node and the 
next node to reach destinations, as well as a flag indicating the status of the route. The LCT 
gives the number of hops to reach a destination, by relaying messages through each link and 
recording the number of update intervals between two successive periodic passes, while the last 
successful update was received from that link. Each element of the MRL is used for an update 
message that is to be retransmitted and a counter is maintained for each element. When sent, the 
update message contains the sequence number of the update message, a retransmission counter 
and a list of updates. If the retransmission counter reaches zero after entries in the update 
message for which no acknowledgment has been received, a retransmission of the update 
message will be deleted.  
Update messages are used between neighbouring nodes in the network to bring their routing 
tables up to date. These contain a list of updates: the destination, the distance to the destination, 
the predecessor of the destination and a list of responses indicating which mobiles should 
acknowledge the update. Each node in the network can modify the elements of its DT regarding 
the distance to the corresponding nodes, which can be checked for new possible paths through 
other nodes when receiving the update message.  
The main advantage of WRP lies in the fact, explained above, that it is free from temporary 
routing loop and count-to-infinity problems, which it is able to avoid when performing 
consistency checks on the predecessor information reported by all the neighbours of a node in 
the network. This terminates looping situations and involves fewer table updates if a link failure 
event occurs. Nevertheless, the complexity of maintaining multiple routing tables demands a 
larger memory and greater processing power from nodes in the ad hoc wireless network. The 
increased amount of control overhead involved in updating table entries at high mobility in 
WRP is substantial; hence it is not suitable for higher dynamics or for very large ad hoc wireless 
networks. 
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3.4.1.3 Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing  
CGSR [37] uses a hierarchical network topology, unlike other table-driven routing approaches, 
which are based on flat topologies. CGSR organises nodes into clusters and in each cluster a 
special node named a cluster head is selected dynamically by employing an algorithm called 
Least Cluster Change [38], which deals with two cases where there is a change of CH. The first 
is when two cluster heads come into one cluster. When it is using lowest-id or highest-
connectivity, this will lead to a situation where one node has to relinquish its CH status. The 
second case obtains when one of the nodes moves free and out of range of all CHs. All member 
nodes of a cluster within communication range can be reached by the cluster head in a single 
hop. The CH keeps all necessary information on other nodes, such as the track of the nodes in 
its own cluster and of the other cluster-heads. 
CGSR assumes the CH and all communications passing through it. Communication between 
two CHs takes place through common member nodes or gateway nodes which are in the 
communication range of both and are members of both clusters. Thus, the transmission of data 
packets takes place through cluster heads and gateways in a path such as: 
CHGatewayCHGatewayetc. 
In CGSR, every member node maintains two tables: the first is a routing table listing the 
destination CH for every node in the network and the second is a distance vector routing table of 
next-hop nodes for reaching each destination cluster. The CH node transmits the cluster member 
table periodically and every node updates its own table when it receives this table update. When 
a node has a data packet to be routed, it identifies the nearest cluster head to the destination 
from the cluster member table and the routing table. It can then find from its routing table the 
next hop node to reach the selected CH and transmit the packet to that node.  
An advantage is that the routing table is reduced in size by grouping nodes into clusters and 
keeping one entry for each destination cluster. CGSR also allows better bandwidth utilization 
and it is easy to implement priority scheduling schemes with symbol scheduling and gateway 
code scheduling, because CGSR is based on clustering nodes and routing transmissions through 
the cluster heads.  
The main disadvantages of this protocol are an increase in the path length and instability in the 
network at high mobility when the rate of change of cluster heads is high, which degrades the 
performance of the protocol. In addition, complexity and overhead are caused by the selection 
of the CHs, causing difficulty in continually maintaining the cluster structure in a mobile 
environment. Another matter of concern is the power consumption at the CH nodes, because the 
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battery-draining rate at these nodes is faster than at normal nodes. This may lead to frequent 
changes in the CH and single point failures at the CHs and gateways, which may cause multiple 
path breaks. All these will reduce the scalability of the network, which is particularly 
undesirable. 
3.4.2 Reactive Routing Protocols  
Several protocols of the reactive routing type have been proposed, the most typical being 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [38, 39], Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [40], 
the Temporarily Ordered Routing Algorithm [41, 42], Associativity-Based Routing (ABR) [43, 
44] and Signal Stability-based Adaptive (SSA) routing [45]. 
These protocols, also called on-demand routing protocols, are proposed for mobile ad hoc 
wireless networks only. The primary characteristic of such networks is their dynamic topology; 
hence, because they follow the topology changes, regular updates of global topology 
information are required at every node. Sometimes the received routing information updates 
may expire before being needed; this further complicates matters and the routing of obsolete 
information wastes bandwidth. Johnson proposed the concept of reactive or on-demand routing 
to reduce unnecessary updates and thus the amount of bandwidth consumed. 
By establishing the necessary routes when required (on demand), using a route discovery 
process and source, on-demand routing protocols, unlike proactive ones, do not maintain the 
network topology information and route to each destination of the network. Generally, when a 
route is needed by a source S, a route request packet propagates it into the network to construct 
a route to the required destination, D. When D receives the RREQ, it then sends a route reply 
(RREP) packet back to S. When the route request has travelled through bi-directional links, 
RREP is sent using link reversal, or by piggybacking the route in an RREP packet through 
flooding. In on-demand routing protocols, we have the main functions of the routing algorithm, 
which are route discovery and route maintenance. 
Reactive protocols can be categorised according to the route information carried in data packets 
as either source routing (full path) or hop-by-hop (point-to-point) routing protocols [46]. In 
source routing protocols such as DSR [39] and ABR [43, 44], all data packets carry the 
complete route address from source to destination nodes. Therefore, the data packet in the 
header of this packet is forwarded towards the destination along the path mentioned previously. 
An advantage of using this type of protocol is that there is no need to maintain neighbour 
connectivity at intermediate nodes, nor therefore to maintain routing information for each active 
route for forwarding the packet towards the destination at intermediate nodes.  
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In point-to-point routing approaches, as with the AODV protocol [40], the data packet needs to 
specify only the destination and next hop addresses. The intermediate nodes are used for 
forwarding the packet towards the destination along the path to maintain routing tables. Using 
routing tables at every node in the network provides an advantage to hop-by-hop routing, in that 
dynamically updating the network topology ensures that nodes receive recent topology 
information and can forward data packets over current best routes. 
3.4.2.1 Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
The AODV routing protocol [40] is a reactive routing algorithm of the hop-by-hop type. In 
order to ensure that routes are kept up to date and that the most recent routing information is 
used, AODV uses sequence numbers. It differs from other generic on-demand systems in that it 
finds a route to the intended destination by using the sequence numbers of both source and 
destination, thus streaming the RREQ packet across the network. The RREQ packet contains the 
IP address of the source node and the destination node, the broadcast ID, the current sequence 
number of the source and the time to live (TTL) field.  
The validity of a route in AODV at an intermediate node is determined by the corresponding 
destination sequence number, which is greater than or equal to that contained in the RREQ. If 
the node wants to send, RREP places the recent sequence number of the destination as its 
distance in hops to the destination into the RREP, then an RREP is returned to the source along 
the path followed by the RREQ. Once the source node receives the RREP packet, it will start 
transmitting data packets to the destination. If the route discovery timer expires and the source 
node has not received an RREP, it rebroadcasts the RREQ. This process is repeated up to some 
predetermined maximum number of times, after which if no route is discovered (no RREP is 
received) the session is aborted.  
In case a link break occurs while the route is active and any neighbour of the upstream node 
uses that link, the node generates and propagates a route error (RERR) packet to the source node 
to inform it about the link break. The RERR packet contains all IP addresses of unreachable 
nodes, because the link break and their sequence numbers are incremented by one. The node 
then broadcasts the packet and deletes these routes from its route table. After receiving the 
RERR, if the source node still needs the route, it reinitiates the path-finding process.  
The main advantage of the AODV protocol is the familiarity of the on-demand approach to 
establishing routes. On the other hand, a serious drawback is that multiple RREP packets in 
response to a single RREQ packet can add to the already heavy control overhead occurring as a 
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result of flooding the RREQ packet across the network. This is very costly in contention and 
collision, which results in serious redundancy.  
If an RREQ packet is sent to all neighbours during route discovery, each neighbour in turn 
forwards it to its own neighbours, without taking into account whether they are about to move 
out of range. In time, this could lead to failure in sending data along a discovered route, as a link 
break could occur through a neighbour moving out of range of the previous node on the path. 
3.4.2.2 Heading-directional Angle Routing Protocol  
The core of the proposed schemes is the Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol (HARP) 
[49], so called because it utilizes directional information on nodes in the network. Such 
information can be obtained from the node‘s own instruments and sensors, such as a compass, 
which delivers the heading-direction angle (HDA) of the mobile device relative to magnetic 
north. This protocol is used to reduce routing overhead and to increase the lifetime of links 
between nodes. It has been assumed that every node can exchange information frequently with 
its neighbours. Under HARP, every node classifies its neighbouring nodes into eight different 
zones according to their heading direction. In theory, the nodes are categorised within at least 
one of the eight zone ranges, regardless of their location. This protocol is based on an on-
demand routing technique. The RREQ packet is transmitted from a node to one of the 
neighbouring nodes that has an angular heading direction similar or near to the HDA of 
neighbouring nodes, where D is a value used for increasing the search around ND. 
When a source node S sends a request for a route to destination node D, it will look into its 
cache for D and if it is found, node S will start broadcasting the data packets to node D. If D is 
not found, a time Td will be initiated by source node S, where Td is the time required to find the 
destination. Then, node S starts searching in its cache for a neighbour that has a reference or 
near reference angle matching with or close to the HDA of S.  
This protocol reduces the overheads and minimises bandwidth usage, since not all neighbouring 
nodes need to reply to a RREQ. Its main advantage is that it increases the lifetime of links 
between nodes. A disadvantage is that when the source node receives an error message, it will 
resend the request packet; the limited amount of sending avoids the formation of a loop without 
taking into account whether it knows the accurate path. Another drawback of HARP is the 
classification of different zones that are not suitable for the network if it is of high or low 
density. This protocol does not seem useful as an axis mapping technique, despite its use. 
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3.4.2.3 Dynamic Source Routing Protocol 
The DSR protocol [38, 39], proposed at Carnegie Mellon University, uses source routing as a 
substitute for hop-by-hop packet routing and is designed particularly for use in multi-hop ad hoc 
wireless networks. In DSR, the elimination of periodic table-update messages means that a very 
large bandwidth is consumed by the control packets needed to establish routes. 
The major difference between DSR and AODV is that DSR reply messages include the full path 
between the source and destination nodes. In addition, the RREQ packet includes addresses of 
every node visited before broadcasting it across the network.  Every node which receives an 
RREQ retransmits the packet to its neighbours if either it has not already forwarded it or the 
node is not the destination node. Upon receiving a route request packet, the destination node 
sends a route reply back to the source. The RREP carries the route crossed by the RREQ.  
There are three advantages to using source routing and sequence numbers: 
 It denies loop formation. 
 It obviates the need for up-to-date routing information in the intermediate nodes when 
packets are forwarded. 
 It avoids retransmitting the same route packet or multiple transmissions by an 
intermediate node.  
These techniques have been incorporated into the basic DSR protocol to improve its 
performance and the utilisation of the route cache information at intermediate nodes in reply to 
the source when they receive a route request packet. In this case, the intermediate nodes could 
have a route to a similar destination. Another optimization is to remove the route acquisition 
latency by piggybacking data on route request packets. 
In addition to these the major advantage of this protocol is that it eliminates the need to burden 
the network with periodic update messages, by establishing routes only on demand. On the 
other hand, broken links cannot be mended locally through the route maintenance mechanism. 
Instead, a link break causes an RERR packet to be sent to the source node to invoke a new route 
discovery phase. Nodes that receive a route error message may also receive stale route cache 
information, which uses the broken link. Another disadvantage is that DSR does not work well 
in large networks because each packet carries the full path to the destination in its header. The 
performance of DSR also degrades rapidly with increasing mobility, but it is good in static and 
low mobility environments. In spite of finding the route on demand, a considerable routing 
overhead is involved, owing to the source-routing mechanism employed in DSR, through 
flooding RREQ; this is directly proportional to the path length. The DSR establishment 
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mechanism can cause a long delay as a result of a packet needing to be transmitted through a 
new link. In on-demand techniques, exploiting one of the positive aspects of mobility reduces 
the effectiveness of that mobility, producing a more adaptive mechanism but one which requires 
longer lived links, in order to reduce the overhead caused by propagating the route request 
packets in the network. 
3.4.2.4 Associatively-Based Routing Protocol 
ABR [43, 44] is a beacon-based, on-demand routing protocol invented by Toh [44] and 
developed at Cambridge University. It is a distributed routing protocol designed for mobile ad 
hoc networks and was selected for the stability of the wireless link. The link is organized and is 
stable or unstable depending on its temporal stability. This is determined by counting the 
periodic beacons that a node receives from its neighbours. Each node in the ABR protocol 
produces periodic ―hello‖ messages to represent its existence to its neighbours. It maintains the 
count of its neighbours‘ beacons and this is used to update the associativity table of each node. 
Since the nodes use the temporal stability and the associativity table, they are able to categorise 
each link with a neighbour as stable or unstable, depending on the beacon count corresponding 
to the neighbour node concerned. The link corresponding to an unstable neighbour is termed an 
unstable link, while a link to a stable neighbour is called a stable link. ABR is a source routing 
protocol that has no need for periodic route updates. 
When the route to the destination is not available in the cache, the source node initiates the route 
discovery by propagating route request packets throughout the network. All the intermediate 
nodes forward these packets only once when they receive them. Every intermediate node adds 
its address and its beacon count to the packet. The destination waits for a period, TRouteSelectTime, 
from when it receives the route request packet before selecting the route that has the maximum 
proportion of stable links. It will select the shortest route if it has received multiple routes that 
have the same overall degree of stability.  
If a link break occurs at an intermediate node, it is detected through the beacons, and then the 
node closest to the source which detects the break initiates a local route repair process by locally 
broadcasting a route repair packet with limited TTL. If this node fails to repair the broken link, 
then the next node in the path to the source (the uplink node) reinitiates the local query 
broadcast. This route repair process continues along the line of intermediate nodes toward the 
source node until the node in the middle of the broken path fails to repair the dead link, in which 
case the source is informed, triggering a new route establishment phase.  
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The main advantages of ABR is that more stable routes are preferred over shorter routes, which 
results in fewer path breaks and in turn reduces the extent of propagation because of the 
reconfiguration of paths in the network. However, the chosen path may sometimes be longer 
than the shortest path between the source and destination, owing to the preference given to 
stable paths; this is one of the disadvantages of this protocol. Another is that local query 
broadcasts may result in long delays during route repair. 
3.4.2.5 Signal Stability-Based Adaptive Routing Protocol 
The SSA routing protocol, proposed by Dube et al. [45], bases the selection of routes on the 
signal strength between two nodes and their location stability, which identifies those paths 
which have existed for longer than others. The SSA protocol, like ABR, uses beacon messages 
between nodes where the signal strength of the beacon is measured to determine link stability. 
According to the received signal strength, a link is classified as stable or unstable. This 
technique requires SSA to use an extended radio interface to measure the signal strength from 
beacons. SSA consists of two cooperative protocols: the Forwarding Protocol (FP) and the 
Dynamic Routing Protocol (DRP). FP performs the routing to forward a packet on its way to the 
destination, while DRP maintains the routing table and the Signal Stability Table (SST) by 
interacting with its processes on other nodes. The SST contains the beacon count and is based 
on the signal strength of its neighbour‘s beacons. This table is used to forward the route request 
from the nodes in the path to the destination, over strong links, to find the most stable end-to-
end path.  If a node has received strong signals from the last few beacons, then it considers the 
link to the sending node as strong and stable.  
If the destination is not available in the routing table, FP initiates a route request packet to detect 
a route. The crucial task in route detecting is that route request packets are forwarded to the next 
node, but only if they are received over strong links and have not been previously processed. 
The packets are silently dropped before being processed when they are received over a weak 
link. If the source node fails to find the stable links needed to construct any path to a destination 
in order to forward a route request, then the FP propagates the route request across the network 
without considering the stability of links as a forwarding criterion. In this case, the destination 
chooses the link which is received on the first route packet request and triggers the sending of a 
route reply packet back to the source. The DRP hops along the links, updating their routing 
tables accordingly; thus the route request packets reach the destination via the links of strongest 
signal stability. 
The major advantage of the SSA protocol is that it forwards packet between nodes along stable 
routes, depending on the signal strength, but a concomitant disadvantage is that if stable links 
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are not available to forward a route request between two nodes, then the sender node propagates 
the route request across the network without considering the stability of links as a forwarding 
criterion. Each node receiving route request packets over weak links should drop it before it is 
processed. In this case, if there is no stable link but there are some other links with different 
weakness ranks, the node cannot take one of these links, even though it is possible that one of 
them may be available and strong after a short period of time. Hence, the node still drops the 
RREQ, without selecting the strongest link among the weak ones. Another disadvantage of SSA 
is that when a node detects a link break that is not repaired, it sends an error packet to the source 
node, notifying it of which link has failed. If the error packet reaches the source node, it sends 
an erase packet to notify all nodes in the path of the broken link and triggers a new route request 
process to choose a new path to the destination. This causes an increase in multiple RREQs, 
flooding the network and reducing available bandwidth.  
3.4.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols  
Hybrid routing protocols are designed to be both reactive and proactive in order to classify and 
offer different routing solutions. They increase the network‘s scalability, which allows nearby 
nodes to define a local zone, while determining routes to distant nodes using a reactive 
approach. In order to reduce route discovery overheads, neighbouring nodes work together by 
proactively maintaining routes to nearby nodes.  
Most proposed hybrid protocols are based on zones, which mean that the network is partitioned. 
Each given node partitions a zone of the network into two distinct regions. The routing zone for 
a particular node can be defined in terms of distance from that node or as lying inside a 
particular geographical region. This routing uses a proactive (table-driven) approach; a reactive 
routing approach uses nodes located in the area beyond the routing zone. The most typical 
hybrid types are the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [47] and the Core Extraction Distributed Ad 
hoc Routing (CEDAR) algorithm [48]. The latter selects a minimum set of nodes as a core to 
perform quality of service route computations. 
3.4.3.1 Zone Routing Protocol  
ZRP [47] is a hybrid routing protocol that combines the best features of on-demand and 
proactive routing protocols. That is, ZRP splits a network into limited zones according to the 
nodes of a local neighbourhood. Each node has an intra-zone and an inter-zone. The protocol 
uses a proactive routing scheme within the former, a limited zone in the r-hop neighbourhood of 
the node, while for nodes in the inter-zone beyond this it uses a reactive routing scheme. The 
intra-zone is referred to as a routing zone. Thus, each node can be within multiple overlapping 
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zones in the network and each zone may be of a different size. The size of a zone is given by its 
radius, whose length is the number of hops to the inner boundary of the zone. For each node, the 
peripheral nodes are those whose distance from it is equal to the zone radius. ZRP is similar to a 
cluster system in dividing the network area into a number of zones, with the difference that in 
ZRP, every node performs as a cluster head and a member of other clusters.  
Each node uses proactive routing protocols to maintain routing information on nodes within its 
routing zone. When any of those nodes moves outside the routing zone and inter-zone 
connections are required, reactive routing is adopted. In the routing zone, the proactive 
IntrAzone Routing Protocol (IARP) is responsible for maintaining routes to destinations. IARP 
can be any proactive routing protocol, based on the implementation. The reactive Interzone 
Routing Protocol, which is used to find routes to destination nodes outside the routing zone, 
adopts a reactive routing approach, using RREQ and RREP packets in order to discover a route.  
The Broadcast Resolution Protocol is the type of broadcasting used when a node requires a 
route to a destination and the intended destination is not in the routing table of IARP; ZRP 
considers that the destination node must be outside its routing zone. Thus, the broadcasting of 
RREQs will continue from one node‘s peripheral nodes to other peripheral nodes until the 
destination node within its zone is reached. 
Since ZRP is a hybrid routing protocol that exhibits better performance owing to its use in both 
reactive and proactive schemes, it has the advantage of limiting the periodic propagation 
(proactive overhead) of the nodes within the routing zone. It also restricts the reactive route 
detection (search overhead) to selected peripheral nodes. However, it is potentially inefficient if 
the RREQ packet is to propagate across the entire network and because the use of hierarchical 
routing in finding the path to a destination could be suboptimal. As the size of the routing zone 
is increased, greater memory is needed and each node will need to have a higher level of 
topological information. Table 3-1 shows the performance comparison between the protocols 
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Table 3.1: Performance comparison between protocols  
 
Routing 
technique 
Source 
route 
Neighbour 
detection 
Loop freedom 
maintenance 
Multiple 
paths 
Communication 
Overhead 
AODV 
Reactive/ 
Flooding 
No HELLO message Sequence number No High 
DSR 
Reactive/ 
Flooding 
Yes No Source route Yes High 
DSDV 
Proactive/ 
Flooding 
No HELLO message Sequence number Yes High 
FSR 
Link state 
update 
 
No 
Periodical link 
state 
updates 
 
Limited scope 
(multi-level scope 
No 
reduces the routing 
update overhead in 
large networks 
WRP Proactive No HELLO message 
sequence number 
and checks of 
predecessor 
information  
Yes High 
CGSR Proactive No 
broadcasts 
cluster member 
table periodically 
Limited scope of 
transmission to a 
cluster 
No 
the selection of the 
cluster-heads causes 
overhead 
ABR 
Reactive / 
based on the 
wireless link 
stability 
No 
periodic beacons 
between the 
neighbour nodes 
sequence number No Low 
SSR 
Reactive / 
based on the 
signal strength 
No 
beacon messages 
between nodes 
sequence number No Low 
ZRP Hybrid No 
Hello message in 
the Intrazone 
sequence number Yes Low in outer zone 
 
3.5 Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks  
The nodes in ad hoc wireless networks act both as regular terminals (source or destination) and 
as routers for other nodes in the network, unlike fixed wired networks such as the Internet, 
where dedicated routers are controlled by a service provider. This absence of dedicated routers 
makes the provision of security a challenging task in ad hoc wireless networks, where the task 
of ensuring secure communication is also made difficult by factors including the mobility of 
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nodes, limited processing power and limited availability of resources such as battery power and 
bandwidth.  
The requirements of a secure routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks are as follows [2]:  
 Detection of malicious nodes: If there are malicious nodes in a network, then a secure 
routing protocol should be able to detect them and avoid selecting them in the routing 
process.   
 Guarantee of correct route discovery: The protocol should be able to find a route when 
one exists between the source and the destination; it should also ensure that it is correct.  
 Confidentiality of network topology: Malicious nodes will be able to view disclosure and 
information regarding network topology that may lead to an attack on these networks. 
The confidentiality of the network topology is an important requirement in order to 
prevent a potential attacker from studying the traffic pattern of the network. Thus, the 
attacker will not be able to discover the active nodes in ad hoc wireless networks and all 
attempts to mount e.g. Denied of Service (DoS) attacks against such bottleneck nodes will 
fail.  
 Stability against attacks: The routing process in ad hoc wireless networks should not be 
disrupted permanently by passive or active attackers. The routing protocol must be self-
sustainable; thus it must be able to revert to its normal operating state within a finite 
amount of time after a passive or active attack. The protocol must ensure Byzantine 
robustness; that is, the protocol should work correctly even if some of the nodes which 
have previously participated in the routing process turn out later to be malicious or are 
intentionally damaged.  
The following sections discuss some of the security-aware routing protocols proposed for ad 
hoc wireless networks.  
3.5.1 Proactive RSA  
The proactive RSA [19] protocol was not designed in particular for ad hoc wireless networks; 
however, many other protocols used in this type of network are based upon it. The essential 
characteristic of the proactive RSA is that it uses distributed shared keys. It is more difficult for 
an adversary to find these, because they are updated frequently. The device is a mechanism used 
to share a key and update it frequently without revealing secret values; these are the main goals 
of this protocol, which functions by communicating through an authenticated bulletin board. 
The avoidance of jamming and the capability of nodes to restart (re-initialise) a compromised 
node are the main advantages of this protocol. On the other hand, it supplies only probabilistic 
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stages of security and requires a trusted dealer to authenticate the initial group to create the 
authenticated bulletin board. 
3.5.2 Security-aware Ad Hoc Routing Protocol  
The Security-aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) protocol [20] uses security as one of the key metrics 
to find paths, incorporating a structure for enforcing and measuring features of the security 
metric. This structure uses different levels of security for different applications that use the SAR 
protocol for routing. The communications between end nodes in ad hoc wireless networks are 
made through (possibly multiple) intermediate nodes, depending on the fact that the two end 
nodes trust the intermediate nodes. One of the tasks of SAR is to define the level of trust as a 
metric for routing. This means that every path for packets is associated with a security level, 
which is determined by a numerical calculation. A certain level of security is also associated 
with every intermediate node. When an intermediate node receives a packet it compares its level 
of security with that defined for the packet, and if the packet‘s security level is less than that of 
the node, then this node is considered to be a secure node and is permitted to view the packet. If 
it is greater, the packet is simply discarded. 
The SAR mechanism could easily be incorporated into traditional routing protocols for ad hoc 
networks. SAR permits the application to select the level of security it requires; however, the 
protocol requires different keys for different levels of security. The main disadvantage of this 
mechanism is that it tends to increase the number of keys required when the number of security 
levels used increases.  
3.5.3 Authenticated Routing Protocol  
The Authenticated Routing Ad hoc Network (ARAN) protocol [21] provides secure routing for 
ad hoc wireless networks by means of cryptographic certificates that successfully defeat all 
identified attacks in the network layer. It takes care of authentication, message integrity and 
non-repudiation, but expects a small amount of prior security coordination among nodes. In 
general, the main requirements it attempts to fulfil are first preventing things such as the 
spoofing of routing signals, the fabrication of routing packets, the shaping by adversaries of 
routing loops and the exposure by routing packets of the network topology; and secondly 
ensuring that such routing packets are not altered during transmission and that the shortest 
routing path is utilised. 
 The major drawback of the protocol is that it needs a trusted certification server to issue the 
initial certificates. It offers security at two levels. The first, which is not fully secure, is an end-
to-end authentication that is effective and requires low CPU power; however, it does not 
 Chapter 3: Critical Review of Routing Protocols and Secure Routing in Ad hoc Wireless Network  
49 
 
guarantee the shortest path usage. The second is stronger in security and guarantees to provide 
the shortest path, but requires more CPU power and resources. The ARAN protocol prevents 
compromised nodes from disrupting the network by providing route maintenance mechanisms 
and key revocation schemes. 
3.5.4 Secure AODV  
The Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol [22] provides security by securing the 
routing information. It uses schemes such as digital signatures, depending on source and end-to-
end authentication. The protocol protects non-mutable data (not required or changed in the 
routing process) by use of public-key schemes. It secures the mutable data (necessary for the 
routing process), which in this case is the hop count information that uses hash chains. AODV 
uses a key management scheme and proposes a distributed CA to issue and validate the digital 
signature. The source performs the following three tasks: 
 It uses a public-key encryption scheme  
 It signs the data 
 It uses a hash function to encrypt the hop information.  
On the path, every router will use a hash function to encrypt and update the hop information in 
order to secure it. When the destination receives the message, it uses the same hashing chain to 
verify the path and uses its keys to obtain the rest of the data and authenticate it. This scheme 
consumes less CPU power from the intermediate nodes, since they do not require access to the 
encrypted data. However, it still requires some authority structure to provide and manage the 
nodes with valid certificates.  
3.5.5 Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector  
The Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector (SEAD) routing protocol [23] is a secure routing 
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks depending on the DSDV. This protocol protects against 
DoS attacks, reduces the overhead and speeds up the routing process, since it uses efficient one-
way hash functions. It also assumes a limited network diameter in order to reduce the amount of 
information needed in the routing table and any exchange of information between nodes. As in 
secure AODV, it uses the incremental hash function of the route information to identify a 
correct path to the destination node. It also needs a similar security association between the 
source and destination nodes.  
SEAD avoids routing loops except the loop that includes more than one attacker. This protocol 
could be implemented easily with minor changes to the existing distance vector routing 
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protocols. It is robust against multiple uncoordinated attacks. Nonetheless, SEAD is unable to 
defeat attacks where the attacker uses the same sequence number and metric which has been 
used by the latest update message and sends a new routing update. 
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3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the major issues of routing in Ad hoc wireless Networks were described. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses all the general information of routing and secure routing .The 
routing is one of the important cores in mobile ad-hoc networks. Every routing protocol has its 
strengths and drawbacks and aims at a specific application. In addition, the strengths of a 
protocol could be drawbacks in another protocol. Current routing protocols provide routing 
solutions up to a certain level for certain scenarios. However, they are lacking the ability to 
handle other scenarios with related points (such as nodes mobility with long-lived routes to the 
destination). If these protocols could be extended further, or new routing protocols are designed 
by taking into account other routing related factors, it may come out with a standard routing 
solution for mobile ad-hoc networks.  
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Chapter 4 
Enhanced Heading Direction Routing Protocols and 
Modelling 
Objectives: to present  
  Present research methodology 
  Present simulation environment 
  Present key idea of heading direction 
  Present modelling of ad hoc networks 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Several routing protocols have been proposed for ad hoc networks as a solution to major 
problems such as mobility effects in multi-hop communication and overhead. These lead to 
significant control overhead and interference to ongoing traffic, which are often unacceptable. 
Flooding techniques may result in excessive redundancy, contention, broken links and collision. 
This outcome is notorious as the ―broadcast storm problem‖ [86].  
In order to reduce the overhead and flooding effect, Kumar and Xue [87] propose a scheme to 
reduce the overhead involved in the discovery of a route to the end node. This scheme utilises 
forwarding packets to certain nodes, which fall within a determined direction. These 
intermediate nodes are selected according to their location and that of the final destination. 
However, the scheme does not take into account the lifetime of the links between neighbouring 
nodes, which would be necessary to establish long-lived routes and guarantee selection of the 
optimal path. 
The work reported in this thesis falls into the category of on-demand routing protocols. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, a serious drawback of AODV and HARP are the generation of multiple 
RREP packets in response to a single RREQ packet, leading to heavy control overhead added to 
that caused by the flooding of the RREQ packet across the network. This overhead is very 
costly and results in serious redundancy, contention, increased broken links and collisions. 
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Thus, one of the aims of the approach proposed here is to reduce the rate of broken links and 
improve the guarantee of optimal path selection in on-demand routing protocols.  
The core of the proposed scheme is the Heading-direction Angle, so called because it utilizes 
directional information on the nodes in the network. Heading direction information can be 
obtained from a node‘s own instruments and sensors, such as a compass, which delivers the 
HDA of the mobile device relative to magnetic north. This protocol is used to reduce routing 
overhead. 
In the proposed approach, which is an enhanced version of HARP based on demand techniques, 
the effect of the mobility of nodes is reduced by exploiting one of the positive aspects of 
mobility, which is the heading direction. At the same time, the lifetime of the link is elongated, 
in order to produce a more adaptive mechanism with mobility and in order to reduce the 
overhead caused by flooding the network with route request packets. 
4.2 Research Methodology 
The research methodology adopted to attain the research goal comprises the following main 
steps and activities: (1) identification of problems (via an intensive literature review), (2) 
concept presentation, (3) designing the approaches, (4) concept development, (5) validation and 
evaluation, (6) reflection and feedback, and (7) documentation/ reporting of findings and 
identification of directions for future research and development. Note that in practice the 
process is inherently iterative.  
The research study was initiated with a two-stage literature review consisting of state-of-the-art 
and in-depth reviews. The state-of-the-art review was conducted for the recognition of up-to-
date developments in mobile ad hoc networks. Since the aim of this research is to design a new 
routing approach and a new secure routing protocol, the literature review focused on the 
following areas: routing protocols and mechanisms for ad hoc networks, the security of ad hoc 
networks, security requirements, and the security mechanism and application spectrum of ad 
hoc networks. 
The purpose of the second (in-depth) stage of the literature review was to identify specific 
research problems and their potential solutions, which may have been researched previously but 
not sufficiently extensively. The focus of this research has been on the route lifetime, the 
reduction of broken links and strengthening the guarantee of selecting the optimal path, in 
addition to ensuring a secure routing protocol and a secure environment. Note that this step was 
conducted continuously and in parallel with steps 3 to 6 above, throughout this study. This was 
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necessary to ensure that potential developments in related areas could be continuously fed back 
to the other activities throughout the research period.   
During the second and third steps, concept presentation and designing, three conceptual 
approaches were formulated. The first was to design a new routing protocol which concentrated 
on improving the performance of a network by reducing the rate of broken links and 
strengthening the guarantee of selecting the optimal path, based on time and acknowledgement. 
The second approach was to design a new secure routing protocol which would resolve the 
problem of insecure node-to-node paths and satisfy all other security requirements. The third 
approach was to design a secure environment, in response to the problem of hostile 
environments.  
In the fifth step, validation and evaluation, means of intensive simulation and software 
implementation of all the proposed approaches were formulated. This involved deeply 
understanding the simulation tool and the programming languages in which it was written. It 
also involved the development and evaluation of each proposed approach by implementing the 
software code into the simulation code to demonstrate and validate the approaches and methods 
which had been developed. Due to various resource constraints, this was done using the most 
common and best known simulation tool (within the three-year timescale of this research study), 
the Network Simulator NS-2, for the purpose of evaluation.  
This was followed by step 6, reflection and feedback, where the problems, limitations and 
potential refinements of the proposed approaches were identified. In the final step, findings 
were documented and reported.  In addition, potential extensions of this study have also been 
identified for future research and development.  
4.2.1 Simulation Environment 
The research in this thesis has been simulated by using NS-2.  Kurkowski et al. [88] surveyed 
the 2000-2005 proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad hoc 
Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), concluding that NS-2 [89] is the most used simulator 
tool in mobile ad hoc network (MANET) research: ―35 of the 80 simulation papers that state the 
simulator used in the simulation study used NS-2 (43.8%)‖. This finding is shown graphically in 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Simulator usage, from the Mobile Hoc survey [88] 
In an attempt to generate results that would be representative of some potential real-world 
scenarios which the algorithms in this thesis might encounter, simulations were run with 
parameters close to the available realistic values. Without loss of generality the protocol 
evaluations are based on the simulation of 50 wireless nodes for some scenarios and on a 
number of nodes varying from 10 to 70 for other scenarios. These nodes form an ad hoc 
network moving about over a flat area of 1000 m x 1000 m for 500 seconds of simulated time. 
The square site models situations in which nodes can move freely around each other and where 
there is a small amount of path and spatial diversity available for the routing protocol to 
discover and use. The dimension of 1000 m, which is four times the transmission range, was 
chosen in order for there to be a reasonable number of nodes between the source and destination 
nodes, because a higher number of intermediate nodes results in quicker route breaks, whereas a 
smaller number would not give an indication of the realistic routing protocol. This protocol, 
most of the time, needs some intermediate nodes to establish the connection between two 
communicating nodes. Another reason for selecting a square with 1000 m sides was to keep the 
average number of neighbouring nodes equal to or higher than the required number of 
neighbours in EHARP. The number of neighbour nodes is based on transmission range R and 
the simulation area:  
)5(
2
n
lw
R
nodesNeighbour

  
where w and l are the width and the length of the network area. According to the parameters 
used for simulating the work, there are approximately 9 neighbour nodes. The physical radio 
characteristics of each mobile node‘s network interface, such as the antenna type, transmit 
power and receiver sensitivity, were chosen to approximate the best known commercially 
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available wireless LAN radio products such as Lucent WaveLAN [90] radio. Some well known 
wireless LANs are listed in Table4.1 [91].   
Table 4-1: Wireless LAN Products 
Company Product Advertised Speed Advertised Distance 
AT&T WaveLAN 2 Mbps 800 feet 
Digital RoamAbout 2 Mbps 800 feet 
NCR WaveLAN 2 Mbps 800 feet 
Solectek AirLAN 2 Mbps 800 feet 
 
A Tcl script file for ad hoc wireless simulations provided with NS-2 distribution was modified 
to fit the simulation environment of the project. In this file, it was necessary to define the type 
for each of the network components constituting a mobile node, such as the link layer, the 
interface queue, the MAC layer and the wireless channel on which nodes transmit and receive 
signals. Additionally, in the Tcl script file, it is necessary to define other parameters including 
the type of antenna, the radio-propagation model and the type of ad hoc routing protocol used 
by mobile nodes.  
The size of trace files generated by running the Tcl script file is huge (of the order of tens of 
MB). These files were analysed to obtain the performance metrics. In order to extract certain 
lines and discard the rest from the generated trace file for analysis, the AWK utility language 
was used. AWK is a programming language included with the UNIX operating system that is 
designed for processing text-based data, either in files or data streams. For example, to extract 
only the information related to route request packets, it was decided to write a programming 
code using AWK, because writing programming code to do these tasks in languages such as C, 
C++,java or Pascal is time consuming and inconvenient, while such jobs are often easier with 
AWK. The AWK utility interprets a special-purpose programming language that makes it easy 
to handle simple data-reformatting jobs and allows us to extract pieces of data for processing, to 
sort data and to perform simple network communications [92].  
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4.3 The Key Idea of Heading Direction 
This section explores the using of heading information to improve the performance of routing 
protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. As a demonstration, this section shows how a route 
discovery protocol based on mobility information can be improved. Consider two mobile nodes
1n and 2n that are within the transmission range R of each other, where ),( 11 nn yx , 1nv  and 
),( 22 nn yx , 2nv  are the coordinates and velocities of 1n and 2n respectively. In addition, 1n and 
2n  move in direction 1n and 2n from the north respectively (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Communication between two nodes in an ad hoc wireless network [93] 
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the total time that the two mobile nodes remain connected depends 
on the difference between 1n and 2n as denoted by [8]:  
 
22
2222 )()()(
qp
lqpdRqpqdpl
T



               (6) 
where  
                                                                  
                
               
,sinsin 2211 nnnn vvp  
,21 nn xxl 
,coscos 2211 nnnn vvq  
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The distance between the two nodes changes with time. Note that when n1 and n2 move in a 
similar direction the link between them lasts longer. Figure 4.3 depicts the relation between T 
and the difference between 1n and 2n , with 1021  nn vv , R = 50,   1011  nn yx  and 
2022  nn yx . 
It is clear from Figure 4.3 that the time to path break is increased when the difference between 
the direction angles of the two nodes is decreased. Hence, the link will last longer when the next 
node in the link is selected as having a similar direction to the upstream node. If the velocities of 
the two nodes are equal and 012  nn  , assuming that no other channel conditions affect the 
channel link, the time to path breaks increases to infinity [84].  
Figure 4.3: Lifetime of link vs. difference between heading angles of end nodes [84] 
 
In order to apply the idea explained above for selecting the next node in the route during the 
route discovery process, extra data is needed, in the form of the node heading direction. This 
could be provided by utilising a compass with Magneto Resistive (MR) technology [93], which 
delivers the heading direction angle of the mobile device relative to magnetic north. The 
expected lifetime of a link has been examined by Turgut et al. [71] and Samar et al. [94], who 
.21 nn yyd 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0.
03
0.
13
0.
31
0.
73
2.
83
3.
22
3.
35
3.
61
L
ife
 ti
m
e
 o
f t
h
e
 li
n
k 
(t
im
e
)
(Rad)
 Chapter 4: Enhanced Heading Direction Routing Protocol and Modelling 
59 
 
derive the relation between the lifetime of a link and the difference between the motion angles 
of two communicating nodes. 
4.4 Principle of the Heading Direction Mechanism 
The core idea of the proposed scheme is termed Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing 
Protocol (EHARP), as it makes use of direction information on the nodes in the network. The 
aim of using the heading direction is to reduce routing overhead and to increase the lifetime of 
links between communicating nodes. It has been assumed that each mobile node in the network 
knows its own heading direction by using a digital compass with MR technology. Most 
navigation systems today use some type of compass to determine heading direction. Electronic 
compasses based on MR sensors can determine electrically a change in direction of 0.1° and can 
easily be integrated into systems via a simple communication interface, which makes it ready 
for use in applications that need such information [93].  
The general behaviour of ad hoc networks is to deliver the data packet to the destination 
through intermediate nodes. Therefore, it is assumed that all hosts wishing to communicate with 
other hosts in the network are willing to participate fully in the protocols of the network: each 
node is willing to receive and forward packets for others nodes in the network. Moreover, each 
node periodically exchanges heading direction information with its neighbours and stores the 
information received in its cache memory. 
4.4.1 Categorization of Nodes 
Under EHARP, each mobile node in the network classifies its neighbouring nodes according to 
their heading directions into four different zone-direction groups: Z1, Z2, Z3 and Z4, as can be 
seen in Figure 4.4. The heading directions between 0° and 90° are categorised as zone-direction 
1 (Z1); those between 90° and 180° as zone-direction 2 (Z2) and so on. For example, consider 
that a mobile node (MN) has a neighbour node moving in a heading direction 60° and sending 
its heading direction information periodically to its own neighbouring nodes. The MN, when it 
receives the heading direction information from this neighbour, will classify it as in Z1. 
Theoretically, the neighbouring nodes of a mobile node are categorised within at least one of the 
four zone ranges, regardless of their actual positions relative to the mobile node itself. 
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Figure 4.4: Neighbours categorised within four basic zone ranges 
 
4.4.2 Downstream Node Selection 
The proposed approach (EHARP) is based on the on-demand routing technique; this means that 
establishing routes are based on route requests and route replies. In other words, when a source 
node S wishes to send data packets to a destination D, in order to find a route to D, it will send a 
RREQ packet. Almost all on-demand routing schemes require that the route request be 
forwarded towards the destination through intermediate nodes. This means that each node will 
forward the RREQ to the next downstream node. (Nodes towards the destination are called 
downstream nodes, whilst those lying in the direction of the source are called upstream nodes).  
In the proposed EHARP approach, when an intermediate node wants to forward a packet to a 
downstream node, it selects this from its neighbouring nodes, which are classified according to 
their heading direction and stability of link. The selected node has an angular heading direction 
similar or near to the heading direction angle of the selecting node and the highest stability of 
link. For example, consider a node with a heading direction angle, #Node . The selected 
downstream node has the nearest heading direction angle and highest value of SL to 
)( #  node , where   is an angle around #Node to expand the search. By doing so, the lifetime 
of the link between the two nodes will last longer and the stability of link will be maximised. 
These parameters are reflected in the routing functionality, in that this approach reduces the 
effects of mobility and reduces the packet drop rate. In addition, selecting an appropriate 
downstream node will result in lower computational overhead and minimise the packet drop 
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rate, because not all neighbouring nodes will need to react to a route request. If the node does 
not find a neighbour that fulfils the heading angle condition or if the stability of link of all such 
neighbours is poor, the search will be expanded by applying the axis-mapping technique, as 
shown in Figure 4.5.  
To widen the search, the angular value represented by  is increased, so a large range of heading 
directions are taken into consideration when a route request message is being propagated or a 
route reply message is being sent along an already established route.  
 
Figure 4.5: Axis mapping technique; is added and subtracted through 45°[94] 
 
4.4.3 Route Records List  
When a source node wishes to send a packet to a destination node it will initiate the Route 
Records List (RRL) if it does not find the destination node in its cache memory (a neighbour 
table). The source node then adds a record to the RRL containing information about itself. Each 
RRL record has the following fields: 
 A node IP address, which is the IP address of the node that is involved in the route. 
 A node-heading angle, which is the heading direction angle of the node itself. 
 A zone-direction number, which is the number of the zone in which the heading direction 
angle of the node falls and which has a range of values from 1 to 4. 
 SL counter, giving the status of links between these nodes. 
The RRL will be attached in the header of the route request packet, which is propagated to the 
appromate node(s) depending on the scheme used in routing. Each node visited by the RREQ 
during its transmission will adds a new record to the RRL containing information about the 
visited node itself. 
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4.5 Modelling Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
This section presents the definition of the general system model for the routing algorithm and 
describes the network model, mobility model and traffic model. It also elaborates on the format 
of messages, routing tables and the general route establishment mechanism used by the 
proposed algorithm. 
4.5.1 Definition of the System Model 
The proposed EHARP routing algorithm is intended for use by any mobile device and is able to 
work in a peer-to-peer mode (ad hoc wireless network). Complete functions and tasks expected 
from this protocol have to be achieved via a distributed algorithm, which exploits the mobility 
and stability of links between users to offer adaptation to dynamic topology changes and 
frequent link breaks, low control traffic overhead, elongation of link lifetime and reduction of 
the packet drop rate. To ensure loop freedom, some other existing routing protocols utilise 
destination sequence numbers, in addition to which EHARP uses the RRL to provide an 
additional guarantee of freedom from the counting-to-infinity problem. Each record in the RRL 
contains information about a node involved in the route between the source and the destination 
node. This algorithm can be adopted by other routing protocols to improve their performance. 
4.5.2 Assumptions 
Some assumptions have to be made in order to accomplish the tasks of the proposed routing 
algorithm. These are: 
1. Each mobile node works in group and is willing to exchange all information of heading 
direction and stability link with its neighbours in a timely manner. The information 
received from a neighbour node will be stored in one of the four zone-directions in the 
cache memory regardless of the actual position of that neighbour. 
2.  Each node is able to obtain the necessary routing information by direct communication 
with a resource which provides this information whenever it is required. Alternatively, 
the mobile node is equipped with a device such as a digital compass, which delivers the 
heading direction angle of the mobile device hosting it. 
3. The function of ad hoc wireless networks is to transmit data packets through relay nodes 
between the sender and the receiver. Therefore, it must be assumed that each node in the 
network is willing to forward other nodes‘ packets as well as its own.  
4.  The nodes move at roughly similar speeds to people in the street. 
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4.5.3 Models 
This section presents three models: the network, mobility and traffic models. 
4.5.3.1 Network Model 
A multi-hop ad hoc wireless network consists of a set of nodes, N. The area of the network, A, 
that nodes move in depends on the application and the purpose of the network. The distribution 
of nodes in A also depends on the scenario that the network is running. It can be predetermined 
for some applications such as in a classroom, conference or meeting room, whilst for other 
applications, the nodes are randomly distributed (such as in search-and-rescue or free user 
movement). Therefore, the density of nodes in the area (N/A) varies from application to 
application and from one subsection of A to another.   
Assuming that the transmission range of each node is equal to R and every node has an omni 
directional antenna, the transmission/communication between any two nodes n1 and n2, (where 
Nnn 21, ) is successful if it satisfies the two conditions: 
 If the distance between these two nodes is 
21nn
d , the condition Rd nn 21  should be 
satisfied;  
 If the interference range of the receiving node n2 is Rint, any node ( Nm ) within Rint of 
the receiving node n2, int2 Rdmn  is not transmitting. In general, the transmission range is 
the same as the interference range. 
In the case of IEEE 802.11 MAC protocols [44], the sending node n1 is also required to be free 
of interference, as it needs to receive the link layer acknowledgement from the receiving node 
n2. Therefore, in IEEE 802.11MAC protocols, a node m falling in the interference range of the 
nodes n1 or n2 must not be transmitting.  
The hidden and exposed terminal problems are generally the concern of the MAC protocols. 
They do not affect wired networks and occur only in wireless ones. The hidden terminal 
problem arises from a simultaneous transmission by nodes that are hidden from each other; in 
other words, they are not within the direct transmission range of the sender but are within the 
transmission range of the receiver. In this situation, a collision of packets at the receiving node 
occurs when nodes transmit packets simultaneously without knowing about transmission by 
each other. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, both node N1 and node N2 try to transmit to node G1 at 
the same time, because neither is aware of the transmission of the other, being hidden from each 
other. This means that the two node packets will collide at node G1.  
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Figure 4.6: Hidden and exposed problems in ad hoc wireless networks 
The exposed terminal problem occurs when one node is blocked from transmitting by another 
nearby transmitting node. In Figure 4.6, N3 cannot transmit to G2 because the transmission from 
N1 to G1 is already in progress and the transmission of N3 would interfere with this ongoing 
transmission. 
The performance of ad hoc wireless networks is reduced by the occurrence of the hidden and 
exposed terminal problems, especially when the traffic load is high. Therefore, the design and 
development of a MAC protocol should consider the potential for these problems and take 
appropriate measures. 
4.5.3.2 Mobility Model 
The EHARP algorithm is proposed for ad hoc wireless networks with a minimum number of 
mobile nodes, which varies with the scheme used in routing. The proposed algorithm requires a 
different minimum number of nodes in the network to guarantee establishment of the route from 
the source node to the destination node. In EHARP, each node sends an RREQ packet to only 
one neighbour. Hence, a low density of nodes is acceptable but, of course, the higher the 
number of available neighbours to select from, the more appropriate the selected neighbour will 
be increases the performance of EHARP.  
Since the EHARP algorithm depends on the direction movement of mobile nodes and it is an 
on-demand algorithm, it can handle low and moderate mobility rates. Clearly, in ad hoc wireless 
networks, mobility models are application dependent. Moreover, the various mobility patterns 
affect the performance of different network protocols in different ways. For example, the 
performance of the routing protocol under the scenario of the group mobility model (such as in 
a highway or military group) differs from that of a random mobility or random walk mobility 
model.  
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The random mobility model is the one most commonly used by researchers. In the Random 
Waypoint mobility model [74], nodes are randomly placed within the simulation field at the 
start time. Each node selects a destination randomly and independently from other nodes, 
moving to it at a constant speed. When it reaches the destination, it stays there for a given pause 
time before starting to move to another random destination. In the EHARP algorithm, selecting 
the next appropriate node when establishing the route depends on the heading direction 
information. Hence, the mobility model is not strongly affected by the performance of these 
algorithms, because of its adaptiveness to the direction of movement, where a node selects the 
next node from those that are moving in a similar direction and highest value of SL to the 
current node. For example, in the group mobility scenario, all nodes move in the same 
determined direction, so there is an easier and wider choice of the next node. Under a random 
scenario, there are still neighbour nodes to select from, with near similar directions and highest 
value of SL to that of the current node. 
4.5.3.3 Traffic Model 
The physical model is directly related to the physical layer characteristics. The transmission 
from node n1 to n2 is successful if the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at node n2, SNRn
1
n
2
, is not less 
than a minimum threshold: SNRn
1
n
2
 ≥ SNRthresh. Since the work in this thesis is related to the 
network layer, the physical model is beyond the scope of this discussion. As it is assumed that 
each mobile node has an omnidirectional antenna model, the propagation model combines a free 
space propagation model with a two-ray ground reflection multipath model. In the free space, 
the power of a signal attenuates as 
2/1 d , where d is the distance between the transmitter and 
the receiver. For this work, it is assumed that the propagation range of mobile nodes is equal. 
4.5.4 General System Model 
This section describes the messages used by the EHARP algorithm, the routing tables used to 
maintain the routing information and the general route establishment mechanism. 
4.5.4.1 Message Formats 
In the proposed algorithm, as in other routing algorithms of mobile ad hoc wireless networks, a 
number of messages are used to perform the task of running the algorithm. These messages are 
used to establish routes and for sending data packets from a source node to a destination node. 
The required format for each message, the fields that each message consists of and the 
contribution of each message to the achievement of routing in mobile ad hoc wireless networks 
are described. 
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4.5.4.1.1 Route Records List Format 
In the RRL, each record contains the node‘s IP address, its heading direction angle and its zone-
direction number. Each node in the network which contributes to setting up the route or which is 
involved in forwarding the data packet to the destination has a record in the list, which is 
constructed during the stage of finding the path to the destination. An additional task of this list 
is to share with the destination the sequence numbers, preventing the counting-to-infinity 
problem. Other details of the RRL are explained in subsection 4.4.3. The field names of the 
RRL used in the proposed approach are shown in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Route records list format 
Field Name Description 
lr_nodeIP  Node IP address 
lr_nodedir  Node heading angle     
lr_zonerange  Zone-direction number (1-4) 
lr_nodeSL Stability of link 
 
4.5.4.1.2 Route Request Message Format 
If the destination node is not a neighbour to the source node, the route request message is 
initiated and prepared by the source node with the necessary information before being 
transmitted onto the network. The fields most commonly required in the RREQ message are the 
source and destination IP addresses, the RRL and the packet type (to differentiate between route 
request, route reply, route error, acknowledgment and hello messages). The general field names 
used in the RREQ message is shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Route Request Message Format 
Field Name Description 
rq_type  Packet Type 
rq_bcast_id  Broadcast ID 
rq_dst  Destination IP Address 
rq_dst_seqno  Destination Sequence Number 
rq_src  Source IP Address 
rq_src_seqno  Source Sequence Number 
rq_timestamp     When RREQ sent; to compute route discovery latency 
rq_rt_list  Route Record List 
 
4.5.4.1.3 Route Reply Message Format 
The route reply message is initiated and prepared with necessary information by the destination 
node or by an intermediate node, which has a fresh enough route to the destination node. The 
RREP is then unicast back to the source node that generated the RREQ. In our proposed 
scheme, the RREP message consists of identical fields. In general, the main fields required in 
the RREP message are the source and destination IP addresses the RRL and the packet type. 
Here, it is important to notice that the Destination IP Address field refers to the node that 
generates the RREQ message, while the Source IP Address field denotes the node that generates 
the RREP message. The general field names used in the RREP message are shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Route Reply Message Format 
Field Name Description 
rp_type Packet Type 
rp_dst                  Destination IP Address 
rp_dst_seqno Destination Sequence Number 
rp_src                  Source IP Address 
rp_lifetime Lifetime 
rp_timestamp    When corresponding RREQ sent; used to compute route 
discovery latency 
rp_rt_list Route record list  
 
4.5.4.1.4 Route Error Message Format 
The route error message is initiated and prepared by an intermediate node when a broken link to 
the next node is discovered. In addition, an RERR is initiated if the time required to find the 
destination expires without the destination being reached (further explanation is given below). 
The route error message is filled with necessary information before it is unicast over the 
network towards the source node that generated the RREQ. In our proposed scheme, an RERR 
message consists of the same fields: it should contain all the IP addresses of the nodes that have 
not been reached because the error has occurred, accompanied by their sequence numbers. The 
general fields used in the RERR message are shown in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Route Error Message Format 
Field Name  Description 
re_type  Packet type 
re_DestCount                   Destination count 
re_unreachable_dst[]   List of unreachable destination IP addresses 
re_unreachable_dst_seqno[]     Unreachable destination sequence numbers 
 
4.5.4.1.5 Hello Message Format 
Selecting the next hop according to the heading direction of the next node requires that the node 
should be aware of the heading directions of its neighbour nodes. Each node in the network is 
required to broadcast local hello messages with one hop distance every hello interval time. The 
determined value of the interval time should be a compromise between the local control 
overhead and the information update frequency. Before determining that the neighbour no 
longer exists as a neighbour because there are no more hello messages being received from it, a 
number of lost messages should be allowed. 
In general, the main fields required in the RREP message are the node IP address, its sequence 
number and the node heading direction angle. The general fields used in the hello message are 
shown in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Hello Message Format 
Field Name Description 
hl_type  Packet Type 
hl_IP_Node                   Node IP Address 
hl_Node_seqno  Node Sequence Number 
hl_hop_count  Hop Count 
hl_nodedir  Node direction     
hl_nodesl  Node stability of link 
 
4.5.4.2 Table Formats 
This section describes the format of the routing tables used by the proposed algorithm, which 
contain the routing information used to establish routes between nodes and information about 
neighbours.  
4.5.4.2.1 Routing Table Format 
Since EHARP is an on-demand routing protocol, it should be noted that algorithm needs a 
routing table to keep information about all known routes. The routing table also needs special 
algorithm management such as adding new routes, deleting expired or broken routes and 
searching in the table for a route to a known destination.  
The routing table is a collection of records each of which contains the following main fields: the 
destination IP address, which represents the destination node reachable by this node itself, the 
sequence number corresponding to the destination, the number of hops forming the route to that 
destination, the IP address of the next hop on the route, the stability of link and the time of 
expiration of that route (the time when the information stored in this record becomes stale). The 
general fields in the routing table at each node are shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Routing Table Format 
Field Name  Description 
rt_dst Destination IP Address 
rt_seqno Destination Sequence Number 
rt_hops Hop count 
rt_nexthop Next hop IP address 
rt_expire Expiration of the route 
rt_sl Stability of link  
 
4.5.4.2.2 Neighbours Table Format 
The information about the neighbouring nodes extracted from received messages is stored in the 
neighbours table. The hello message sent by a node to all its neighbours (one hop away) 
contains the node‘s IP address, its heading direction and the calculated zone number that it falls 
into. This information when received by a neighbour will be stored in the neighbours table as a 
new record if the neighbour is not previously stored or will be modified if the neighbour is 
already listed in the table. The hello message also states the status of the neighbours in terms of 
link stability, which increases after a successful sending and decreases after a failed sending. 
The RREQ and RREP messages received from a neighbour node will also cause the information 
on that neighbour to be added as new record in the neighbours table if it currently contains no 
record of that neighbour. Alternatively, the information currently held may be modified.  
The neighbours table is a list of records, each containing the following main fields: each 
neighbour‘s IP address, it‘s heading direction angle, its zone-direction number, the time that this 
information expired and became obsolete, and the stability of the link to that neighbour. The 
neighbours table also needs special algorithm management, such as adding new neighbours, 
deleting expired neighbours, increasing and decreasing link stability and searching in the table 
for a neighbour by its IP address, by its heading direction angle or by its zone number. The 
general field names used in the neighbours table in our approach are shown in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8: Neighbours Table Format 
Field Name Description 
nb_addr Neighbour IP Address 
nb_dir  Neighbour Heading Direction 
nb_zonerange Neighbour Zone Number (1-4)  
nb_expire       Expiration of the neighbour 
nb_sl Stability of link to the neighbour 
 
4.5.5 Route Establishment 
The EHARP algorithm is classified as an on-demand/reactive routing protocol. This means that 
the source node discovers the route only when it is needed. On-demand routing protocols are 
different from other classes where each node in the network is aware of all network information 
and changes to it: on-demand protocols maintain only information on routes already discovered 
and use them if they have not expired. The source node will send the data packets directly 
addressed to the destination without establishing a path to that destination in the following 
cases: 
 The destination is a neighbour of the source node. 
 There is a readily valid route to the destination in the routing table that has not expired at 
the time of sending the data packets. 
In all other cases, the operation of establishing a route to the intended destination is triggered. In 
addition, to improve the performance of the proposed algorithm, the Local Broken Route Repair 
algorithm is implemented. Data packets intended to reach a destination node should be buffered 
in the node until an active path to the destination is available. Otherwise, after a predetermined 
waiting time for finding a path has expired, the data packets should be dropped and a 
notification message should be sent to the application which generated them. The general 
method of route establishment under the proposed algorithm is detailed in the following 
subsections.  
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4.5.5.1 Route Requests 
When the source node S has data packets to send to a destination node D, it first looks into its 
cache to discover whether D can be reached either as a neighbour to S or by an already validated 
route. Otherwise, S needs to set up a path to D. Preparing and broadcasting the RREQ packet for 
finding the path to D can be divided into two parts: 
1) General information that every RREQ packet should contain and which can be classified as 
two types: 
 a) Route information that is contained in the packet during its life and passage across the 
network: 
- The destination sequence number: the last known destination sequence number for 
D. 
- RREQ ID: increment by one from the last RREQ ID used by the current node. This 
ID, together with the originator IP address, prevents the node from receiving and 
reprocessing the same packet more than once. 
- The hop count, to count the number of nodes visited, starting with the sender. 
- Time to live value. 
- The originator IP address. 
- The destination IP address.  
- The RRL, as explained above. 
 b) RREQ information that is kept at the source node itself to control the generation and 
propagation of RREQ packets: 
- RREQ ID.  
- Maximum of RREQ tries: the maximum number of broadcasts of the RREQ in order to 
find the required route. Every time the RREQ is broadcast, the RREQ ID is 
incremented. 
- RREP waiting time: the time a node will wait for a RREP from the destination that the 
RREQ was sent to. If no RREP is received within the waiting time, the node may 
broadcast another RREQ, provided that the maximum number of RREQ tries is not 
exceeded. 
- The heading direction angle of the node itself. 
- The zone number that the node falls into, which is derived from the heading direction 
angle. 
- the stability of the link to that neighbour 
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2) RREQ broadcasting technique: The protocol itself determines whether blind flooding, 
partially flooding or controlled flooding is used. In the AODV protocol, RREQ messages 
are flooded to all neighbouring nodes and those, in their turn, flood the received RREQ to 
their neighbour nodes. In the work reported in this thesis, the selective and controlled 
flooding technique is used. The EHARP technique is elaborated on in chapter five. 
4.5.5.2 Route Replies 
After receiving a RREQ, the node generates a route reply packet in two cases: 
 The node is the intended destination, or 
 The node has a valid route to the destination in the routing table and the route has not 
expired. 
Before unicasting the RREP back to the source node that generated the RREQ, the node should 
prepare the RREP packet with the necessary information, extracted from the received RREQ: 
- The originator IP address 
- The originator sequence number 
- The destination IP address 
- The RRL.  
The node then increments its own sequence number so that it is greater than that in the RREQ 
and enters the value zero into the hop count of the RREP. The RREP is now unicast to the next 
hop indicated by the last record in the RRL towards the originator of the RREQ. 
When receiving a RREP packet, the node first checks whether the RREP is addressed to this 
node. If not, it discards the RREP; otherwise, the node resets the ―soft state‖ maintained for the 
route in the routing table. The node checks if it has a route to the destination. If not, the route is 
added. Otherwise, the existing route is updated by updating the destination sequence number 
and the hop count to that destination. If the node has data packets to this destination, it starts 
forwarding them to the destination. Finally, the RREP is sent to the next hop IP address 
available in the RRL. 
4.5.5.3 Route Errors 
In general, invalid routes to a destination can occur in two cases: 
1) The received data packet contains an unknown destination. 
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2) The route has not been previously established or has expired, or a link between the node 
and the next one in the route is broken for some reason, such as node mobility, fading 
environment, signal interference, high error rate or packet collisions. A node detects a 
link break when it receives a link layer feedback signal from the MAC protocol, or when 
it does not receive passive acknowledgments.  
A route error message is raised in the following cases: 
 The period Td (the time required to find the destination by RREQ) has expired at an 
intermediate node during route request. 
 The period Tn (the time required by a node to find its neighbours) has expired and the 
intermediate node has been unable to find a neighbour. 
 At a broken route, if a downstream node cannot find the upstream neighbour that has a 
record in the RRL. This error is triggered after the failure of the local broken route repair 
algorithm to solve the problem which caused the error. 
Preparing an RERR packet before sending requires the inclusion of the following information: 
- The IP addresses of all destinations that are unreachable because of the broken route or 
invalid next hop. 
- If the broken route is already in the routing table, its destination sequence numbers should 
join the IP addresses added in the previous step by filling the ―unreachable destination 
sequence numbers‖ field in the RERR packet. This field has zero as its initial value. 
When a node receives an RERR packet, it searches for a route to the unreachable destination in 
its routing table. If a route exists and the next hop listed in the routing table entry is the node 
that sent this RERR, then the route is invalidated. 
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4.6 Summary  
This chapter has presented the general system model for the proposed routing algorithm and 
listed conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to accomplish its tasks. The environment in 
which the proposed algorithm is designed to work has been explicated by describing the 
network model, the mobility model and the traffic model. There has been a detailed discussion 
of the format of control messages used in this algorithm to perform the task of establishing 
routes and controlling the transmission of data packets between mobile nodes. In addition, the 
chapter has examined the routing tables used by nodes to maintain the information received 
about known routes and neighbouring nodes, showing the general information contained in 
these tables. The general system model discussed in this chapter will be elaborated in the 
coming chapter, in which the EHARP algorithm is described in detail. 
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Chapter 5 
Algorithm and Analysing of EHARP Protocol 
Objectives: to present 
 EHARP architecture  
 Our EHARP formal description  
 Simulation environment 
 Evaluating our protocol EHARP using NS-2 base simulation 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a novel routing approach for multiple-hop mobile ad hoc wireless 
networks. Research into such networks has yielded considerable advances over the past few 
years, particularly in the areas of developing and designing new routing techniques. 
Nevertheless, significant deficiencies remain, especially when they are compared with 
infrastructure networks. In mobile ad hoc wireless networks, the only possible direct 
communication is between neighbouring nodes, due to the limited transmission power of the 
devices; therefore communication between remote nodes is based on multiple hops. The nodes 
are mobile, so the interconnections between them are liable to change continually. Thus, the 
most important role of routing protocols in such networks is finding and maintaining robust and 
long-lived routes between sources and destinations. When designing a routing algorithm, the 
essential requirements are to keep the routing table reasonably small, to select a long-lived route 
for any given destination and that a small number of control messages should converge.  
The approach proposed in this chapter takes advantage of the mobility of mobile nodes and the 
stability of links to establish a robust and long-lived route between sources and destinations, in 
addition to reducing the flooding and overhead effects and minimizing the rate of breakage of 
links in the established paths. In the proposed approach, selecting nodes to forward packets 
between the source and the destination nodes is based on the Head Direction Angle (HAD) of 
these nodes and the stability of links between them. It should be borne in mind that the proposed 
approach could be used as a stand-alone routing protocol under the limits and environmental 
conditions discussed in chapter 3 and in this chapter. 
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5.2 Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol  
This section presents the operation of the proposed EHARP protocol [101], an enhancement of 
HARP [48] based on an on-demand routing scheme. We have added important features to 
overcome its disadvantages and improve its performance, providing the stability and availability 
required to guarantee the selection of the best path and to reduce the occurrence of broken links 
and dropped packets. 
 Each node in the network is able to classify its neighbouring nodes according to their 
heading directions into four different zone-direction groups. The zone direction is 
reduced until the node can select the strongest link stability and so increase availability in 
the network.  
 Each node in the network has a counter for the stability of link (SL) to its neighbouring 
nodes. The SL counter indicates which nodes are active in the network and this will 
improve the performance of the network and increase the likelihood of selecting the best 
or optimal path. The counter has an initial value of zero, which is increased by 1 after 
every successful sending or receiving and reduced by 1 after every failure in sending or 
receiving. The strongest stability of link is based on the greatest value in the counter. 
 This protocol is based on the time and acknowledgement message in order to guarantee 
the selection of the path and link stability.  
 Each node will send an acknowledgement message after receiving an RREQ and 
forwarding it, so the acknowledgement message should provide information on which 
nodes have problems or have been unable to forward the RREQ. 
 The source node should resend the RREQ whenever the time elapses before receiving the 
error message, in order to make use of the full lifetime of the links. 
EHARP is an on-demand routing protocol which can be considered as comprising two parts: the 
mobility and classification of nodes and the discovery and maintenance of routes.  
5.2.1 EHARP Architecture  
As mentioned in chapter 4, under EHARP each mobile node in the network sends its mobility 
information to its neighbouring nodes periodically and each classifies its neighbouring nodes 
into four different zone-direction groups (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4). As can be seen in Figure 5.1, 
according to their heading directions, each mobile node in the ad hoc wireless network divides 
the heading directions into different sectors. The heading directions between 0° and 90° 
comprise zone-direction 1 (Z1); those between 90° and 180° comprise zone-direction 2 (Z2) and 
so on.  
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Figure 5.1: The four basic heading direction ranges and neighbours classified in these ranges 
After the source node S has classified its cache table, as shown in Figure 5.1, and wants to send 
a request packet to its neighbour, S then selects that neighbour. This selection depends on two 
factors; the first being that it has an angular heading direction of one of the four axis angular 
values (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°) ±δ, where δ is an angular value that represents the range of angles 
that are considered near to the axis. The second factor is the value of the link stability of its 
neighbours. The neighbouring nodes of a mobile node are categorised within at least one of the 
four zone ranges, regardless of their actual positions relative to the mobile node itself. 
5.2.2 Route Discovery 
This section describes the route discovery process initiated at the source node and the 
intermediate nodes (all nodes except the source and destination). It also covers the route 
maintenance and local repair mechanisms that are executed when a link is broken. 
5.2.2.1 Route Discovery at the Source Node 
At the source node, when a source S requests route to a destination D, it will look in its cache 
for the destination node D and if it is found as a neighbour, S will start forwarding the data 
packets to D. If D is not found in the source cache, S will set a determined time Td within which 
the destination node must be found. S then searches its cache for a neighbour that has a 
reference or near reference angle, matching with or close to the heading direction angle of S, 
and the greatest value of SL, in order to extend the lifetime of the route. 
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Therefore, for the best matching and finding a neighbour with nearly similar heading direction 
to the node itself and the greatest value of SL, it can be seen in Figure 5.4 that this protocol 
performs well in a network where nodes form groups and where each group moves together in 
one direction, such as in military vehicles on a road.  
This protocol performs better than other existing routing protocols that use the technique of 
flooding the route request across the network to reach the target destination, by controlling the 
flooding by those nodes that let the link last longer. Here, after searching for a neighbour in the 
cache memory of S, there are two possibilities: 
1) If S does not find a neighbour in its cache by axis mapping [96] or the only neighbour has a 
negative SL value, it will apply an increment of ±δ around the heading angle of S, to widen 
the search for another neighbour in a new direction. If no neighbour is found in the time Td, 
a route request will be triggered again (S will repeat the RREQ for a limited number of 
times, to avoid the search-to-infinity, while excluding neighbours that have been selected in 
previous tries at finding D.  
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Figure 5.2: Route discovery at a source node S 
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2) If S finds a neighbour in its cache, then where more than one neighbour is found, the 
greatest value of SL will be selected. S will initiate an RRL and add its information record 
to that list. Each record has the following fields: node IP, node heading angle, zone range 
area, Td, SL. The route request packet will then be broadcast along a selected heading angle 
of a neighbouring node. Figure 5.2 shows the steps followed at a source that has data 
packets to send to node D. The Max RREQ Count is the maximum number of RREQs 
allowed to be sent to search for a particular destination. S_Dir is the heading direction 
angle of S and S_Zone is the zone of S (Zone 1 between 0° and 90°, Zone 2 between 90° 
and 180°, and so on). Nb_Dir is the heading direction angle of the neighbour Nb, Nb_SL is 
the stability of the corresponding link and Max acceptable HDA is the maximum accepted 
angle around its HDA axis that the node uses to search for a neighbour. 
The source node will again trigger a route request:  
 If it does not find a neighbour in the time Td (S will repeat the RREQ a limited number of 
times, to avoid the risk of search-to-infinity). Each time, it will apply an increment of ±δ 
around the heading angle of S. 
 If it does not receive a route reply from D in Td. 
 If it receives an RREP from D before Td has elapsed. 
5.2.2.2 Route Discovery at Intermediate/ Relay Nodes 
At intermediate nodes, all the nodes that receive the route request message update their route 
cache entries by updating the information of the neighbouring node from which the message 
was received; only the intermediate node to which the RREQ message is addressed will accept 
it, while other nodes will silently drop it. The intermediate node to which the message is 
addressed will search in its cache of neighbours for D, then: 
1) If the intermediate node is found, D in the cache table will be updated in the RRL by 
adding the record containing the information about the node itself, then it will broadcast a 
reply message along the nodes that have records in their RRLs backtracked to the 
initiating source node.  
 
2) If the intermediate node does not find D in the cache table, axis mapping will apply, 
increasing the heading angle of S by ±δ to extend the search for another neighbour with 
the greatest value of SL in a new direction. Before forwarding the route request message, 
the intermediate node will add a record to the RRL containing information about the node 
itself. It will then set up a determined time Tn within which a neighbour must be 
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discovered. After the intermediate node forwards the RREQ, an acknowledgement 
message will be sent to S.  
 
3) Each intermediate node identified again triggers an RREQ, which will be checked in the 
cache memory to see whether it has received an acknowledgement message from its 
nearest neighbour. This will be propagated to the same neighbour. If it has not received 
an acknowledgement message from its nearest neighbour, then an increment of ±δ will be 
applied around the heading angle of S to extend the search for another neighbour in a new 
direction. Figure 5.3 shows the actions performed at the intermediate node. 
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Figure 5.3: Route discovery at an intermediate node I 
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5.2.2.3 Route Reply 
A route reply message is triggered in two cases:  
1) When it receives the route request packet, D will piggyback the RRL that is included in the 
route request in the reply message, which it will send along the reverse path determined by 
the nodes recorded in the RRL. 
2) When the intermediate node has received the route request message and has information 
about the destination stored in its cache (a valid path to D), the intermediate node will 
update the RRL by adding its information and piggyback the RRL in the reply message, 
then send it along the reverse path determined by the nodes recorded in the RRL. 
An example of propagating an RREQ from S to D using EHARP is shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Propagating a route request from source S to destination D 
As can be seen, S moves in the heading direction 60°. Therefore, according to the rule of 
selection that nearly similar heading direction to the node itself and the greatest value of SL, S 
selects node 1 as the next hop to forward the route request packet to. Node 1 then follows the 
same rule of selecting the next downstream node, which is node 6. Node 6 then follows the 
same rule of selecting the next downstream node, which is node 11and so on. The RRL shown 
at the above of Figure 5.4 contains information on the nodes forming the path. The first record 
represents S and in each record the first field is the node identity, the second is the heading 
direction and the third are the zone direction and the stability of link that the node falls into. 
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5.2.3 Route Maintenance and Local Repair 
Route maintenance is a mechanism used to detect changes in the topology of an ad hoc wireless 
network that lead to the breaking of a route being used for sending or forwarding a packet. 
Detecting broken links and negative SL values with its neighbours is the responsibility of each 
node along the route. When a node has a packet to transmit, it detects whether its link to the 
next hop is broken and whether any of its neighbours have negative SL values.  
Route breaks may occur as a result of node mobility, fading environment, signal interference or 
packet collisions. Link breakage can be detected if a node receives a link layer feedback signal 
from the wireless MAC protocol such as IEEE 802.11 [44], where the MAC protocol 
retransmits each packet until a link-layer acknowledgment is received or until a maximum 
number of transmission attempts have been made. Alternatively, in EHARP, link breakage 
detection and a route error message are raised when one of the following conditions is fulfilled: 
1) If Td has expired at an intermediate node during a route request, an error message of the 
type ―Time Td expired‖ will be backtracked to the original sender along the RRL being 
built along the route request path. 
2) If Tn (the time set by a node to find its neighbours) has expired and the intermediate node 
has been unable to hear or find any neighbour which does not have negative SL, an error 
message of the type ―Time Tn expired‖ will be sent to the upstream node, prompting it to 
perform axis mapping along a different heading direction (local repair) in order to replace 
the broken link with an alternative one. 
3) On a broken route (during route reply and data sending), if a downstream node cannot 
find an upstream neighbour that has a record in the RRL, an error message of the type 
―Broken Route‖ is sent to the previous downstream node (local repair), prompting it to 
perform axis mapping and to find a new neighbour to propagate the message in the 
direction of an upstream node in the RRL. 
There are two ways to handle a broken route. When the detecting node returns a route error 
packet to the original sender, S can then attempt to use any other route to D that is already in its 
route cache or can invoke route discovery again to find a new route for subsequent packets. The 
former method is used when S has a valid path to D (i.e. one that has been used or established 
recently and has not expired). Otherwise, the latter method is used. 
5.3 Formal Model of EHARP 
In this section a formal specification of EHARP protocol is given in Interval Temporal Logic 
(ITL). 
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5.3.1 Overview of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) 
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a linear-time temporal logic with a discrete model of time. A 
system is modelled by a set of relevant state variables. An interval is considered to be a (in) 
finite, nonempty sequence of states 𝜎0𝜎1   where a state 𝜎i   is a mapping from a set of variables 
to a set of values. The length,|𝜎|, of a finite interval 𝜎  is equal to the number of states in the 
interval minus one. An empty interval has exactly one state and its length is equal to 0 
[105,107]. 
A behaviour is a sequence of states. As such, a behaviour is represented as an interval in our 
semantic domain. Therefore, the specification of a system represents the set of all acceptable 
behaviours of the system. This set is denoted by an ITL formula whose syntax and semantics are 
given below. 
5.3.1.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics 
The syntax of ITL is defined as follows, where a is a static variable (does not change within an 
interval), A is a state variable (can change within an interval), v a static or state variable, g is a 
function symbol, and p is a relation symbol.  
 Expressions 
 
 
 
 Formulae 
 
 
 
A static variable is global, i.e. its value remains constant throughout the reference interval, 
while a state variable is local, and i.e. its value can change within the interval. The function 
symbols include e.g. arithmetic operators such as  + , −and ∗ (multiplication). A constant is 
denoted by a function without parameter, e.g. 2; 3 or 5. An expression of the form 𝜄 a: f is 
called a temporal expression. It returns a value a for which the formula f holds in the reference 
interval. For example, the expression  
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  returns the value of the state variable A in the second state of the reference interval. 
Atomic formulae are constructed using relation symbols such as = and≤. Formulae are  
 then constructed by composing atomic formulae with first order connectives (e.g. 
⇁,∧,∀) and the temporal modalities skip (i.e. an interval of exactly two states), ―;‖ 
(Chop) and ―∗‖ (chop star). 
5.3.1.2 Derived Constructs 
The following constructs will be used for simplicity. 
 
 
5.3.2   A formal Specification of EHARP Protocol 
 In ITL, a system state is modelled as a mapping from a finite set of variables to a set of values. 
The system‘s behaviour is represented by a non-empty sequence of states, called an interval. A 
variable whose value may change over time is called a state variable, while a variable whose 
value does not change is called a static variable. In additional, we consider the so-called 
memory variables, which behave exactly like variables in an imperative programming language 
such as C, Pascal or FORTRAN. Unlike a state variable, a memory variable keeps its value until 
it is explicitly assigned a new one. By convention, the name of a memory variable begins with 
an uppercase letter (e.g. Td and Angle), that of a static variable begins with a lowercase letter 
(e.g. n and src), while the name of a state variable begins with an underscore (e.g. _error). The 
following variables are used to model the EHARP protocol. 
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5.3.2.1 Static Variables 
The following static variables are used: 
 n: This is the number of nodes in the mobile ad hoc wireless network. Nodes are 
numbered from 1 to n. 
 src: This denotes the source node. In equation 2, it is set to 1 to mean that node 1 is the 
source node. Any other node can be chosen without having to modify any part of the 
protocol specification. 
 dest: This denotes the destination node. In equation 2, it is set to n to mean that node n is 
the destination node. Any node other than the source node can be used as the destination 
node.  
 maxRReqCount: This is the maximum number of tries when the source node fails to 
receive a route reply, for a timeout of Td (see section 4.2.3 for more details about Td). 
Note that these are static variables and so their values do not change during the course of 
the protocol. 
5.3.2.2 State Variables 
The following state variables are used: 
 _err: this variable is set to true when: (1) the source node has not received an 
acknowledgement message from its neighbour after Tn seconds of sending to that 
neighbour a route request message; or (2) the timeout Td has expired without the source 
node receiving a route request reply. In both cases, this will trigger a new route request 
being sent out by the source node if the number of tries has not reached the maximum 
denoted by the static variable maxRReqCount (see equations 4 and 5). 
 _error: error[i] is set to false if the route request forwarded by an intermediate node i to one 
of its neighbours has not been acknowledged after a timeout of Tn seconds (see next section 
for more details about Tn). 
 _fRReq: fRReq[i] denotes the node that has forwarded the route request message to the 
node i. 
 _Ack: Ack[i] denotes the node that has sent an acknowledgement message to the node i in 
response to a route request message received from the node i. 
5.3.2.3 Memory Variables 
The following memory variables are used: 
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_Clock: This variable models a digital clock. It starts from 0 and increments by 1 at each 
transition. 
_RRep: This is true if a route has been found from source to destination, otherwise it is false. 
_RReqCount: This counts the number of times the source node unsuccessfully tries to find a 
route to a destination during the execution of the protocol. 
_Tn: This is the timeout for finding a neighbour node and forwarding a route request to it. 
_Td: This is the timeout for finding a route from source to destination. 
_ Cache: Cache[i; k] is true if node k is in the neighbourhood of node i. 
_ Angle: Angle[i] is the directional angle of the node i. 
_SL: SL[i] is the link stability of the node i. 
_RRL: This is the list of route records. Each route record has the form: node; angle; zone; Td; 
SLi 
_NLRR: This denotes the number of records in the RRL plus 1. 
5.3.2.4 Formal Specification of EHARP 
The protocol is described by the following formula 
 
 
Where 
 Init () is a formula specifying the initial state of the protocol. The   definition of Init () 
is given in Section 5.3.2.4.1. 
 Terminate states the termination conditions of the protocol. Its definition is given in 
Section 5.3.2.4.2. 
 Node (i) is the specification of the node i. The definition of Node (i) is given in Section 
5.3.2.4.3. 
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The formula (1) says that the protocol starts in a state satisfying Init () and involves n nodes that 
run concurrently and cooperate to build a communication route between a source node and a 
destination node. 
5.3.2.4.1 System Initialisation: Init () 
Set all the initial values here: 
 
 
5.3.2.4.2 System Termination: Terminate () 
Put all the invariants here: 
 
5.3.2.4.3 Specification of Nodes: Node (i) 
The source node performs the then and the intermediate nodes perform the else of the formula in 
(4)  
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5.3.2.4.4 The source node performs: 
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5.3.2.4.5 The intermediate nodes perform: 
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5.4 Simulation Methodology and Model 
In fact, most scenarios used in mobile ad hoc wireless networks and the behaviour of nodes in 
the real world are still unknown, for two main reasons: the difficulty of predicting the dynamic 
behaviour of such networks and the fact that they still exist mainly as a research subject, making 
real-life measurements difficult and costly. Hence, simulation is often used to compare ad hoc 
routing protocols. El-Nabi [97] elaborates:  
―There are three different ways to model networks: formal analysis, real life measurements and 
simulation [98]. The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks makes them hard to study by formal 
analysis. Some formal techniques that have been used in static networks include Petri nets, 
stochastic processes, queuing theory, and graph theory. None of these is especially well suited 
to studying dynamic networks. Since ad hoc networks are still mainly a research subject, most 
scenarios they will be used in are still unknown. For those scenarios that are known, e.g. 
military networks, extreme uncertainties and dynamicity are expected. Thus, use of real life 
measurements is currently almost impossible and certainly costly. The commonly used 
alternative is to study the behaviour of the protocols in a simulated environment‖. 
In addition, it is possible using simulation to evaluate and test the behaviour of networks with a 
larger number of mobile nodes and different sizes of network area than might be possible with 
physical devices in a fixed area. Moreover, it allows near perfect experimental control, testing 
protocols under certain parameter values then rerunning the test while varying one experimental 
variable and holding all others constant.  
Many MANET researchers have simulated and evaluated their proposed systems using different 
approaches and simulation tools. The most popular network simulators are the Network 
Simulator NS-2 [89], the Global Mobile Information System Simulation Library GloMoSim 
[92] and the OPNET Modeler [90], while some work has been simulated using programming 
languages such as C, C++ and Java [75, 94]. 
5.4.1 Simulation Environment 
This section reports the evaluation of the performance of the EHARP routing protocol by 
extensive simulation using NS-2. What distinguishes NS-2 [99, 100] from other simulators is 
the range of features it provides and the fact that it is an open source code that can be modified 
and extended. NS-2 is a discrete event and object-oriented simulator intended for networking 
research which was developed by the University of California at Berkeley and the VINT project 
[97]. There are several different versions of NS-2, the latest being NS-2.34. NS-2 provides 
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substantial support for the simulation of TCP, routing and multicast protocols over wired and 
wireless networks.  
NS-2 is written in C++, with an Object Tool command language (OTcl) interpreter as a 
command and configuration interface. The C++ part, which is fast to run but slower to change, 
is used for detailed protocol implementation. The OTcl part, on the other hand, which runs 
much more slowly, but can be changed very quickly, is used for simulation configuration. One 
of the advantages of this split-language programming approach is that it allows for rapid 
generation of large scenarios. One of the key hurdles to advancing MANET technologies from 
single-tier, 2-D topology to multi-tier, 3-D topology is the lack of research tools that support 3-
D simulation and visualization [97]. For example, the wireless extension of NS-2 and Network 
AniMator (NAM) [89], which have been among the most popular MANET research tools, lacks 
3-D support. Ryu et al. [97] present a 3-D extension of NS-2 and NAM for mobile ad hoc 
networks.  
5.4.2 Parameter Values 
In the simulation model, the number of mobile nodes ranges from 10 to 60, placed randomly 
within the simulation area. Each simulation was executed for 250 seconds and the network 
space for each simulation was 1 km x 1 km. The square site models situations in which nodes 
can move freely around each other and where there is a small amount of path and spatial 
diversity available for the routing protocol to discover and use. The network traffic was 
modeled as 10 constant bit rate sources. All communication patterns were peer-to-peer and 
connections were started at times uniformly distributed between 0 and 180 seconds (the 
maximum value allowed in NS-2). TCP sources were not used in the simulation because of the 
behaviour of TCP in offering a conforming load to the network by changing the times at which 
it sends packets based on its perception of the network‘s ability to carry them. As a result, both 
the time at which each data packet is originated by its sender and the position of the node when 
sending the packet would differ between the protocols, preventing a direct comparison between 
them. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the rest of the simulation parameters.  
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The results presented are mean values of multiple runs for each scenario and the collected data 
were averaged over those runs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Parameters of simulation used with NS-2 and random waypoint 
Scenario Name Mobility 
Scenario 
Speed 
 Scenario 
Network Size 
Scenario 
Pause time (s) 0,50,100,200
,250 
10 10 
Max Node Speed 
(m/s) 
10 10,20,30,40,50,60 10 
Number of mobile 
nodes 
50 50 10,30,50,60 
Simulation Time (s) 250 250 250 
Network Space 1 km x 1 km 1 km x 1 km 1 km x 1 km 
Radio range 250 m 250 m 250 m 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 IEEE 802.11 IEEE 802.11 
Radio propagation 
model 
Free space/ 
two-ray 
Free space/ 
two-ray 
Free space/ 
two-ray 
Antenna model Omni 
Antenna 
Omni Antenna Omni Antenna 
Traffic pattern CBR CBR CBR 
Maximum number 
of connections 
10 10 10 
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5.5 Summary 
In the proposed algorithm (EHARP), the use of HDA and the SL of nodes to select the most 
robust and long-lived link between each two communicating nodes is investigated. In addition, 
EHARP considers that the ad hoc wireless network lacks any external source of routing 
information.  Therefore, EHARP can be considered as a solution to handle the frequent changes 
in the network topology due to mobility and to maintain the long-lived multi-hop paths between 
two communicating nodes.  
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Chapter 6 
Secure Enhanced Heading Direction Angle Routing Protocol 
(SEHARP)   
Objectives: to present  
 Our approach of  (SEHARP) 
 The stages of (SEHARP) 
 Evaluating our  using NS-2 base simulation 
 
6.1 Introduction   
The nodes in ad hoc wireless networks act both as regular terminals (source or destination) and 
as routers for other nodes in the network, unlike fixed wired networks, such as the Internet, 
where dedicated routers are controlled by a service provider. The provision of security becomes 
a challenging task in these networks, owing to the absence of dedicated routers. The task of 
ensuring secure communication in ad hoc wireless networks is difficult for reasons including 
the mobility of nodes, limited processing power and limited availability of resources, such as 
battery power and bandwidth.  
Ad hoc wireless networks rely on the collaboration of the nodes involved for the network to 
create itself and operate efficiently. While maintaining suitable routing information in a 
distributed way is a challenging issue in such networks, it is even more challenging to secure the 
protocols used for routing [1-20]. At the network level, an ad hoc network fundamentally 
requires secure routing protocols, as these enable a communication path to be established. On 
the other hand, most of the routing protocols [21-30] designed for these networks give no 
consideration to security, operating with an implicit assumption of trust among the nodes. This 
provides opportunities for malicious attacker‘s intent on bringing down the network. Many 
types of routing protocol exist and have been extensively researched, with a view to finding 
solutions to security vulnerabilities[22-30]. 
Our contribution presented in this chapter is to design a Secure Enhanced Heading-direction 
Angle Routing Protocol (SEHARP) for ad hoc wireless networks based on the integration of 
security mechanisms that could be applied to the EHARP routing protocol. It proposes a novel 
secure routing protocol to improve the security level in ad hoc wireless networks, based on key 
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management and a secure path, which protects data to satisfy our security requirements. The 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 reviews related work in ad hoc wireless networks; 
Section 6.3 explains our security requirements; in Section 4 we propose an approach to 
introduce a secure version of the EHARP routing protocol and Section 6.5 reports on its 
evaluation. The chapter concludes with a summary.  
6.2 Our Security Requirements  
The following security requirements are to be satisfied by SEHARP. 
Detection of malicious nodes: If there are malicious nodes in a network, then the secure 
routing protocol should be able to detect them and avoid choosing such nodes during the routing 
process. 
Authentication: It is fundamental to verify the identity of an ad hoc wireless network node and 
its fitness to access the network. In other words, nodes that wish to communicate with each 
other must ensure that they are communicating with the right party and that they are genuine, 
not impersonators. They must ensure that data is from the origin and not modified or falsified.  
Authorisation: The nodes in ad hoc wireless networks need to have accurate authorisation in 
order to access shared resources on the network. This ensures that only authorized nodes are 
allowed to enter the network, store information and use it on their devices. In addition, RBAC 
provides different priority levels, to guarantee that network elements and individuals can only 
gain access to and perform operations on stored information, resources, services and 
applications. 
Confidentiality: The information that is sent between the ad hoc network nodes resident on 
their devices, or related to their locations, needs to be protected. This is to ensure that the data 
which has been sent between the nodes is the same and has not been modified, deleted or 
retransmitted to another node or entity. 
Availability: The availability of a network means that its essential services and applications 
should be accessible at any time when they are needed, even in the event of a breach in security. 
This availability ensures the survivability of the network, despite malicious attacks (denial of 
service), or the misbehaviour of particular nodes. This requirement is especially important in ad 
hoc wireless networks, where security breaches, attacks and malfunctions are more frequent and 
less likely to be detectable. 
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Data integrity: The information that is exchanged between the nodes needs to be protected in 
order to ensure that messages which have been sent are the same and have not been modified, 
deleted or retransmitted to another node or entity. This is most fundamental in situations such as 
banking, military operations and equipment controls (e.g. trains or planes), where such 
modification or deletion could cause potential damage. 
Non-repudiation: This ensures that any ad hoc wireless network node which sends/ receives a 
message, or initiates a ‗not deny‘ on receiving/ sending packets to/ from other nodes, is genuine 
and proves who the sender is. This is very important in situations of dispute or disagreement 
over events. It can be achieved using techniques such as digital signatures that relate the data or 
action to a signer. 
Guarantee of secure correct route discovery: This ensures that the protocol is able to find the 
route correctly and provide security for the selected route. 
6.3 Our Approach  
Our main focuses are to introduce SEHARP [102] to protect data transmission and to construct 
a secure routing protocol. The network consists of a group of mutually trusting nodes. There are 
two types of node, which are: 
 User Node (UN): Normal ground nodes, typically soldiers.  
 Network Backbone Node (NBBN): Usually units or master nodes located within the 
network, for example tanks. NBBNs can establish direct wireless links for 
communication amid themselves, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
The network based on NBBNs is responsible for the key certificates and manages them. There 
are four NBBNs in each network, because a defining characteristic of EHARP is that there 
should be four head directions so that each has an NBBN. Our approach locates four NBBNs to 
achieve our requirement for availability and non-repudiation. 
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Figure 6.1: User nodes and network backbone nodes in a network 
All user nodes should be able to run the encryption algorithms with limited computational 
power. All UNs in the network should trust any data message or any message signed using the 
corresponding private key. Each user node has enough memory to store information such as the 
public keys and certificates of many other nodes. 
SEHARP works as a group and has three stages, examined in turn in the remainder of this 
section: 
 Distribution of keys and certificate stage. 
 Secure path stage.  
 Secure routing protocol stage.  
 
6.3.1 Distribution of Keys and Certificate Stage  
Our scheme adopts the NBBN approach because of its superiority in distributing keys and 
achieving integrity and non-repudiation. The system uses private and public keys. The private 
key is used to sign the certificate and the public key of all the nodes, while the public key is 
used to renew certificates that are issued by another NBBN. All nodes must have a copy of the 
NBBN‘s own public key to verify signatures. The public keys and the corresponding private 
keys of all nodes are created by the NBBNs, which also issue the public-key certificates of all 
nodes. Each node has its own public/private key pair. Public keys can be distributed to another 
node in the secure path stage, while private keys should be kept confidential to individual nodes. 
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The NBBN signs the public key certificate for all nodes, so that these signings take place offline 
before the nodes can enter the network. 
Each node in our approach receives exactly one certificate after securely authenticating its 
identity to the NBBN. Each node will hold its digital certificate in the Node Databases (NDB). 
The main structure of node digital certificates, it contains the identifier of the node, its public 
key, the name of the NBBN issuing this certificate, the certificate issue and expiry dates, and the 
public key of the NBBN. Finally, the contents of the certificate will be attached to the digital 
signature of the NBBN. All nodes in a network should maintain fresh certificates with the 
NBBN. At the secure path stage, nodes use their certificates to authenticate themselves to other 
nodes in the network. 
6.3.2 Secure (node-to-node) Path Stage  
Our approach is to use a public-key algorithm to establish secure paths between nodes. The 
Secure Path Stage (SPS) is based on the requirement for all nodes to have a secure path with 
other nodes before sending any route request packet. Any node receiving an RREQ from the 
source node or another node without a secure path should discard the request. In our approach, 
each node is given the system public key in order for any node to be able to send a Secure Path 
Request (SPR) to another node the first time the certified public keys are exchanged. The 
authenticity of the certificate can be confirmed as the nodes have the system public key. The 
first objective of the SPS is the exchange of the certified public keys and their confirmation, 
while its second objective is to ensure the identity of the sender before acceptance of the RREQ. 
The SPS considers secure authentication node by node. 
6.3.2.1 Source Node 
When the source node S has an RREQ for node D, it looks for it in its route table, and then if it 
finds it, acts as follows: 
1- S will send an SPR specifying the type of packet (SRP), the IP address of the destination 
(IPD), S‘s certificate (certS), all signed with S‘s private key. 
2- D will verify the signature and certS.   
3- If the signature and certS are validated, then D will send a Reply Secure Path Request 
(RSPR), as shown in Figure 6.2. This will specify the type of packet (RSRP), the IP 
address of the source (IPS), D‘s certificate (certD), all signed with D‘s private key, and it 
will save certS in its NDB. If either is not validated, D will discard the request.  
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Figure 6.2: Secure path request and reply between nodes S and D  
Otherwise, i.e. if S does not find D in the route table, S will send an SPR to a neighbouring 
(intermediate) node specifying the type of packet, IPD and certS, all signed with S‘s private 
key. 
6.3.2.2 Intermediate Node 
1- The intermediate node I will verify the signature and certS.  
2- If these are validated, then I will send an RSPR specifying the type of packet, the IP address 
of the source (IPs) and I‘s certificate (certI), all signed with I‘s private key, as shown in 
Figure 6.3. 
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 Figure 6.3: Secure path request and reply between nodes S and I  
 
3- To make a secure path with its neighbour, node I will send an SPR to a neighbouring node 
specifying the type of packet, IPD and certI, all signed with I‘s private key, as show in 
Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4: Secure path request from intermediate node 
 
6.3.3 Secure Routing Protocol Stage 
At this stage, our SEHARP approach uses a hybrid of security mechanisms so that it satisfies 
the main security requirement and guarantees the discovery of a correct and secure route. The 
security mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash function, digital signature, time 
synchronisation and route discovery request, each of which is now explained in turn. 
6.3.3.1 Hash Function 
The hash function is used to encrypt and update the data necessary for the routing process in 
order to secure the mutable data, which in this case is the head direction and time to find a 
destination, whose information uses hash chains. 
SEHARP uses hash chains in order to secure the mutable data of the head direction and Td, the 
maximum time to find a destination node, for any node in the network, including an 
intermediate node and the destination node, which when it receives the message can verify that 
the mutable data has not been decremented by any attacker. SEHARP forms a hash chain by 
applying it one way.  
A hash function is the operation whereby a node creates an RREQ or RREP and a hash function 
repeatedly to begin. The setting of the hash function is as follows: 
1.  Assign a random number to the Hash field as the beginning value, so that Hash = 
beginning.    
2. Set the MaxHashCount field to the time to find destination value from the IP header, i.e. 
MaxHashCount = Td.  
3. The Hash_Function field is set to indicate which hash function is employed: 
Hash_Function = h. 
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4.  Calculate Top_Hash by hashing beginning value as _hash_Count. 
- Top_Hash = h MaxHashCount –  h hash_Count  
- Hash  Count = time to find neighbour 
- Where h is a hash function and h j (y) is the result of applying the function h to y j 
times.                                                
When a node is retransmitted an RREQ or an RREP packet is used to verify the hash count. The 
node performs the following operations: 
1.  It applies the hash function indicated by the Hash_Function field MaxHashCount minus 
Hash Count  to the beginning value in the Hash field and verifies that the value is equal 
to the value contained in the Top_Hash field.  
 Top_Hash =(h MaxHashCount – h Hash_Count).  
2.  Before rebroadcasting an RREQ or forwarding a RREP, a node uses the hash function 
from the Hash value for the new node: Hash = h (Hash). 
6.3.3.2 Digital Signature 
A digital signature is used to protect the non-mutable data, which is data not required or 
changed in the routing process. Digital signatures provide authentication and data integrity and 
ensure non-repudiation. 
SEHARP has two digital signatures. The first is the source signature used to protect the integrity 
of the non-mutable data in RREQ and RREP messages, which means that the source signs 
everything. The second is the node-by-node signature, based on who obtained a secure path, and 
every intermediate node afterwards verifies the hash function, updates information and provides 
a signature for the updating. When a node receives an RREQ, it first verifies the signature of the 
sender and of the secure path before creating or updating a route to that neighbour. Only if the 
signature is verified will it update a route and set Td to find the neighbour. After it is updated, it 
will sign all new updating and fields node by node from the RREQ. In the event of a failure, it 
will discard the RREQ. The destination node, when it receives an RREQ, first verifies the 
signature of the source and the signature of the intermediate node that has a secure path by field 
signature node-to-node. In the event of a failure, the RREQ will be discarded. 
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6.3.3.3 Time Synchronisation 
A timestamp is used to protect the route path from specific attacks. The EHARP protocol is 
based on the time to find the destination and neighbouring nodes. When a node has a request 
packet, it calculates the time to find a neighbour and destination, and after creating the packet 
uses the timestamp; then the node that has received the packet must verify it from the 
timestamp.  
6.3.3.4 Route Discovery Request 
Source node 
To secure routing, the EHARP protocol has an additional secure suffix on the original message 
format to carry out the expansion; its format is shown in Table 6.1.  
 Table 6.1: Secure suffix message format 
TYPE Length Hash Function Max Hash Count 
Top Hash 
Source Signature 
Timestamp 
Node-to-Node Signature 
Hash 
 
In the table, the type of suffix field for a secure RREQ message has a value of 32, while for an 
RREP message the value is 33. The suffix is lengthened for security in addition to type and 
lengthening of the number of bytes outside the field. MaxHashCount field values from the 
source node in the routing message are sent when randomly assigned. When these four fields are 
accounted for by a byte store, the TopHash field value is equal to that of the MaxHashCount 
field designated by the hash function to do the hash calculation.  
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When the source node sends a route request packet, SEHARP sets the MaxHopCount field 
equal to the time to find the destination node (TD) field from the IP header; assigns a random 
number and sets the hash field equal to it; and applies the hash function specified by the 
corresponding MaxHashCount field multiplied by the random number, storing the calculated 
result to the TopHash field. The source node also digitally signs all fields of the SEHARP 
packet (except the HopCount domain) and the field before the global suffix of the message. 
Node-to-node Signature intermediate node on the information stored signature, in RREQ source 
node signature information, including the SEHARP packet (except the HopCount domain) and 
the suffix field before the security message. Before signature the source node uses a timestamp.  
Intermediate node 
The signature line in the route discovery and route maintenance process occurs before sending 
the routing information and before the beginning of the calculation. Intermediate nodes, on 
receipt of an RREQ message, require secure authentication to activate. This process comprises 
four steps:  
(1)  The TopHash value field is verified by comparing the result of the Hash function and so 
on (MaxHashCount - HashCount) times the same hash result; 
(2)  Verification of the signature of the source node;  
(3)  Verification that the signature on the node-to-node is the owner‘s securing path; 
(4)  Verification of the timestamp. In the event of a failure the message is discarded.  
The intermediate node, before forwarding messages to its neighbours, will re-sign carefully and 
be used to replace the value of the node-to-node security suffix. The signature field must also be 
updated before the Hash value, and its value will be equivalent to the original to provide a value 
for computing Hash. 
6.3.3.5 Route Reply 
Destination node: 
When the destination node has received the route request packet, it will verify three steps, i.e. 
hash function, signatures and timestamp, and if all these are valid, it will update the information, 
set the hash function and sign all information. The destination node will sign only in the node-
to-node signature field and send the message along the reverse path in the network, which is 
determined by the nodes recorded. 
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Intermediate node: 
If an intermediate node receives a route request message, it will check the security and if all 
steps are valid it will accept the message; otherwise it will discard it. When it has information 
about the destination node stored in its cache table (a valid path to the destination), then the 
intermediate node will update and add its information. It will calculate and set the hash function 
and sign all updated information, then sign in the node-to-node field and send the message 
along the reverse path in the network, which is determined by the nodes recorded. 
6.4 NS-2-Based Evaluation  
This section reports on the testing of the performance of SEHARP in real network environments 
using the NS-2 simulator. The simulation environments, parameter values and evaluation 
metrics used in the experiments are presented and their results analysed.  
6.4.1 Simulation Environment  
The latest version of NS-2, version 2.34, was used to simulate the SEHARP algorithm. NS-2 
simulator is installed in the Linux-based operating system the Fedora. In order to reduce the 
effect of randomisation used in the simulation, each experiment was executed 25 times and the 
average calculated. Therefore, the trace files containing the experimental results were very 
large. They were filtered and sent to a Visual Basic tool in order to measure the evaluation 
metrics. The mobility models generated and used in the experiments, Tcl scripts and trace files 
were saved and will be provided for use with SEHARP. 
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6.5 Summary  
This chapter has presented a secure routing protocol based on key management, a secure path 
and protecting data to satisfy our security requirements. After understanding security 
requirements and identifying the types of attack the network might face, we proposed the 
security mechanism most able to satisfy these security requirements, having the following 
elements: 
 asymmetric encryption (used to protect non-mutable data) 
 hash function (used to protect mutable data) 
 Time synchronisation. 
All these mechanisms when applied to routing protocols should prevent external attacks, 
including black holes and routing holes, while providing viability, confidentiality and 
authentication. Time synchronization is used to provide the protocol with the ability to find the 
route and to ensure that the selected route is the correct path. The digital signature mechanism, 
when applied to routing protocols, should prevent internal attacks, including impersonation, and 
should provide non-reputation and integrity.  
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Chapter 7 
Security of Access in Hostile Environments Based on the History 
of Nodes in ad hoc Networks 
Objectives: to present 
 Security requirements of secure environment  
 Classification in secure environment 
 Digital operation certificate management framework 
 Components of our architecture 
 Our secure environment formal description 
 Case study. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
An ad hoc wireless network is built on cooperation between two or more nodes with wireless 
links and networking capability. The major applications of such networks today are tactical 
military and other security-sensitive operations. For example, military and police units (e.g. 
soldiers, tanks, police cars) equipped with wireless communication devices can form ad hoc 
wireless networks when they roam in insecure environments. Such networks can also be used 
for emergency, law enforcement and rescue missions. Since they have relatively low cost and 
can be deployed rapidly, they also constitute a viable option for commercial uses such as sensor 
networks and emergency situations, and there is a trend to adopt them for commercial uses due 
to their unique properties. The most critical challenge in the design of these networks is their 
security in hostile environments [81-86]. 
Their nodes are independent units which rely not on a central infrastructure but on neighbouring 
nodes to route each packet to the destination node. Ad hoc wireless networks can therefore work 
properly only if the participating nodes cooperate with each other in routing and forwarding. 
Nodes lack physical protection and are always under threat of being captured and compromised. 
They carry user and device histories, as each node can obtain data on all events involving a 
specific user and a specific device; therefore, each has to be able to document the user and the 
device at the registration stage.  
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The security requirements for different services range from highly security-sensitive military 
tactical operations, such as battlefields, rescue missions and emergency situations, to 
instantaneous classroom applications and areas where density is too small to justify 
economically the deployment of a network infrastructure. Attacks on ad hoc wireless networks 
can come from any direction and can target any node. Thus, ensuring a secure environment is as 
important as for wired networks, which have several lines of defence such as firewalls and 
gateways. Security depends on access to the history of each unit, which is used to calculate the 
cooperative values of each node in the environment. The calculated cooperative values are then 
used by the relationship estimator to determine the status of the nodes. Every node should be 
capable of making its own security decisions based on cooperation with other peer nodes.  
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 7.2 discusses the 
requirements for any security solution, while section 7.3 explains the secure environment. 
Section 7.4 describes the creation of public/ private keys and digital certificates, section 7.5 sets 
out the components of our architecture, section 7.6 presents and explains the activity diagram 
and section 7.7 presents a case study. Section 7.8 concludes the chapter. 
 7.2 Security Requirements  
The following are the security requirements to be met by a secure environment:  
 Authentication: Ensures the identity of the node with which the communication is 
carried out. This avoids impersonation. 
 Availability: Ensures that the eligible nodes are able to obtain the required services 
despite denial-of-service attacks. 
 Non-repudiation: Ensures that a node cannot deny a particular action performed by it at 
a later stage. This could help in the detection of compromised nodes. 
 Detection of malicious nodes: Ensures that nodes are capable of detecting the presence 
of malicious nodes in the environment, thus avoiding the participation of such nodes in 
the routing process. 
 Stability: Ensures that a node is able to revert to its normal operating state within a finite 
time after any attack. 
7.3 Secure Environments 
In a secure environment, some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other infrastructure-based 
wireless networks such as WLANs and cellular systems; therefore, each of the ad hoc nodes 
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will belong to an operation service provider(OSP), as shown in Figure 7.1. Other non-managed 
ad hoc network nodes, which are not involved in any other wireless networks, will be managed 
by the OSP, in order for those undefined nodes or networks to be able to access our secure 
environment. The following sections show how our SE consists of a number of ad hoc wireless 
networks interconnecting with each other.  
7.3.1 Node classification 
Nodes in the SE are classified thus: 
 User Nodes are normal ground nodes; typically, soldiers equipped with devices of 
limited communication and computation ability whose duty it is to collect data and 
transfer it to a network backbone node.  
 Network Backbone Nodes are usually units or master nodes located within the same 
network, for example in towers or tanks. NBBNs can establish direct wireless links to 
communicate amongst themselves.  
 Operation Service Providers are usually units in the environment. This type of node 
will have many management, registration and control functions, such as duty signing and 
creating new certificates for different nodes in the secure environment.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Secure environment 
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7.3.2 Node Documentation  
All nodes in the secure environment are also placed into three categories according to their 
documentation status. 
 Documented nodes are those which are documented by the OSP. Information on these 
nodes and their history is stored in a database (DB) authenticated by the OSP. 
 Certificate-documented nodes are those which possess a certificate issued by the OSP. 
They will have come into contact with a secure environment earlier and the certificate 
will verify that they are secure. Information on these nodes is stored in the documented 
DB of the OSP and they do not have any history in the documented DB. 
 Undocumented nodes are those in the secure environment which do not fall into either 
of the above two categories. This category may also contain nodes which could have been 
certificate-documented by an OSP, but remain undocumented because there has been no 
need to verify their certificates. 
7.4 Digital Operation Certificate Management Framework  
This section describes the certificate management system of a secure environment. It shows 
how public/private keys and digital operation certificates are created. It also illustrates the 
process of certificate revocation.  
7.4.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificates  
The public keys and the corresponding private keys of secure environment nodes are created by 
the OSP, which also issues the public-key certificates of SE nodes. Since a key is unique, 
(Kpublic) is unique and thus H(Kpublic), the fingerprint of Kpublic, is also unique and is considered 
the identifier in an SE. The operation certificate is used as permission to access this 
environment. Each node in the secure environment holds its digital operation certificate in its 
node database. The main structure of digital operation certificates contains [70] the MAC 
address of the node, its public key, the name of the OSP issuing this certificate, the certificate 
issue and expiry dates and the public key of the OSP. Finally, the contents of the certificate are 
attached to the digital signature of the OSP. 
 Node Identifier (ID):  Holder of the certificate 
 MAC address of device (Mac): The unique serial number of the device  
 Node Public Key (Kpublic): A unique key that is the fingerprint of the user  
 Certificate Operation OSP Identifier: Name of the OSP that created and signed the 
certificate 
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 Certificate Issue Date/Time: The first day on which the certificate is valid  
 Certificate Expiry Date/Time: The last day on which the certificate is valid  
 OSP Digital Signature: Digital signature of the OSP. 
7.4.2 Digital Operation Certificate Distribution  
Certificate distribution is a very important and low-cost mechanism that allows SE nodes to 
send the certificates they hold. Each node periodically starts receiving its physical neighbour (in 
one hop), its digital operation certificate and the corresponding OSP‘s public key stored in its 
NDB. Each node receives these certificates, compares them with its NDB and adds whatever 
new certificates it does not hold, as well as the public keys of its issuer; or it adds the renewal of 
an expired, extant certificate. The certificate distribution process is repeated at regular time 
intervals (RTIs). All nodes will have almost all digital operation certificates based on the 
mobility of the nodes and the RTI. 
7.4.3 Revocation of Digital Operation Certificates  
The digital certificate management system provides certificate revocation as one of its basic 
services. There are two types of certificate revocation in our algorithm. Explicit revocation 
occurs when any node has a certificate and the OSP revokes it. The OSP sends the 
corresponding revocation to the other nodes belonging to the SE. If it cannot send the 
corresponding revocation for any reason, the renewal of the certificate can be denied, resulting 
in an implicit revocation. 
In general, the OSP, when issuing the certificate, determines its issuing and validity times. All 
certificates are revoked after their expiration time. Therefore, the OSP should be updated about 
the certificates of SE nodes before the expiration time. In both types of revocation, when the 
OSP provides the SE nodes with information about any certificate, it should be distributed 
through the exchange process. In this way the nodes in the secure environment will be provided 
with this new information. Consequently, the OSP is responsible for the certificate revocation 
process and for transferring these revocations to all SE nodes. All SE nodes are informed when 
any of them carries out an explicit revocation and their NDBs are subsequently modified. This 
revocation will be distributed to the other nodes in the secure environment, both by certificate 
distribution and the process by which NDBs are merged. 
The OSP is responsible for updating those certificates that have been implicitly revoked at 
regular intervals. Each SE node that has a new certificate will update its NDB, and then transfer 
the new certificate to its neighbours through the certificate distribution process. If any node 
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does not receive the new certificate through the distribution and merging processes, and needs 
to validate the key, a new certificate will be requested from the OSP itself.  
7.5 Components of our Architecture 
The components of our architecture are as follows:  
User Nodes, as set out in 7.3.1 above, are typically soldiers or persons equipped with devices of 
limited communication and computation ability, whose duty is to deal with nodes, collect data 
and transfer them to NBBNs.  
Network Backbone Nodes are usually units or master nodes located within the same network, 
for example towers or tanks. NBBNs can establish direct wireless links for communication 
among themselves. There are three divisions which carry out many functions (management, 
observation, control and so on) for the network. Their responsibility is to collect data, to observe 
nodes entering the network and to record the histories and certificates of all other nodes.  
Operation Service Providers are usually units in the environment whose five divisions carry 
out many functions (management, registration, control and so on) for that environment. Their 
responsibility is to register new nodes, collect and analyse data, update the history of nodes and 
observe nodes entering the environment. The OSP has six units, which are the Registration Unit 
(RU), the Operation Certificate Unit (OCU), the Data Packet Collection Unit, the Analyser Unit 
(AU), the History Model Unit and the Database Unit.  
The responsibility of the Registration Unit is to register a new node and apply the policy of the 
unit. Registration is an important stage before issuing a digital operation certificate for a node, 
as it verifies the identity of the user. This is the function of the RU. The user provides the RU 
with essential information: the user‘s name, the MAC address of the device and the fingerprint 
of the user. 
The Operation Certificate Unit is the main service provided by the OSP. When the OCU 
receives a certification request from the RU, the OSP issues a digital operation certificate and 
signs it with its private key. The structure of the certificate should be defined by being 
standardised to ITU-T recommendation X.509, for example. All the information needed to 
complete the certificate will be provided by the RU. 
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Figure 7.2: Components of our architecture 
The Data Packet Collection Unit collects the data packets in a secure environment and saves 
them in the main buffer. The data collector enables the packet analyser to use data collection 
containers to analyse all available data that the system has collected from the different nodes. At 
the same time it enables the packet analyser to process the transferred information, which can be 
used to obtain and save data that is gathered from several sources [106].  
The Database Unit stores information on each node in a secure environment, including 
information regarding the history model of each node. It also keeps information like H (Kpublic), 
Kpublic, the fingerprints of each node and the MAC address of each device. Finally, it holds 
information regarding digital operation certificates and their revocation, to help in restricting 
future access with the same certificate. 
 Chapter 7: Security of Access in Hostile Environments Based on the History of Node in Ad hoc Networks 
117 
 
The History Model Unit is used to calculate the cooperation values of each node in the 
environment. Our secure environment access system uses the history of nodes to build several 
lines of protection, equivalent to firewalls and gateways in wired networks. This unit receives 
data on the classification of nodes from the analyser base to analyse the packets. There are three 
kinds of node, as follows. 
1) Positive Node (POSN). This is considered a cooperative node which, concerning packets 
or messages, will: 
- Notify its neighbours of any misbehaviour  
- Send an update to its neighbours when it receives new information 
- Forward any notification it receives from the OSP or NBBN 
- Notify its neighbours about any problem occurring with itself.  
The history of positive node (HPOSN) =  
   Σ all  events  of  (POSN )
Σ all  events  of  node
                   (1). 
2) Natural Node (NATN). This is considered an uncooperative node and  carries out  normal 
work, such as: 
-  Regular forwarding 
-  Sending regular updates to its neighbours  
-  Sending acknowledgment messages   
The history of natural node (HNATN) =  
   Σ all  events  of  (NATA )
Σ all  events  of  node
.       (2) 
3) Negative Node (NEGN). This type misbehaves and does not send natural packets and 
messages. It is not considered a natural node because it: 
- Does not perform regular forwarding 
- Does not send regular updates to its neighbours 
- Does not send acknowledgment messages     
- Carries out misbehaviour  
- Tries to attack, for example by sending invalid certificates or invalid public keys, or 
sending many packets to a specific node. 
The history of negative node (HNEGN) = 
   Σ all  events  of  (NEGN )
Σ all  events  of  node
                                 (3)            
The Analyser Unit checks each packet or message in the secure environment that the main 
buffer has collected. It then classifies all packets according to their contents. The analyser deals 
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with all definition of packets and messages. It has the ability to define and classify unknown 
packets and add to the classification. The analyser will classify the nodes in the secure 
environment into three categories, POSN, NATN and NEGN, according to Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Node classification by analyser unit 
Event and behaviour 
Positive 
Node 
Natural 
Node 
Negative 
Node 
Regular forwarding  √  
Sends regular updates to its neighbours  √  
Sends acknowledgment messages  √  
Notifies its neighbours of any misbehaviour 
by others 
√   
Send updates to its neighbours when it 
receives new information 
√   
Forwards any notification it has received 
from OSP or NBBN 
√   
Notifies its neighbours of any problem 
occurring with itself √   
Carries out misbehaviour   √ 
Tries to attack (sends invalid certificate or 
invalid public key, or sends many packets to 
a specific node) 
  √ 
7.6 Activity Diagram 
The activity diagram (Figure 7.3) depicts the steps taken by a node while handling requests to 
access a secure environment. The following are the steps shown in the activity diagram:   
- Request from node J to node I  
- Node I checks whether node J is registered   
- If node J is not registered and node I ignores its request then node J transfers to the 
registration stage.  
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- If node J is registered then node I checks for the operation certificate (OC) of node J in 
its database. 
- If the OC of node J is not in the database then node I requests it from the OSP. 
- If the OC of node J is in the database then node I checks that the MAC address and public 
key of node J are valid  
- If the MAC address and public key of node J are not valid then node I ignores its request 
and node J transfers to the registration stage 
- If the MAC address and public key of node J are valid then Node I checks whether node 
J is documented  
- If node J is not documented, then it is certificated-documented   
- If node J is certificated-documented then it can access the secure environment through 
the OSP  
- If node J is documented then node I requests the history of node J from the OSP. 
- If the history of negative node of node J > 0 then Node J can access the secure 
environment through the OSP  
- If the HNEGN of node J < 0 then If the HPOSN of node J = 0 then Node J can access the 
secure environment through an NBBN. 
- ELSE node J can access the secure environment through any node. 
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Figure 7.3: Activity diagram 
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7.7 Formal Description 
The formal description of the Secure Environment (SE) is as follows. 
7.7.1 Network model 
In a secure environment, some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other infrastructure-based 
wireless networks such as WLANs and cellular systems; therefore, each of the ad hoc nodes 
will belong to an operation service provider (OSP), as shown in Figure 7.1. Other non-managed 
ad hoc network nodes, which are not involved in any other wireless networks, will be managed 
by the OSP, in order for those undefined nodes or networks to be able to access our secure 
environment. Our secure involves a number of MANET interconnecting with each other; in 
addition all PKI are pre-connected by wireless connection to exchange data, and to update 
information.  
𝑃𝑘𝑖: Public key of network 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
Those OSP are fully trusted by all nodes that belong to this secure environment. Nodes in the 
SE are classified thus: 
 User Nodes(UN) are normal ground nodes;  
𝑛: Number of networks in the SE; networks are numbered from 1 to 𝑛;  
  Network Backbone Nodes(NBBN) are usually units or master nodes located within the 
same network,  
𝑛𝑖: Number of nodes, including Network Back Bone Node (NBBN), in the network 𝑖, 1 ≤𝑖 ≤𝑛; 
nodes in a network 𝑖 are numbered from 1 to 𝑛𝑖;  
 Operation Service Providers (OSP) is usually units in the environment.  
k𝑖: Number of Operation Service Providers (OSPs) in SE 𝑖, 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛;  
𝑃𝑘𝑖: Public key of network 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
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7.7.2 Behaviour model 
In a secure environment, the behaviour of nodes capture by operating service node 
(OSP) and stores in history file of behaviours  that nodes might have (positive node , 
negative node and natural node ). Positive Node (POSN) This is considered a 
cooperative node which, concerning packets or messages, will: Notify its neighbours of any 
misbehaviour  , Send an update to its neighbours when it receives new information, 
Forward any notification it receives from the OSP or NBBN and Notify its neighbours 
about any problem occurring with itself.  
POSN:  Positive node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛. 
     Natural Node (NATN), this is considered an uncooperative node and carries out normal         
    work, such as: Regular forwarding, Sending regular updates to its neighbours and sending 
acknowledgment messages.  
NATN:  Natural node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
Negative Node  (NEGN),this type misbehaves and does not send natural packets and messages. 
It is not considered a natural node because it: Does not perform regular forwarding, does not 
send regular updates to its neighbours, does not send acknowledgment messages,   carries out 
misbehaviour, tries to attack, for example by sending invalid certificates or invalid public keys, 
or sending many packets to a specific node. 
NEGN:  Negative node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛. 
During specific period of time; this capture is always updated depending on the 
observed node actions, despite the fact that saving all behaviours is impossible; 
nevertheless, a reasonable number of behaviours must be stored. 
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7.7.3 Mobility model 
Our secure environment (SC) is proposed for ad hoc wireless networks with a minimum number 
of mobile nodes. The proposed algorithm requires a different minimum number of nodes in the 
network to guarantee establishment of connection between nodes. In secure environment (SC), 
each node sends an RREQ packet to only one neighbor or operating service provider (OSP). In 
an ad hoc network, however, there are many situations where mobile nodes move 
together or form groups (the heading direction angle of nodes in each group is nearly 
similar). For example, vehicles on a road or, in a military scenario, a group of soldiers 
searching a particular plot of land, all working together in a cooperative manner to 
accomplish a common goal. 
 The following variables represent the parameters of the SE: 
 𝑛: Number of networks in the SE; networks are numbered from 1 to 𝑛;  
 𝑛𝑖: Number of nodes, including Network Back Bone Node (NBBN), in the 
network 𝑖, 1 ≤𝑖 ≤𝑛; nodes in a network 𝑖 are numbered from 1 to 𝑛𝑖;  
 k𝑖: Number of Operation Service Providers (OSPs) in SE 𝑖, 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛; 
 hi : History of node in SE 𝑖, 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛;  
 DOC𝑥𝑗: Digital Operation Certificate of node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 DOCM : Documented of node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 C-DOCM: Certificate -Documented of node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 2POSN :  Positive node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 NATN : Natural node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 NEGN : Negative node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 HPOSN : History of positive node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 HNATN : History of natural node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 HNEGN : History of negative node 𝑖  in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
 𝑃u𝑏𝑖𝑗: Public key of the node 𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for 1 𝑗 ≤𝑛𝑖 and 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
 𝑃𝑟v𝑖𝑗: Private key of the node 𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for 1 𝑗 ≤𝑛𝑖 and 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
 𝑃𝑘𝑖: Public key of network 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
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 MAC 𝑖: MAC address of node 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 
Before defining our access mechanism, healthiness conditions for the above variables must be 
defined.  
 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗≠𝑃𝑘𝑢𝑣 for 𝑖≠𝑢 or 𝑗≠𝑣  
 𝑃u𝑏𝑖≠ 𝑃u𝑏 𝑗 for 𝑖≠𝑗  
 𝑃𝑟v𝑖≠𝑃𝑟v𝑗 for 𝑖≠𝑗  
 MAC 𝑖≠ MAC 𝑗 for 𝑖≠𝑗 
 
After showing the healthiness of our variables, our access mechanism can be described by the 
following steps, where 𝑇𝑖 denotes the 𝑖th component of a tuple 𝑇:  
1. Granting certificate and history authority duties to nodes:  
 ∀𝑖,𝑗. 1≤𝑗≤𝑛𝑖 ∧ 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 ∧ OSP 𝑖𝑗=𝑡𝑖. (1) 
  
2. Issuing digital operation certificates to local nodes of each network:  
 ∀𝑖,𝑗. 1≤𝑗≤𝑛𝑖 ∧ 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 ∧ 𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗> 
(2) 
Where OSP𝑖 is the OSP of the node 𝑗 in the network 𝑖; 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 and 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 are the start and end 
date of the digital operation certificate; and the digital signature of the certificates 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is 
calculated by the OSP𝑖 of the network 𝑖 by performing threshold cryptography. CAL𝑖𝑗 is the 
type of node based on the registration.  
3. Recording history certificate to local nodes of each network: 
 ∀𝑖,𝑗. 1≤𝑗≤𝑛𝑖 ∧ 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 ∧ H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗,… 
.…, CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗> (3) 
 
Where OSP𝑖 is the OSP of the node 𝑗 in the network 𝑖; 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 and u𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 are the start and update 
of the history file; HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗 and HNEGN 𝑖𝑗 are the history file of the node and the 
OSP of the network 𝑖 calculated from their events. CLLA 𝑖𝑗 is the kind of node that it will be 
after calculation.   
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Each node uses its digital operation certificate and history certificate in order to access services 
in the SE through another node. A node needs to request from its OSP a new history certificate 
and operation certificate in order to perform in it.  
4. A request for digital certificates from a node 𝑗 of the network 𝑖 to another node can 
be modelled by a message of the form:  
  𝒋, 𝒊,𝑾,𝒁       (4) 
for some digital operation certificate  𝑊  and some history certificate 𝑍. 
Such a request   𝑗, 𝑖,𝑊,𝑍   is checked as follows: 
 
a) The requester is the owner of the digital operation and history certificates, i.e.  
 𝑾𝟏 = 𝒋 ∧  𝒁𝟏 = 𝒋 ; 
 
b) The OSP is the node where 𝑊 and 𝑍 were issued, i.e. 
 𝑾𝟐 = 𝒊 ∧  𝒁𝟐 = 𝒊 ; 
 
c) These certificates have not expired, i.e. 
 𝑾𝟑 ≤ 𝑪𝑫 ≤ 𝑾𝟒 ∧  𝒁𝟑 ≤ 𝑪𝑫 ≤ 𝒁𝟒 ; 
Where CD denotes the current date; 
 
d) Certificates 𝑊 and 𝑍 are authenticated using the public key 𝑃𝑘𝑖  of the network 𝑖 
and a signature verification algorithm for threshold cryptography.  
 
5. The requester node can access services in SE as follows: 
a) It has access through the OSP when the its history certificate is negative 
 
   H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗….… HNEGN 𝑖𝑗, 
𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗> (9) 
negativeiHifOSPaccessiNode  )()(  
 
b) It has access through NBBN when its history certificate is natural 
   H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗….… HNATN 
𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗> (10) 
naturaliHifNBBNaccessiNode  )()(  
 
c)  It has access through any anther node when the its history certificate is positive  
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   H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗….… HPOSN 
𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗> (11) 
                  postiveiHifjNodeaccessiNode  )()()(  
7.8 Case Study  
Wireless ad hoc networks of networks (WANETs) are considered to be the future of wireless 
networks owing to their specific characteristics: practicality, simplicity, self-organization, self-
configuration, ease of use and low cost when operating in a licence-free frequency band. 
 There are many applications of ad hoc networks, ranging from small, static networks that are 
constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile, highly dynamic ones such as:  
 In education, for students to interact with teachers during classes via laptops 
 Healthcare and telecare systems     
 Inter-vehicle communications; for example, sending instant traffic reports and other 
information between drivers  
 Email and electronic file transfer  
 Web services that can be used by ad hoc network users where a node in the network 
serves as a gateway to the outside world  
 A wide range of military applications, such as a battlefield in unknown territory where an 
infrastructure network is not available or impossible to maintain  
 Collaborative work for business environments  
 Emergency search-and-rescue operations in disaster areas, where it is almost impossible 
to implement an infrastructure network  
 Personal area networking and Bluetooth  
 Electronic payments from anywhere (i.e. taxi)  
 Home wireless networks and smart homes  
 Office wireless networks.  
In this section, we evaluate our secure environment system, concentrating on access to the SE. 
A military case study with two scenarios will be introduced. The first highlights our secure 
environment system, concentrating on our access control prevention technique for predefined 
armies in an unknown and unstable military environment; this scenario combines 
authentication, authorisation, confidentiality and integrity to provide privacy protection for 
elements and tactics. The second scenario illustrates an SE system in an unstable and unknown 
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military environment, showing event detection techniques combined with policies to provide a 
secure military system against unknown elements.  
7.8.1 Military environment  
This military case study considers a battlefield in unknown territory, where infrastructure 
deployment is hard to achieve or maintain; therefore, SE will be the perfect solution. The 
military domain is a very challenging environment characterised by ambiguity and the need to 
be able to deal with significant and disruptive dynamic changes. The goals of military systems 
are mainly concerned with the ability to provide a secure environment for their components, 
because opponents (enemies) are always trying their best to break down or destroy our 
activities. Therefore, our secure environment concentrates on prevention and detection 
mechanisms. 
7.8.2 Definition of components  
In the military environment, a critical system and the specification of the security requirements 
for its components are essential. Registration, authentication and authorisation are among the 
most important requirements, but before defining and analysing them, we need to define our 
military system and its elements. We will be dealing with a military alliance consisting of 
different armies (e.g. NATO [105]); each army will be defined as a WANET, while the whole 
alliance is defined as an SE. Each of the armies comprises different elements, from a soldier to 
the commander-in-chief. Usually in the military, there will be a specific hierarchy, in which 
each officer will have the authority to give orders or to communicate with different elements 
based on his/her rank.  
 Each army is classified as a WANET  
 WANETs merge to create a military alliance which is an SE  
 NATO is defined as the OSP for all armies  
 Soldiers in our SE will be defined as normal ad hoc nodes (negative, positive and nautral)  
 Base stations, tanks, trucks and military aircraft are defined as NBBNs  
 A set of policies is defined for each WANET (army).  
7.8.3 Securing the Military Environment  
Our military alliance will be a merger of different WANETs creating the SE, depicted in Figure 
7.4.  
The first step in providing a secure military system is to set up an operational process for the SE 
components; this is done by distributing operation certificates, which are initially granted by the 
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SE. These certificates act as identity documents for each element of the military SE. As with the 
operation certificates, each OSP distribute certificates to enable specific nodes to carry out 
leading and agile operations.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Secure environment community [105] 
Two scenarios are now considered for the military environment. 
7.8.4 Scenario One  
The first scenario assumes a military alliance of two armies (British and French), each of which 
has all kind of nodes (positive, negative and neutral). Before defining the SE to provide 
authorisation and authentication to other nodes, a few points must be clarified in our scenario:  
 Armies can join and disconnect without affecting the SE system.  
 The public keys of the digital operation certificate are known between all elements in the 
whole SE.  
 All nodes (soldiers) have received their operation certificates from their OSPs.  
 The OSPs have sent the history of the nodes to the NBBNs. 
 Each WANET has a set of policies. 
 All nodes in the SE must be registered at the registration stage. 
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To provide a secure environment in this scenario, the first step is to ensure administration; as 
previously mentioned, the OSP and the NBBNs will carry out the administration. Their duties 
are to guarantee that elements from different armies can communicate and engage with different 
elements in the SE system and to provide all nodes with updates on the history of other nodes. 
The second step is to provide or prevent access to the most essential components, which are 
needed in any community. Such prevention and access are needed for the authentication (by 
operation certificate) and authorisation (by node history status) of the SE elements. For 
instance, if a node (soldier) from the British army is trying to connect through the French army, 
this node will be authenticated (verified) by the NBBN of the French army by his operation 
certificate. Meanwhile, the granting of history status will be based on the policies (positive, 
negative and natural) of the node to access the SE through the French army. 
The third step is the containment and recovery component. When a problem has occurred 
during any military operation, specific rules and procedures usually apply; for example, if 
members of a French platoon have been captured, the enemy will try its best to extract the 
private key in order to gain access to all secret information and to forge new certificates in order 
to break the system down. In this situation, the OSP of the SE will try to regenerate new shares 
of the private key, to make sure that it is kept safe during military operations. Moreover, the 
history file of this node, updated via links through heterogeneous cards available with NBBNs 
(e.g. satellites and cellular), will be used to receive orders from the main station OSP of the SE 
to which the NBBN belongs.  
To elaborate on our secure system and to show the components providing authentication and 
authorisation between the military elements in the SE, the following specification formalism 
will be introduced:  
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        𝑋𝑖 𝑗: soldiers 𝑖 from army 𝑗; 𝑖 ≥1; 𝑗 = NATO countries;  
      𝑌𝑖 𝑗: tanks, trucks and military aircraft 𝑖 from army 𝑗; 𝑖 ≥1; 𝑗 = NATO countries;  
      Zi:  base station and cellular (OSP) 𝑖 from SE; 𝑖 ≥1.  
DOCM: Documented node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤  𝑖 ≤𝑛 
POSN:  Positive node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
NATN: Natural node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
NEGN: Negative node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
HPOSN: History of positive node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
HNATN: History of natural node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
HNEGN: History of negative node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
Hi: History certificate of node in SE 𝑖, 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛;  
DOC𝑥𝑗: Digital Operation Certificate of node 𝑖 in the SE, for 1≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛 
𝑃𝑘𝑖: public key of network 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛;  
MAC 𝑖: MAC Address of node 𝑖, 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 
 
7.8.4.1 Authentication and authorisation between elements of an army in the 
SE military system 
  Authentication (X1 British, X2 British) between soldiers in the same army is based on the X 
operation certificate, where X is received from base station Z. The certificate will be 
verified using the British public key and the MAC address of X. 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                 ifreqdrop )( validBBXDOC  ))21((  
        )21( BBX         
                                   validBBXDOCifreqAccept  ))21(()(  
 
 Authorisation (X1 British, X2 British) between soldiers in the same army is based on the 
history file of X and its status, where X is received from base station Z or Y and will be 
granted only for positive X.  
H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
 
 Chapter 7: Security of Access in Hostile Environments Based on the History of Node in Ad hoc Networks 
131 
 
                       ifreqdrop )( positiveBBH  )21(       
 )21( BBX    
                                 positiveHBifXaccessreqAccept  )21()(  
                     
 Authentication (Y1 British, Y2 British) between tanks or trucks in the same army is based on 
the Y operation certificate, where Y is received from the base station Z. The certificate will 
be verified using the British public key and MAC address of Y.  
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
 
 
                           ifreqdrop )( validYBDOC  ))21((  
           )21(YB         
                                   validYBDOCifreqAccept  ))21(()(  
 Authorisation (Y1 British, Y2 British) between tanks or trucks in the same army is based on 
the history file of Y and its status, where Y is received from base station Z and will be 
granted only to positive and natural Ys.  
        H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                            ifreqdrop )( negativeH  )21(  
        )21(YB      
                                  negativeHifYaccessreqAccept  )21()(  
               
 Authentication (Y1 British, X2 British) between tanks or trucks and soldiers from the same 
army is based on Y and X operation certificates, where Y and X are received from base 
station Z. The certificates will be verified using the British public key and MAC addresses 
of Y and X. 
 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>   
                           ifreqdrop )( validYXDOC  )(  
           YBXB         
                                validYXDOCifreqAccept  )()(  
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 Authorisation (Y1 British, X2 British) between tanks or trucks and soldiers in the same army 
is based on the history files of Y and X and their status, where Y is received from base 
station Z, and will be granted only to positive and natural Ys or Xs.  
           H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                     ifreqdrop )( negativeYXH  )(  
YBXB           
                          negativeYXHifYXaccessreqAccept  )()(  
       7.8.4.2 Authentication between elements from different armies in the SE 
military system 
 Authentication (X1 British, X1 French). If a soldier from the British army wants to 
authenticate a French soldier, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be 
verified using the French public key and the MAC address of X. 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>   
                           ifreqdrop )( validXBDOC )(  
            XF         
                                   validXBDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 
 Authorisation (X1 British, X1 French). If a British soldier tries to communicate with a 
French soldier, then the latter will need to check the history which he receives from the OSP 
or a French NBBN. If the British X is a positive node it will be allowed to communicate 
directly with the French soldier, while if it is a natural node it will be allowed to do so 
through a French NBBN.  
 
H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                    ifreqdrop )( negativeXBH )(  
           XF naturalXBHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(        
                      positiveXBHifXFaccessreqAccept  )()(   
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 Authentication (Y1 British, Y1 French). If tanks or trucks from the British army want to 
authenticate a French tank, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be 
verified using the French public key and the MAC address of Y. 
 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>   
                           ifreqdrop )( validYBDOC )(  
       )(FY          
                                 validYBDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 Authorisation (Y1 British, Y1 French). If a British tank tries to communicate with a French 
one, the history of the British Y is required and can be received from the OSP. If the British 
Y is a positive or natural node it is allowed to communicate with French tanks, whereas if it 
is a negative node it can do so only through the OSP of the SE.  
 
      H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                     negativeYFHifOSPaccessreqAccept  )()(          
)(FY   
               naturalpostiveYBHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(            
 
 Authentication (Y1 British, X1 French). If a British tank wants to authenticate a French 
soldier, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be verified using the 
French public key and the MAC address of Y. 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>   
                           ifreqdrop )( validYBDOC )(  
       )(FX          
                                   validYBDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 
 Authorisation (Y1 British, X1 French). If a British tank tries to communicate with a French 
soldier, a history of the British Y is required and can be received from the OSP. If the 
British Y is a positive or natural node it is allowed to communicate with French tanks, 
whereas if it is a negative node it can do so only through the OSP of the SE.  
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      H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                     negativeYBHifOSPaccessreqAccept  )()(          
)(FX   
               naturalpostiveYBHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(            
7.8.5 Scenario Two  
As with the first scenario, scenario two assumes a military alliance consisting of two armies 
(British and French). In addition, new elements will be defined in this scenario (Japanese army). 
Before stating how the SE provides authorisation and authentication to other nodes, some points 
must be clarified:  
 Armies can join and disconnect without affecting the SE system.  
 The public keys of the digital certificates are known by British and French elements in 
the whole SE system and unknown to the Japanese army.  
 All nodes (soldiers and tanks) have received their operation certificates from their own 
OSPs (each army has its own certificate).  
 Any node that is undefined and trying to operate in a different network will receive an 
operation certificate from its OSP and its history file will be new.  
 The OSP sends node histories NBBNs. 
 Each WANET has a set of policies.  
To illustrate the working of the SE system and to show how the authentication and authorisation 
components operate between the military elements, the following example is introduced. If 
during a war the British army needs reinforcements from a non-NATO country such as Japan, in 
order for the Japanese army to communicate with British forces and to engage into the 
battlefield, Japanese soldiers and tanks will need to obtain an operation certificate from the OSP 
to perform in such situations. As Japanese forces are non-trusted, our OSP will monitor and 
observe their actions based on their history in order to check whether or not Japanese elements 
are acting in a normal or malicious manner. This checking is accomplished by tracing their 
behaviour. Usually, showing all aspects of the tracing of behaviour under the set of policies in 
our scenario is impossible; therefore, we provide examples showing normal, malicious and 
positive actions.  
The following specific formalism is introduced:  
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𝑋𝑖 𝑗:  soldiers 𝑖 from army 𝑗; 𝑖 ≥1; 𝑗 = NATO countries;  
𝑌𝑖 𝑗:  tanks, trucks and military aircraft 𝑖 from army 𝑗; 𝑖 ≥1; 𝑗 = NATO countries;  
Z:   base station and cellular (OSP) 𝑖 from SE 𝑖 ≥1; 
W 𝑖k:  soldiers 𝑖 from army k; 𝑖 ≥1; k = non-NATO country; 
M ik:  tanks, trucks and military aircraft 𝑖 from army k; 𝑖 ≥1; k = non-NATO country. 
 
In the first instance, the Japanese will deal with the OSP. Four examples, all set in wartime, are 
given below to show how the OSP observes the behaviour of new nodes and the new army to 
build a history for every node as a basis for granting authorisation. 
In the first example, if an order from an OSP has been given to Japanese troops and the soldiers 
obey this order, the OSP will observe these acts and decide whether or not they are normal; it 
will still classify the nodes as new and follow these rules:  
 Authentication (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a soldier from the Japanese army wants to 
authenticate a French soldier in the SE, this will be done using the operation certificate, 
which will be verified using the OSP‘s public key and the MAC address of W.  
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗> 
                           ifreqdrop )( validWJDOC )(  
       )(FX          
                                   validWJDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 Authorisation (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier tries to communicate with a 
French one, the latter will need to check his history, which he obtains from the OSP or a 
French NBBN; if the Japanese W is a new node from a new army it will be allowed to 
communicate with the French soldier through the OSP. 
H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                            ifreqdrop )( DOCMWJH )(  
           XF      
                      DOCMWJHifOSPaccessreqAccept  )()(   
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In the second example, if an order from an OSP has been given to Japanese troops and the 
soldiers obey it, the OSP will observe these acts and decide whether or not they are normal. If 
the node continues to obey every order the OSP will classify is as neutral and follows these 
rules:  
 Authentication (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier wants to authenticate a 
French one in the SE, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be 
verified using the OSP‘s public key and the MAC address of W1.  
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗> 
                           ifreqdrop )( validWJDOC )(  
       )(FX          
                                   validWJDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 Authorisation (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier tries to communicate with a 
French one, the latter will need to check his history, which he obtains from the OSP or a 
French NBBN; if the Japanese W is a natural node it is allowed to communicate with the 
French soldier through a French NBBN. 
  H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                    ifreqdrop )( DOCMWJH )(  
           XF     DOCMWJHifOSPaccessreqAccept  )()(  
                      naturalWJHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(   
In the third example, if an order and notification from an OSP has been given to Japanese troops 
and the soldiers obey this order and forward the notification to their neighbours, then the OSP 
will observe these acts and decide that they are positive. If the node continues to obey all orders 
and forward all notifications, the OSP will classify it as a positive node and follow these rules:  
 Authentication (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier wants to authenticate a 
French soldier in the SE, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be 
verified using the OSP‘s public key and the MAC address of W1.  
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𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗>                           
                          ifreqdrop )( validWJDOC )(  
  )(FX      
                          validWJDOCifreqAccept )()(  
 Authorisation (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier tries to communicate with a 
French one, the latter will need to check his history, which he obtains from the OSP or a 
French NBBN. If the Japanese W is a positive node it is allowed to communicate directly 
with the French soldier. 
      H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                  ifreqdrop )( DOCMWJH )(  
       XF     naturalWJHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(  
                   positiveWJHifXFaccessreqAccept  )()(   
 
In the fourth example, a Japanese soldier tries to request a specific tactic from the French army 
in the SE using an invalid or fake operation certificate. The OSP will observe this act, decide 
that it is negative and send an update for the history file to all nodes in the SE. If the node 
continues to behave in this way, the OSP will classify it as a negative node and adopt the 
following rules:  
 Authentication (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier wants to authenticate a 
French one in the SE, this will be done using the operation certificate, which will be 
verified using the OSP‘s public key and the MAC address of W1.  
 
𝐷O𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, MAC 𝑖𝑗, CAL 𝑖𝑗 …, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n 𝑥𝑖𝑗> 
                          ifreqdrop )( validWJDOC )(  
      )(FX          
                                 validWJDOCifreqAccept )()(  
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 Authorisation (W1 Japanese, X1 French). If a Japanese soldier tries to communicate with a 
French one, the latter will need to check his history, which he obtains from the OSP or a 
French NBBN. If the Japanese W is a negative node it will not be allowed to communicate 
directly with the French soldier. 
 
      H𝑥𝑖𝑗=<𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠h𝑥𝑖𝑗, uh𝑥𝑖𝑗, OSP 𝑖, 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑗, HPOSN 𝑖𝑗, HNATN 𝑖𝑗, HNEGN 𝑖𝑗…CLLA 𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑖𝑔n𝑥𝑖𝑗>  
                  ifreqdrop )( negativeWJH )(  
       XF      
                    negativeWJHifNBBNaccessreqAccept  )()(  
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7.9 Summary 
This chapter has proposed ways to control access to a secure ad hoc database environment 
based on the history of its nodes. It also proposes an access algorithm which explains the steps 
taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure environment.  
We have provided a case study, with specific concentration on two military scenarios in 
unknown and insecure territory. Scenario one assumed two NATO countries (pre-connected) in 
a battlefield and showed the implementation and evaluation of access to a secure environment 
providing authentication and authorisation between members of the same network and between 
other members. Scenario two considered two NATO countries with new elements (non-
defined), showing the implementation and evaluation of our mechanism for allowing and 
preventing access to the secure environment. It detailed the access technique between NATO 
countries and the undefined elements, presenting a number of different situations that any 
military system might experience. In each situation our technique was examined to establish 
whether or not the situation was adequately addressed by our set of policies in order to prevent 
malicious acts by undefined elements in a secure military environment. 
The solution is a combination of the history of the nodes and operation certificates. Each node 
in a secure environment is uniquely identified by its public key and MAC address. The solution 
addresses various vulnerability issues affecting wireless links such as active and passive attacks. 
The dynamic nature of networks and their membership does not affect the solution, since each 
node makes access decisions on its own and the use of cooperative algorithms is avoided.  
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Chapter 8  
Comparative Analysis of Routing Protocols 
Objectives: to present 
 Compare results and analysis of EHARP and  HARP  
 Compare results and analysis of SEHARP and  EHARP  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a quantitative analysis comparing the performance of our 
proposed algorithms. There are two sections, the first giving the results of detailed 
simulations and a comparative analysis of the relative performance of two protocols: 
EHARP and HARP. The second section compares the performance of EHARP with that 
of SEHARP. 
 The protocols were carefully implemented in the NS-2 network simulator 
according to the specifications and guidance for implementing new routing 
algorithms issued by its designers. The particular parameters and values that were 
chosen when implementing each algorithm in the network simulator are 
described. 
8.2 Results and Comparative Analysis of EHARP and HARP  
This section consists of two main parts; the first presenting the performance metrics used for 
evaluating and comparing the performance of the routing algorithms, while the second offers a 
comparative overview and an analysis of these comparisons.  
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8.2.1 Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics used for the comparison are the same as those used for 
evaluating the EHARP, HARP algorithms.  
We measured three key parameters to evaluate the performance of our: 
 The efficiency of data packet delivery is defined as the measured ratio of the 
number of data packets delivered to their destinations to the number of all packets 
generated in the network. Note that each time a packet is forwarded this is 
counted as one packet transmission. 
 Route discovery packets (overhead) are defined as the number of all packets 
generated by all nodes in the network in order to establish routes between sources 
and destinations. 
 Average end-to-end delay of transferred data packets includes all possible delays 
caused by buffering during route discovery, queuing at the interface-queue and 
retransmission delays at the medium access control layer..  
Each parameter metric mentioned above was simulated in three different scenarios:  
1) Mobility scenario: with elapsed time values,  
2) Speed scenario: with different node speeds, 
3) Network size scenario: with different numbers of nodes. 
8.2.2 Comparative Overview and Analysis 
This section highlights the performance parameters used for comparing our proposed algorithms 
with the HARP protocol. 
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8.2.2.1 Route Discovery Packets (overhead) 
Figure 8.1 is a chart of route discovery packets through out the simulation period with 
the information captured at 50 sec and interval. The number of route discovery packets 
needed to find the path under EHARP and HARP increase and is shown in the chart. It 
can be seen that the number of route discovery packets needed to find the path is much 
lower in EHARP than in the HARP protocols, because the node under EHARP selects 
only that one node which has the greatest value of link stability to transmit the request 
packet. 
The increase is shown in Table 8.1, as a percentage and this is affected by many factors: 
the number of intermediate nodes, the location of source and destination, the number of 
attempts to reach the destination, the dropping of packets and the range of radio 
frequency (RF). The maximum percentage is 24.4% and the minimum is 13.3%. Based 
on the chart, the minimum percentage occurs when for example the source and 
destination are close together thus the number of intermediate nodes will be the 
minimum and the number of attempts to reach the destination will be the minimum. The 
maximum percentage occurs when for example the source and destination are not close 
together thus the number of intermediate nodes will be the maximum and the number of 
attempts to reach the destination will be the maximum. 
Table 8.1: Percentage of increase against period of simulation 
Period of simulation (s) Percentage of increase 
0–50  22.2% 
50–100 17.7% 
100–150 13.3% 
150–200  22.2% 
200–250  24.4% 
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Figure 8.1: Route discovery vs. mobility (elapsed time) 
 
The impact of node speeds on the route discovery packets for our scheme is shown in 
Figure 8.2, which plots route discovery against speed of node movement. As speed 
increases, the number of route discovery packets generated by EHARP and HARP 
increases, because the locations of source and destination are changed; thus the number 
of attempts to reach the destination will be the maximum. Route discovery packets in 
our scheme are significantly fewer than this generated by HARP because when 
establishing routes, in all situations, the source and intermediate nodes under EHARP 
select a limited number of nodes to contribute to finding these routes.  
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Figure 8.2: Route discovery vs. speed 
 
Figure 8.3: Route discovery vs. network size 
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The scalability of mobile ad hoc networks with the number of nodes is shown in Figure 
8.3, which displays the results of an experiment examining the effect on numbers of 
route discovery packets of changes in the number of mobile nodes. As can be seen in 
Figure 8.3, as the number of nodes in the network was increased, the number of route 
discovery packets generated by EHARP and HARP also increased, because the source 
and destination were not close together; thus the number of intermediate would be the 
maximum. Our scheme has fewer the number of route discovery packets than HARP 
because the nodes under EHARP select only those nodes which have strongest link to 
transmit the request packet. 
. Consequently, it can be seen that our proposed scheme is more scalable with the 
network size in terms of overhead cost than HARP  and that the number of route 
discovery packets is less affected by mobility, node speed and network size than in 
either of this. 
8.2.2.2 Efficiency of Data Packet Delivery   
Figures 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 compare the efficiency of our proposed scheme with HARP a 
by plotting ERDP against mobility for elapsed times, node speeds and network size. In 
general, these figures show that the ERDP in our scheme is higher than for HARP in 
terms of elapsed time, speed and number of nodes. This means that fewer of the number 
of route discovery packets are needed to deliver data packets from source to destination, 
because long-lived routes are established.  
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Figure 8.4: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. mobility (elapsed time) 
Figure 8.5 plots the ERDP ratio against the speed of mobile nodes and shows that at low 
speeds (10-30 m/s) in  EHARP the ERDP is increased, while at higher speeds (>30 
m/s), EHARP show good efficiency than HARP because the routes under EHARP are 
long- lived which have strongest link.  
 
Figure 8.5: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. speed 
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Analysing the scalability of the network against the number of mobile nodes, Figure 8.6 
compares the ERDP ratio against number of nodes. As the number of nodes in the 
network was increased the ERDP ratio for EHARP decreases because the higher 
number of nodes in an ad hoc wireless network will lead to more of them contributing 
to the formation of each route. As can be seen in Figure 8.7 the ERDP ratio for EHARP 
better than HARP because the probability of link breaks under HARP more than 
EHARP caused by the overhead is thus needed to repair or re-establish broken routes. 
  
 
Figure 8.6: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. network size 
8.2.2.3 Average end-to-end Delay  
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mobile nodes is depicted in Figures 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9. It can be seen that EHARP has an 
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nodes which are nearest heading direction and have the strongest stability links. 
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is decreased in EHARP, as shown in Figure 8.8, because there is a lower probability of 
link breaks caused by there are more neighbours with strongest link. 
 
                 Figure 8.7: Average end-to-end delay vs. mobility (elapsed time) 
 
Figure 8.8: Average end-to-end delay vs. speed 
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nodes in the network in flooding the route request packets, which in turn increase  the 
delay in finding the route 
 
 
Figure 8.9: Average end-to-end delay vs. network size 
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EHARP and better than in HARP in terms of elapsed time, speed and number of nodes. 
Because the throughput of the network decreases after incorporating SEHARP, the 
ERDP is low in many cases. When elapsed times increases, a number of data packets 
waiting for route discovery are dropped, hence fewer data packets reach the destination, 
but the decrease in throughput is only about 3%. As the number of routing packets 
increases, this can again be attributed to the authentication overhead.  
 
 Figure 8.10: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. mobility (pause time) 
 
Figure 8.11: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. speed 
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Analysing the scalability of the network with the number of mobile nodes, Figure 8.12 
plots the ERDP against the number of nodes. As increases nodes, the ERDP for 
SEHARP decreases. This indicates that a larger ad hoc wireless network has a higher 
number of nodes which will contribute to the formation of a route, increasing the 
probability of link breaks and thus requiring more overhead to re-establish broken 
routes. The ERDP of EHARP is better than that of SEHARP because when the network 
size is increased, the SEHARP overhead also increases, which affects the ERDP.  
 
Figure 8.12: Efficiency of data packet delivery vs. network size 
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frequently; therefore more authentications are needed. 
Figure 8.13 plots the number of route discovery packets throughout the simulation 
period with information captured at 50 sec and interval. It can be seen that the number 
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of route discovery packets needed to find a path is much higher in SEHARP than in 
EHARP. This is because SEHARP need secure path  packet. 
 
 
Figure 8.13: Route discovery vs. mobility (elapsed time) 
The impact of node speeds on the number of route discovery packets for our scheme is 
shown in Figure 8.14, which plots route discovery against speed of node movement. As 
speed increases, the number of route discovery packets generated by SEHARP and 
HARP increases due to the higher speed of nodes in the network requires more packets 
to cope with network topology changes and route break recovery. Significantly more 
route discovery packets are generated in SEHARP than in EHARP due to with increase 
speed of nodes the routes need more authentication packet.  
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Figure 8.14: Route discovery vs. speed 
The scalability of mobile ad hoc networks with the number of nodes is shown in Figure 
8.15, which plots the number of route discovery packets against the number of mobile 
nodes. As the number of nodes is increased, the number of route discovery packets 
generated by SEHARP is higher than for EHARP, because the source and destination 
were not close together; thus the number of intermediate would be the maximum with 
maximum number of authentication packet    . 
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Figure 8.15: Route discovery vs. network size 
 
8.3.3 Average end-to-end Delay  
In Figures 8.16, 8.17 and 8.18 show that in general a secure path which uses 
authentication causes more overhead in the SEHARP scheme. Authentication increases 
the route discovery latency and causes more data packets to queue up. As a result, we 
see that the average end-to-end delay under SEHARP is greater than for EHARP. It 
should be noted that this increase in delay is a worst-case scenario for SEHARP and 
that it occurs when there are no malicious nodes. The delay under EHARP can be much 
higher in the presence of attacks. The values shown are the average delays for all data 
packets. The only ones which increase are for data packets waiting for route discovery, 
whereas delays for all other data packets are unaffected. Therefore, the increase in the 
end-to-end delay is fairly low. 
A comparison of SEHARP with EHARP in terms of the average end-to-end delay of 
transferred data packets against mobility for elapsed times, node speeds and numbers of 
mobile nodes is made in Figures 8.16, 8.17 and 8.18. It can be seen that under SEHARP 
the average delay is greater than for EHARP. This is because SEHARP need  secure 
path to forwarding the route request packets to a few selected nodes which have the 
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strongest stability links. Therefore, additional delays will occur during the establishment 
of the path to the destination. When the speed of mobile nodes is increased, the average 
end-to-end delay in SEHARP greater than EHARP, as shown in Figure 8.18, because 
there is a higher probability of link breaks due to it needs more authentications.  
  
Figure 8.16: Average end-to-end delay vs. mobility (pause time) 
 
In terms of the scalability of the network by increasing the number of nodes, EHARP 
performs better than SEHARP, because it selects the only nodes have the secure path 
with strongest link as the next hop towards the destination. 
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Figure 8.17: Average end-to-end delay vs. speed 
 
 
Figure 8.18: Average end-to-end delay vs. network size 
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8.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a comparative analysis of the proposed routing algorithms, 
EHARP and SEHARP, against the HARP routing protocols, which were evaluated 
using the most popular network simulator among ad hoc researchers, NS-2. The results 
show that EHARP clearly offers a significant reduction in the cost of route discovery 
packets (overhead) in comparison with HARP and that this scheme is less affected by 
mobility, speed and number of nodes than HARP in terms of the efficiency of data 
packet delivery  
It was noticed, however, that the increased average end-to-end delay under EHARP put 
it at a disadvantage compared to HARP. In spite of this limitation, in many applications, 
finding the path that lasts longest with reduced overhead and collisions and with an 
acceptable level of delay is crucially important; furthermore, this acceptable delay is 
application dependant.  
In terms of route discovery, at elapsed times, EHARP was found to perform better than 
HARP, while at longer elapsed time, EHARP performed better than HARP. EHARP 
was found to perform better in route discovery against speed than either HARP.   
In analyzing the ERDP, in terms of pause time, EHARP was found to perform better 
than HARP, as it did in route discovery with respect to the number of nodes. 
The second set of quantitative analyses compared the performance of the proposed 
security protocol, SEHARP, with EHARP, using the same evaluation metrics. The 
algorithm performed well in scenarios where mobility, speed and network size were 
varied. The simulation results show that SEHARP functions very similarly to the 
EHARP protocol and better than HARP. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Objectives: to present 
 Summary 
 Contributions  
 Future work 
 
9.1 Summary 
Rapid advances in the technology of wireless communication systems and small, lightweight, 
portable devices have had significant effects in the field of mobile ad hoc wireless networks. 
Designing communication protocols and applications for such networks is very challenging due 
to the absence of fixed infrastructure, the inevitable mobility and constrained bandwidth. It is 
crucial in ad hoc wireless networks to deliver data packets effectively, minimise connection 
breakdown and control packet overhead, while ensuring that a route remains connected for the 
longest possible period. The mobility of the nodes of these networks presents the most difficult 
challenge to routing protocol designers, because it causes frequent topology changes and route 
invalidation, which increase the signaling overhead required to establish routes, thus affecting 
the performance of the routing protocols. Therefore, these protocols must construct and 
maintain multichip routes in dynamic networks effectively and efficiently. However, this need 
brings with it new security vulnerabilities that are specific to the ad hoc environment. Limited 
battery life and computational power and the lack of fixed infrastructure make the design and 
implementation of a security scheme very challenging.  
While the routing protocols proposed for mobile ad hoc wireless networks seem to meet rather 
well the basic requirements, such as dynamically changing network topologies, security issues 
have generally been ignored. These protocols must be secure from the viewpoint of 
authentication, integrity and privacy, requirements which can be at least partially met by using 
strong secure path and encryption mechanisms, digital signatures and hashing. Moreover, the 
means of protection can be optimized for every protocol based on the approach taken to routing. 
Some ad hoc wireless network routing protocols have been developed in response to security 
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needs, but such an approach is not totally adequate, due to the problems of replay etc, as 
discussed in the earlier chapters. 
Secure routing is a central aspect of security in ad hoc wireless networks. Solutions to the 
problem of public secure routing protocols have been presented in chapter 2and 3. Some of 
these, such as the SAODV and SEAD schemes, rely on adapting the hash function in order to 
provide secure, available key management services. Most of these solutions are based on 
enhancements to existing routing protocol. They are quite elegant and potentially offer a good 
measure of security and availability, but they still have many drawbacks and may not be 
applicable to most commercial WMANET environments for various reasons, such as the high 
maintenance overhead. 
Solutions to routing protocol security problems in general and to key management and secure 
path provision in particular should be built upon a strong foundation. This means constructing a 
specialised reference paradigm for routing protocol security that helps in modelling it, 
addressing security challenges, defining security attacks and security requirements and 
describing principles and plans to achieve all the objectives of these security requirements, then 
proposing security mechanisms to enforce the implementation of these objectives. This 
methodology was followed in chapters 4-8. 
Chapter 4 establishes the EHARP model for ad hoc networks. It starts by defining the system 
model and listing the assumptions adopted in developing the new algorithm. It then describes 
the general network model, the mobility model, the traffic model and the general system model, 
including the format of all types of messages used in these algorithms. Chapter 5 presents the 
design and development of the proposed EHARP protocol, including the evaluation and 
simulation results based on the NS-2 network simulator package. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the proposed SEHARP secure protocol and proposes a novel security 
mechanism for secure routing in ad hoc wireless networks. It also presents the validation and 
simulation results based on the NS-2 package.   
Chapter 7 proposes a novel approach to security of access in hostile environments based on the 
history of the network nodes. It also proposes an access activity diagram and code which 
explain the steps taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure environment. This 
is a comprehensive solution, providing a high level of security for ad hoc environments that is 
available, scalable, flexible, reliable and efficient. The approach is evaluated by means of a 
military case study. 
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Chapter 8 presents a comparative analysis of EHARP by comparing its performance with that of 
the HARP and AODV routing protocols. There is also a comparative analysis of EHARP and 
SEHARP; the same evaluation metrics used for evaluating these two protocols are used to 
compare them. 
9.2 Contributions  
The main contributions of this work to the existing literature on the subject are the definition of 
the architecture for the EHARP routing protocol and the new secure routing protocol 
(SEHARP) for ad hoc wireless networks. Both EHARP and SEHARP are unique in the respect 
that no comparable proposals have been made. In addition, the secure environment approach is 
applied to the problem of regulating access to a hostile environment in an ad hoc wireless 
network. The ad hoc environment assumption and the way it is used in defining these protocols 
is of itself a novelty. The contributions made by this study are detailed in the following sections. 
9.2.1 Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
The first contribution is the proposal of a new routing protocol, EHARP, where each node in the 
network is able to classify its neighbouring nodes according to their heading directions into four 
different zone-direction groups. The zone direction is reduced until the node can select the 
strongest and most stable link, so increasing availability in the network. 
Each node in the network has a counter for the stability of the links to its neighbouring nodes. 
This SL counter indicates which nodes are active in the network, thus improving the 
performance of the network and increasing the likelihood of selecting the best or optimal path. 
The SL counter has an initial value of zero, which is increased by 1 after every successful 
sending or receiving and reduced by 1 after every failure in sending or receiving. The strongest 
SL is based on the greatest value registered by the counter. 
This protocol is based on the time and the sending of an acknowledgement message in order to 
guarantee the selection of the path and link stability. The source node must resend the route 
request whenever a certain time elapses before receiving the error message, in order to make use 
of the full lifetime of the links. Each node will send an acknowledgement message after 
receiving an RREQ and forwarding it, so the acknowledgement message should provide 
information on which nodes have problems or have been unable to forward the RREQ. 
9.2.2 Secure Enhanced Heading-direction Angle Routing Protocol 
The second contribution is to propose a novel secure routing protocol for ad hoc wireless 
networks, SEHARP, designed to improve the security level, based on key management and a 
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secure node-to-node path, which protects data and satisfies our security requirements: the 
detection of malicious nodes, authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, availability, data 
integrity and a guarantee of secure correct route discovery. 
SEHARP works as a group and has three stages: 
1) Distribution of keys and certificate stage 
Our scheme adopts the network backbone node system because of its superiority in distributing 
keys and achieving integrity and non-repudiation. The system uses private and public keys. The 
former are used to sign certificates and the public key of all the nodes, while the latter is used to 
renew certificates that are issued by another NBBN.  
2) Secure path stage  
Our approach is to use a public-key algorithm to establish secure paths between nodes. The 
secure path stage requires all nodes to have an SP with other nodes before sending any route 
request packet. Any node receiving an RREQ from the source node or another node without an 
SP should discard the request. 
3) Secure routing protocol stage 
At this stage our approach uses a hybrid of security mechanisms to introduce SEHARP so that it 
satisfies the main security requirement and guarantees the discovery of a correct and secure 
route. The security mechanisms that the protocol uses are the hash function, digital signature 
and time synchronisation. 
The performance of these two protocols was tested in simulation and their communication costs 
were measured using the NS-2 simulator, which was suitable for the present purpose. The 
evaluation metrics used in this study were success ratio, delay, average number of retries and 
overhead. 
9.2.3 Secure Ad Hoc Environments 
The third contribution of the study is to propose a new approach to ensuring security of access 
in hostile environments based on the history of the nodes of a network. It also proposes an 
access activity diagram and code which explain the steps taken by a node while handling 
requests to access a secure environment.  
In an SE, some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other infrastructure-based wireless networks 
such as WLANs and cellular systems; therefore, each of the ad hoc nodes will belong to an 
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operation service provider. Other non-managed ad hoc wireless network nodes, which are not 
involved in any other wireless networks, will be managed by the OSP, in order for those 
undefined nodes or networks to be able to access our SE. 
 Security depends on access to the history of each unit, which is used to calculate the 
cooperative values of each node in the environment. The calculated cooperative values are then 
used by the relationship estimator to determine the status of the nodes. Every node should be 
capable of making its own security decisions based on cooperation with other peer nodes. The 
solution is a combination of the history of the nodes and operation certificates. Each node in an 
SE is uniquely identified by its public key. This solution protects against various vulnerability 
issues affecting wireless links such as active and passive attacks. It is scalable and does not 
depend on other nodes. The dynamic nature of networks and their membership does not affect 
the solution, since each node makes access decisions on its own and the use of cooperative 
algorithms is avoided.  
This approach has been evaluated by a military case study, where the performance of the access 
to hostile environments was evaluated using a formal description. In addition, a military case 
study in an unknown and unprotected environment is provided to show a real example of 
behaviour detection.  
9.2.4 Comparative Analysis  
The EHARP and SEHARP protocols were both evaluated using the NS-2 network simulator, 
testing the two proposed protocols in real network environments and measuring their 
communication costs using other evaluation metrics such as the data packet delivery ratio, the 
efficiency of data packet delivery, the average end-to-end-delay of data packets, the broken link 
rate and overheads.  
A quantitative analysis was then performed, comparing the performance of the EHARP and 
HARP protocols and that of SEHARP with EHARP. The same evaluation metrics used for 
evaluating the EHARP and SEHARP protocols were used for the comparisons. Both protocols 
performed well in different mobility, speed and network size scenarios. The simulation results 
show that exploiting the link stability of nodes in EHARP would allow routes to remain 
connected longer and overcome the effects of the flooding technique and overhead in the 
network. This is achieved by selective forwarding and elongating the lifetime of routes. There 
was also a reduction in the effect of flooding in terms of the number of routing discovery 
packets needed to deliver data packets with different mobility, speed of nodes and network size. 
Results also show that the ratio of the number of data packets delivered to their destinations to 
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the number of all packets generated in the networks is higher in EHARP than in the 
conventional AODV protocol, which is a result of choosing the longest path to the destination.  
The second set of quantitative analyses compared the performance of the proposed security 
protocol, SEHARP, with AODV and EHARP, using the same evaluation metrics. The protocol 
performed well in scenarios where mobility, speed and network size were varied. The delay and 
average number of dropped packets incurred by EHARP was lower than for SEHARP. In 
contrast, AODV was found to cause more overhead than SEHARP. 
The simulation results show that SEHARP functions very similarly to the EHARP protocol and 
better than AODV. 
9.3 Future Work 
The following list identifies areas of research which are worth pursuing.  
 EHARP: In order to improve the performance of the enhanced routing protocol based 
on link stability and time, as presented in chapter 5, there should be a detailed 
investigation of the choice of the number of zones into which a node‘s neighbours are 
grouped according to the stability of links between nodes in the network. A further step 
to enhance its performance would use outdoor locating devices (e.g., GPS) it is both 
technically and economically feasible for a mobile device to know its physical 
location.  
 
 SEHARP: The secure routing protocol based on secure paths presented in chapter 6 
guarantees a comprehensive security solution for ad hoc wireless network routing 
protocols. This thesis has presented the implementation of the protocol in three stages. 
There are therefore still other possible mechanisms by which to achieve the objectives 
of all security requirements, by combining these stages into one. An interesting 
observation is that the security architecture of the routing protocol has provided us with 
a clear line of defence.  
 
 Security mechanism enhancements: Security of access based on node history and 
operation certificates, as presented in chapter 7, guarantees a security solution for 
access to ad hoc wireless networks in hostile environments. Some enhancements that 
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could be made in the future to the security of access in hostile environments and its 
evaluation would be to provide a design for a routing protocol based on node history 
and supported by evaluation using NS-3, which has all the event components necessary 
to implement the history-of-nodes algorithm. An alternative would be to run an Ana 
Tempura simulation and then to conduct a comparative analysis of the NS-3 and Ana 
Tempura results. 
 Ad hoc wireless network challenges: There are interesting challenges facing ad hoc 
wireless networks, in addition to security, which are worth investigating in future work.  
These include:  
 The design of multicast routing protocols  
 The development of MAC layer protocols  
 Approaches to efficient load balancing  
 Provision of end-to-end quality of service   
 The design of power-efficient protocols  
 Cross-layer design for wireless networks  
 The development of a multipath routing approach  
 Pricing schemes in ad hoc networks. 
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